Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report
M23 Chief Executioner, Colonel Sultani Makenga marketing his trade
Rwandan Defense Forces, under the cover of Congolese rebels known as M23, have started their 2,000-mile long march to the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kinshasa.
According to our sources within Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF), the order to march on Kinshasa was given on June 30, 2012 in a final meeting between General Paul Kagame of Rwanda, ex-CNDP Commander General Laurent Nkunda and Rwandan top military leaders, including Defense Minister General James Kabarebe, Chief of Joint Military Staff General Charles Kayonga, and General Paul Kagame's intelligence and security adviser, General Jack Nziza. The march started on July 1, 2012 when the last unit of close to 3,000 Rwandan troops crossed the border into the DRC on the night of June 30th to reinforce 2,000 troops already supporting M23.
m23 Cadre waiting for orders from Rwanda
There's enough evidence by the Group of Experts Interim report on the Democratic Republic of Congo,
that proves how Rwanda and its Prodigal Son, Bosco Ntaganda aka The Terminator are ploting a new frenzy of criminality in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Throughout the Group's investigations, it has systematically gathered testimonies from former M23 combatants, M23 collaborators, ex-RDF officers, Congolese intelligence, FARDC commanders, and politicians which affirm the direct involvement in the support to M23 from senior levels of the Rwandan government.
a)General Jacques Nziza, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, supervises all military, financial, and logistic support as well as mobilization activities related to M23. He has recently been deployed to Ruhengeri and Gisenyi to coordinate M23 assistance and recruitment.
b)General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan Minister of Defense, with the support of his personal secretary Captain Celestin Senkoko, also is a central figure in recruitment and mobilizing political and military support to M23. Kabarebe has often been in direct contact with M23 members on the ground to coordinate military activities.
c)General Charles Kayonga, the RDF Chief of Staff manages the overall military support to M23. Kayonga is frequently in communication with Makenga and oversaw the transfer of Makenga's troops and weapons through Rwanda.
Paul Kagame and M23 Bandits full Report
Criminal Paul Kagame and Bosco Ntaganda's Crew
d) The military support on the ground has been channeled by General Emmanuel Ruvusha, RDF Division commander based in Gisenyi, as well as General Alexi Kagame, RDF Division commander based at Ruhengeri. Both facilitate recruitment of civilians and demobilized soldiers to M23 as well as coordinating RDF reinforcements in Runyoni with M23 commanders.
e)Colonel Jomba Gakumba, a native of North Kivu, who used to be an RDF instructor at the Rwandan Military Academy at Gako, was redeployed to Ruhengeri since the creation of M23, where he has been in charge of commanding locally military operations in support of M23.
M23 is using Rwandan territory and benefiting
directly from Rwanda Defence Forces facilitation
READ FULL UN REPORT OF EXPERTS
http://freeuganda.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/un-report-of-experts.pdf
Security Council
Distr.: General
15 November 2012
Original: English
12-59339 (E) 201112
*1259339*
Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the
Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in
accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011), I have the
honour to submit herewith the final report of the Group of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex).
In this connection, I would appreciate if the present letter, together with its
annex, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and
issued as a document of the Council.
(
Signed) Agshin Mehdiyev
Chair
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Annex
Letter dated 12 October 2012 from the Group of Experts
on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the
Chair of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo have the honour to transmit the final report of the Group, prepared in
pursuance of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011).
(
Signed) Steven Hege
(
Signed) Nelson Alusala
(
Signed) Ruben de Koning
(
Signed) Marie Plamadiala
(
Signed) Emilie Serralta
(
Signed) Steven Spittaels
Executive summary
The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains plagued by
dozens of foreign and national armed groups. Instability has increased
since the mutiny by former members of the Congrès national pour la
défense du peuple and the subsequent creation of the Mouvement du
23 mars (M23) earlier in 2012. The rebels expanded their control over
Rutshuru territory with extensive foreign support in July 2012 and have
recently taken advantage of an informal ceasefire to enhance alliances
and command proxy operations elsewhere.
The Government of Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo
by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating
recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed
forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms,
ammunition, intelligence and political advice. The de facto chain of
command of M23 includes Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and culminates with the
Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe. Following the
publication of the addendum to its interim report (S/2012/348/Add.1), the
Group met the Government of Rwanda and took into consideration its
written response. The Group has, however, found no substantive element
of its previous findings that it wishes to alter.
Senior officials of the Government of Uganda have also provided
support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcements in Congolese
territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning,
political advice and facilitation of external relations. Units of the
Ugandan People's Defence Forces and the Rwandan Defence Forces
jointly supported M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the
major towns of Rutshuru territory and the Congolese armed forces base
of Rumangabo. Both Governments have also cooperated to support the
creation and expansion of the political branch of M23 and have
consistently advocated on behalf of the rebels. M23 and its allies include
six sanctioned individuals, some of whom reside in or regularly travel to
Rwanda and Uganda.
Taking advantage of a lull in combat on the official front lines,
M23 has sought to build coalitions with other armed groups throughout
the Kivus and in Ituri and Kasai Occidental. Col. Sultani Makenga
emerged as the coordinator of the armed groups allied with M23. In
August and September, he ordered Raïa Mutomboki to carry out brutal
ethnically motivated attacks, burning more than 800 homes and killing
hundreds of civilians from Congolese Hutu communities in Masisi
territory, whose militias refused to ally themselves with M23.
The use and recruitment of child soldiers by armed groups, notably
by M23, has increased. In particular, several M23 commanders with
histories of child recruitment have overseen the enrolment and training of
hundreds of young boys and girls. Furthermore, some M23 commanders
have ordered the extrajudicial executions of dozens of recruits and
prisoners of war.
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The many attempts by M23 to forge a common front with ethnic
Hema and Lendu armed groups in Ituri and the Banyamulenge
community in South Kivu have encountered significant resistance. The
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has sought to
counter the efforts of M23 to expand its alliances by promoting
integration processes with armed groups, notably in Ituri and in Masisi
territory.
At historically low numbers, the Forces démocratiques de libération
du Rwanda (FDLR), although continuing to commit abuses against
civilians, have become further isolated from external support and are
focused on self-protection in the face of attacks by the Congolese armed
forces and M23 allies. Junior FDLR officers have sought to ally
themselves with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo against M23, while some criminal networks within the Congolese
armed forces continue to sell small amounts of ammunition to the rebels.
There is, however, no evidence of strategic cooperation between FDLR
and the Government.
Among Burundian rebel groups, the Forces nationales de libération
remain divided and reliant on local Congolese armed groups, while the
Front national pour la révolution au Burundi has now transformed itself
into the Front du peuple murundi and allied itself with M23 in South
Kivu. The Ugandan-led Allied Democratic Forces have expanded their
military capacity and cooperated with Al-Shabaab networks in East
Africa.
The Congolese armed forces continue to be plagued by criminal
networks generating revenue for senior officers through their control
over natural resources and contraband, including the trafficking of ivory
from armed groups. The land forces commander, Gen. Gabriel Amisi,
oversees a network distributing hunting ammunition for poachers and
armed groups, including Raïa Mutomboki. Disarmament and stockpile
management efforts have also been undermined by the increased demand
associated with the M23 rebellion as the market price for small arms has
risen fourfold.
The requirement of the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo for mineral exporters to exercise due diligence in accordance
with United Nations and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development guidelines has nearly halted all tin, tantalum and tungsten
exports from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, apart from
north Katanga where mineral tagging was introduced in 2011. Smuggling
into both Burundi and Rwanda is on the rise. The credibility of the
mineral tagging system in place in Rwanda is jeopardized by the
laundering of Congolese minerals because tags are routinely sold by
mining cooperatives. Several traders have contributed to financing M23
rebels using profits resulting from the smuggling of Congolese minerals
into Rwanda.
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While tin ore production has decreased in the Kivus, tantalum and
tungsten ore production has been resilient to international traceability
demands, given that those minerals are more easily smuggled. Rwandan
exports of tantalum and tungsten have experienced a corresponding
increase during 2012, while tin ore exports have decreased.
Overall price and production decreases have had negative
socioeconomic consequences in some mining zones. New commercial
opportunities have, however, been created as mining communities have
adapted to other economic sectors. Security has improved in most of the
major tin and tantalum mining areas, which has led to less conflict
financing and increased oversight and monitoring by civil authorities and
non-governmental organizations.
Armed groups, criminal networks within the Congolese armed
forces and miners easily shift to gold mines where due diligence
requirements have not affected trade. Nearly all gold from the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo is smuggled out of the country and
channelled through a few major traders in Kampala and Bujumbura who
ship out several tons per year, worth hundreds of millions of United
States dollars. In the United Arab Emirates, most Congolese gold is
smelted and sold to jewellers. The assets freeze imposed by the Security
Council has not limited the operations of the previous owner of the
sanctioned entity Machanga Ltd., who exports through other front
companies and transfers large sums of money to suppliers in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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I. Introduction
1. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2021 (2011), the Group
of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submits the present final report
in fulfilment of its obligation to report to the Council, through the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, before 19 October 2012. In its monitoring of the
arms embargo introduced by the Council in its resolution 1493 (2003), the Group's
primary role is to investigate and document evidence regarding the procurement of
military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, by armed groups active in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as their related financial networks
and involvement in the exploitation and trade of natural resources. The Group
adheres to a rigorous investigative methodology to ensure the greatest degree of
accuracy of its assertions and conclusions. A more complete overview of its mandate
and methodology can be found in annexes 1 and 2 to the present report. A list of
entities with which the Group officially met can be found in annex 77.
2. The Group submitted an interim report to the Committee on 18 May 2012
(S/2012/348) and, on 26 June 2012, an addendum thereto concerning violations of
the arms embargo and sanctions regime by the Government of Rwanda. The Group
provided the Committee with a detailed response (see annex 3 to the present report)
to the rebuttal by the Government of Rwanda of the addendum (see annex 4 to the
present report).
II. Congolese armed groups
A. Mouvement du 23 mars
3. Since the Group submitted the addendum to its interim report, the Mouvement
du 23 mars (M23) has continued to carry out military operations and expanded the
terrain that it controls in Rutshuru territory, shifting the front line to 30 km north of
the provincial capital, Goma. Composed of some 1,250 troops, mainly former
Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) soldiers who deserted from the
Congolese armed forces, M23 faces challenges in carrying out independent
operations and controlling newly gained positions owing to troop shortages.
4. Both Rwanda and individuals within the Government of Uganda have been
supporting M23. While Rwandan officials have coordinated the creation of the rebel
movement and its major military operations, the more subtle support of Ugandan
officials has allowed the political branch of the rebel group to operate from
Kampala and boost its external relations. The limited assistance provided by officers
within the Uganda People's Defence Forces to M23 has nevertheless been decisive
in its seizure of principal towns in Rutshuru.
5. Beginning in July 2012, a series of initiatives by the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region were launched to resolve the conflict in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this context, on 16 August, the Conference
mandated the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, to convey to M23 the
Conference's conclusion that the rebels must cease all offensive activities, leave the
border and withdraw to their initial positions (see annex 5 to the present report).
Nearly two months later, however, amid continuing efforts by the Conference, M23
S/2012/843
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7
has further consolidated its deployments and gained additional terrain with the help
of allied armed groups and continued support from the Rwandan and Ugandan
armed forces.
1. Support provided by the Government of Rwanda to M23
6. The Government of Rwanda has continued to support M23 and other armed
groups in all categories of arms embargo violations previously documented by the
Group. Rwandan officials have provided military support to M23 through permanent
troop reinforcements and clandestine support through special forces units of the
armed forces stationed alongside the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru for joint
operations. Officers of the Rwandan armed forces have also furnished the rebels
with weapons, facilitated the evacuation of casualties to Rwanda and shared
communication equipment with M23. Recruitment for M23 has continued in
Rwandan villages, former CNDP officers have joined the rebellion through
Rwandan territory and Front patriotique rwandais (RPF) members have collected
funds for the movement. Rwandan officials created the political branch and
government of M23 and provided political advice. M23 continues to be commanded
by Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, a sanctioned individual who operates under the orders and
guidance of Rwandan officials.
7. Various Southern African Development Community, European, Ugandan and
Burundian intelligence agents also confirmed the Group's findings concerning
Rwandan violations of the embargo.
(a) Military support provided to M23 by the Rwandan armed forces
(i) Troop support
8. Rwandan troops continue to operate within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in support of M23. Troop shortages notwithstanding, in July 2012, M23
carried out large-scale operations and expanded the area under its control in
Rutshuru. Officers of the Congolese armed forces, former officers of the Rwandan
armed forces and current and former M23 members attested to the deployment of
additional units of the Rwandan armed forces to reinforce all major rebel operations,
as well as to the permanent deployment of Rwandan troops alongside M23 to
consolidate control over acquired terrain. Border officials and former M23 soldiers
repeatedly witnessed the arrival of Rwandan troops into the Democratic Republic of
the Congo from Kinigi, the main Rwandan armed forces base in proximity to the
Congolese border currently supporting M23 operations, and other troop
deployments close to the Congolese border (see annex 6 to the present report).
Current and former M23 soldiers observed a regular presence of Rwandan troops
around the positions taken by Gen. Ntaganda and Col. Sultani Makenga, in addition
to other M23 deployments.
9. Nine local leaders who saw Rwandan soldiers marching together with M23
members stated that the Rwandan troops could be easily identified by their distinct
uniforms, equipment, patrolling style and accent when speaking in Kinyarwanda.
During the Group's visit to Kigali from 23 to 25 July 2012, the Minister of Defence
of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe, confirmed that Rwandan units could be easily
distinguished from M23 or other troops for all the above reasons.
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10. Two current and five demobilized Rwandan soldiers, ordered by their
commanders to join M23, confirmed the permanent presence of Rwandan forces in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 7 to the present report). They
stated that, although Rwandan units frequently rotated, soldiers of the 305th brigade
operating under the coordination of the Western Division commander,
Gen. Emmanuel Ruvusha, had supported M23 operations in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan armed forces,
Gen. Charles Kayonga, confirmed to the Group that in July 2012 the 305th brigade
had been deployed at Kinigi.
(ii) Support provided by Rwandan special forces to M23
11. Rwandan special forces deployed with the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru
have backed M23 operations. Following an agreement between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, two special forces units from the armed forces
of both countries, including Rwandan troops commanded by Lt Col. James Casius,
have conducted joint operations along the Rwandan border since 2011 (see
S/2011/738, para. 116, and annex 8 to the present report).
12. Former and current M23 officers, in addition to senior commanders of the
Congolese armed forces, told the Group that special forces platoons clandestinely
supported M23 attacks. Five local villagers stated that Rwandan special forces held
regular meetings with M23.
1 During a mission to the area, a member of the Group
witnessed how an M23 commander communicated by radio with Rwandan troops
for reinforcements.
13. Its reluctance to remove its special forces from rebel territory notwithstanding,
the Government of Rwanda withdrew 344 soldiers on 1 September 2012. Former
officers of the Rwandan armed forces, M23 members, armed group members and
officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo informed the
Group that some of those special forces returned immediately to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and further operated with M23.
(iii) Treatment of casualties at the Kanombe military hospital
14. The Rwandan armed forces have evacuated casualties to Rwanda. Two former
officers, a senior member of RPF and an ex-CNDP officer informed the Group that
the rebels transported most injured Rwandan soldiers fighting alongside M23 to the
Kanombe military hospital in Kigali. The Rwandan armed forces bury the deceased
in the Kanombe military cemetery. An M23 collaborator interviewed by the Group
visited the hospital after M23 operations had been conducted in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and confirmed the presence of dozens of wounded soldiers.
(iv) Communication between M23 and the Rwandan armed forces
15. Rwandan armed forces and M23 officers have harmonized their
communication equipment in order to coordinate operations. According to former
members of the Rwandan armed forces and RPF, in addition to M23 cadres, senior
__________________
1
Following a small attack on its vehicles by bandits within M23 territory, the Group sought a
security escort by an M23 commander, who called with his digital radio for reinforcements. The
Group proceeded to discover that the escort was led by Rwandan special forces who had come
from Kahunga.
officers of the Rwandan armed forces and M23 communicate through digital VHF
radio systems used by the Rwandan armed forces, which those forces shared with
M23 commanders. Operational radio communications at the junior level are
conducted through commercial radio sets that M23 officers used within the
Congolese armed forces and subsequently gave to officers of the Rwandan armed
forces. Commanders of the Congolese armed forces are capable of intercepting the
latter communications. Since it submitted the addendum to its interim report, the
Group has obtained new radio intercepts of communications between commanders
of the Rwandan armed forces and M23.
2
(v) Clandestine operations by the Rwandan armed forces and M23
16. The Group has documented a pattern of Rwandan armed forces and M23
intelligence activities on Congolese armed forces positions around the front-line
villages of Kibumba and Tongo, defending Goma and Masisi respectively. Since
M23 initiated its operations, the Congolese authorities have captured two Rwandan
soldiers and a demobilized Rwandan soldier in Kibumba (see annex 9 to the present
report). The Group interviewed five other individuals, including two former
Rwandan soldiers, an ex-Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)
combatant who had been recruited by M23, an ex-M23 soldier and a Rwandan
civilian who had been intercepted while gathering intelligence for M23 in Tongo
(see annex 10 to the present report).
17. A series of targeted assassinations and grenade attacks took place in Goma in
the first week of October 2012. M23 commanders told the Group that they would
need to take Goma in order to secure the population. According to Government
investigators, former Rwandan armed forces officers and community leaders,
however, individuals from Gisenyi carried out the attacks with grenades routinely
used by the Rwandan armed forces, under the orders of Rwandan armed forces
officers and M23 members operating from Rwanda (see annex 11 to the present
report). Congolese armed forces logistics officers stated that such grenades were not
registered in their stocks. Following investigations into the attacks, the Congolese
police arrested several individuals operating from Gisenyi, in addition to a former
FDLR officer who the Rwandan armed forces had recruited to work within Rwandan
special forces in Rutshuru immediately after his demobilization (see annex 12 to the
present report). At the time of writing, investigations were continuing.
(vi) Arms supplies
18. The Rwandan armed forces continued to supply M23 with weapons and
ammunition. M23 officers and soldiers have witnessed deliveries every two weeks
by the Rwandan armed forces to the M23 headquarters in Runyoni since the outset
of the rebellion. Col. Makenga showed those officers the large amounts of weapons
and ammunition that the Rwandan armed forces had donated.
19. Several former M23 combatants witnessed increased deliveries of ammunition
from Rwanda before specific operations. Four former M23 soldiers described how
they had assisted in transporting boxes of ammunition from Rwandan armed forces
bases in Kinigi and Njerima in Rwanda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
__________________
2
The Group has placed these new radio intercepts in the United Nations archives for future
reference.
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Attacks on Bunagana and principal towns in Rutshuru
Rwandan armed forces commanders operated alongside M23 and
provided logistical support during the July 2012 operations that enabled
the capture of Bunagana, Rutshuru, Kiwanja and Rumangabo (see
annex 13 to the present report). Ugandan armed forces commanders also
supported those attacks. During the operation, the rebels killed a
peacekeeper from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in Bunagana and
fired on the MONUSCO base in Kiwanja (see annex 14 to the present
report).
M23 soldiers, Congolese armed forces officers, M23 supporters and
United Nations officials stated that, in addition to the Rwandan troops
permanently stationed with M23, the Rwandan armed forces deployed
more than 2,000 soldiers to seize Bunagana. According to several M23
soldiers, Rwandan armed forces commanders provided the rebels with
heavy weapons such as 12.7 mm machine guns and 60 mm, 91 mm and
120 mm mortars, in addition to anti-tank and anti-aircraft launchers
ahead of the attack. Rwandan special forces in Rutshuru also aided the
rebels and fired 13 rounds at a Congolese armed forces combat helicopter
during the takeover of Kiwanja.
According to former M23 officers and ex-Rwandan armed forces
officers, the Rwandan troops who participated in the attack were part of
both the 305th brigade and the ninety-ninth battalion. Lt Col. Kitoko
Kadida commanded those units under the coordination of Gen. Ruvusha
and the overall command of Gen. Kayonga. According to several former
M23 officers and soldiers, Gen. Kayonga was present at the M23
headquarters in Runyoni during the operation.
Current and former M23 officers, politicians and Congolese armed
forces officers confirmed that senior Rwandan and M23 officers jointly
planned the attacks. Before these operations, Gen. Ntaganda, Col. Makenga
and Col. Baudouin Ngaruye had travelled to Rwanda to meet
Gen. Kabarebe, Gen. Nziza and Gen. Kayonga in Kinigi. The same
sources told the Group that Col. Makenga had planned further details
with Gen. Ruvusha.
Subsequent to the fighting in Rutshuru, Congolese armed forces
officers and local leaders observed some 30 casualties on the battlefield,
most of whom wore Rwandan uniforms (see annex 15 to the present
report). M23 is the only armed group in all of the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo that wears Rwandan armed forces uniforms. The
Congolese armed forces recovered an AK-47 that had not been registered
within Congolese armed forces stockpiles, a 60 mm mortar round with an
elongated shell that did not correspond to mortars used by the Congolese
armed forces and a Rwandan driving licence (see annexes 16, 17 and 18
to the present report, respectively).
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(b) Recruitment for M23 in Rwanda
20. Recruitment within Rwanda by the Rwandan armed forces for M23 has
increased in the past months. The main targets for recruitment are demobilized
Rwandan soldiers and civilians, in addition to Congolese refugees. The Rwandan
armed forces are continuing to forcefully recruit ex-FDLR combatants from the
Mutobo demobilization camp (see para. 157). On the basis of numbers provided by
dozens of former M23 soldiers who had escaped from M23 training camps, the
Group estimates that since its creation M23 has trained at least 800 new soldiers.
21. Since the submission of the addendum to its interim report, the Group has
interviewed an additional 48 former M23 combatants, 26 of whom are of Rwandan
nationality.
3 Since the creation of M23, more than 50 Rwandan nationals from M23
have surrendered to MONUSCO, but the Government has refused their repatriation
on the grounds that their nationality has yet to be established.
22. Before being sent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, most recruits
continued to transit through Gen. Ntaganda's Hotel Bushokoro in Kinigi, Rwanda.
During its visit to Bushokoro on 21 August 2012, the Group confirmed that the
premises of the hotel, surrounded by a protection unit of the Rwandan armed forces,
corresponded to the descriptions that former M23 soldiers had provided (see
annex 19 to the present report).
23. From Kinigi, Rwandan troops escort recruits through the Virunga National
Park to Runyoni. Former M23 soldiers stated that, before reaching the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Rwandan armed forces officers had told them that they
would be fighting for Gen. Ntaganda to take control of North Kivu, confiscated their
telephones, burned their identity cards and instructed them to claim to be Congolese
in the event of capture. According to the same sources, recruits who flee to Rwanda
are brought back to M23 by Rwandan soldiers, at which point most are executed,
detained or tortured.
24. M23 members, former Rwandan armed forces officers and politicians told the
Group that Gen. Kabarebe was ultimately responsible for all M23 recruitment and
that he ordered loyal Rwandan armed forces officers to facilitate recruitment
operations within Rwanda.
25. Politicians, local leaders and former M23 soldiers informed the Group that
M23 had established four training camps and had completed a second wave of
training of separate groups of between 100 and 250 soldiers. The trainers, including
Rwandan officers, brief recruits on the failures of the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and explain their objective of liberating the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
26. Former M23 officers and soldiers told the Group that newly trained soldiers
were immediately sent to the front lines to provide cover for M23 units. Owing to
their lack of experience, almost half of the then new inductees were killed during
combat operations in Bunagana, Rutshuru and Rumangabo in July 2012.
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3
The Group has now interviewed a total of 52 Rwandan nationals who have deserted from M23.
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(c) Facilitation by the Rwandan armed forces of desertions to M23
27. Since the Group submitted the addendum to its interim report, former CNDP
officers and troops have continued to join M23. Several former CNDP officers and
current Congolese armed forces officers said that Gen. Kabarebe or his assistant,
Capt. Celestin Senkoko, had ordered them to desert. According to current and
former M23 combatants and immigration officials, most officers who joined M23
did so using Rwandan territory. They stated that the deserters usually crossed the
border at Goma and travelled to Ruhengeri, where Rwandan troops escorted them
through the Virunga National Park to Runyoni.
(d) Support for M23 political activities
28. Rwandan officials nominated the political leadership and government of M23.
According to former Rwandan armed forces officers, M23 supporters and
politicians, at the beginning of July 2012, Gen. Kabarebe imposed Jean-Marie
Runiga Lugerero, a bishop, as the political coordinator of M23 (see annex 20 to the
present report). Mr. Runiga, the former CNDP party representative in Kinshasa,
travelled to Kigali before taking up his new post with the rebels. The same sources
stated that Gen. Kabarebe had also unilaterally appointed the members of the M23
government named on 17 August 2012 (see annex 21 to the present report). During a
visit by the Group to Bunagana on the day of the declaration, several M23 members
were unaware that they had been nominated to a cabinet position.
29. According to M23 members, collaborators and politicians, while regional
initiatives by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to resolve the
conflict began in August 2012, Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza advised the rebels on
how to update former CNDP demands to the current political context.
4
(e) M23 fundraising in Rwanda
30. RPF members have been recruiting sympathizers and raising funds for M23
from within Rwanda. Politicians, former Rwandan armed forces and CNDP officers
told the Group that Rwigamba Balinda, a Rwandan senator and Rector of the Free
University of Kigali, and John Rucyahana, a bishop (see S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 29),
both RPF members, had overseen those activities in Rwanda and abroad. The same
sources informed the Group that senior Rwandan armed forces officers and RPF
officials diverted a portion of the financial contributions collected on behalf of M23
for their own benefit.
(f) M23 chain of command in Kigali
31. Former M23 officers and soldiers stated that Gen. Ntaganda continued to serve
as the highest commander of the rebels on the ground, while Col. Makenga was
responsible for operations and coordination with allied armed groups. Rwandan
armed forces officers and current and former M23 members also stated that the
former CNDP leader, Gen. Laurent Nkunda,
5 a sanctioned individual, provided
advice to M23 commanders and recruited for M23 in Rwanda.
__________________
4
Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza instructed M23 to return to the demands that it made during the
peace process with the Government in 2008 and to add further elements that related to
governance and development.
5
Laurent Nkunda was designated for sanctions in 2007 while he was the leader of CNDP. See
S/2012/348/Add.1, paras. 27, 31 and 34.
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13
32. Rwandan officials exercise overall command and strategic planning for M23.
Politicians, current and former M23 members, Congolese armed forces officers and
former Rwandan armed forces officers all confirmed that Gen. Ntaganda and
Col. Makenga received direct military orders from the Chief of Staff of the
Rwandan armed forces, Gen. Kayonga, who in turn acted on instructions from the
Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. Kabarebe (see annex 22 to the present report).
The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Gen. Jacques Nziza, provides
strategic advice and oversees the provision of logistical support to M23.
Gen. Kabarebe and Gen. Nziza have also played an instrumental role in sustaining
the political activities of M23. According to former Rwandan armed forces officers,
current M23 members and former M23 officers, Gen. Ruvusha manages the
provision of military ground support to M23.
33. Several current and former M23 officers also stated that senior Rwandan
officials travelled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to hold meetings with
M23 commanders. Gen. Kayonga has been at least three times to Runyoni to plan
operations and reassure the rebels of the full support of the Government of Rwanda.
(g) Support for sanctioned individuals
34. Gen. Ntaganda continues to be based near Runyoni (see annex 23 to the
present report), just a few kilometres away from the Rwandan border, and regularly
travels to Rwanda, violating the travel ban. M23 officers loyal to Gen. Nkunda
stated that they agreed to operate with Rwandan support only after reassurances
from senior officials of the Government of Rwanda that the former CNDP leader
would be freed and allowed to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. M23
officers said that, in violation of his travel ban, Gen. Nkunda had visited M23 in
Runyoni to encourage his officers.
2. Support provided by the Government of Uganda to M23
35. While lower in intensity than the involvement of the Government of Rwanda,
networks within the Government of Uganda have also supported M23 by facilitating
the political and military activities of M23 members while permanently present in
Kampala and by providing technical assistance, political advice and military
support. Ugandan armed forces commanders sent troops and weapons to reinforce
specific M23 operations and assisted in M23 recruitment and weapons procurement
efforts in Uganda. Ugandan officials equally endorsed a laissez-faire policy, by
which local military and civil authorities were authorized to cooperate with M23
because of their personal ties to the Rwandan armed forces or the rebels. Senior
Ugandan armed forces commanders have also cooperated with Gen. Ntaganda and
allowed him to visit and acquire a residence in Kampala, in violation of the travel
ban and assets freeze. In an official communication with the Committee, lawyers
hired by the Government of Rwanda have also cited support for M23 from Ugandan
territory (see annex 24 to the present report).
(a) Military support provided by the Ugandan armed forces to M23
(i) Troop support
36. Members of the Ugandan armed forces have actively supported M23 in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, alongside their Rwandan counterparts. During
its field missions to Rutshuru, the Group confirmed this with three Ugandan
S/2012/843
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intelligence officers, three Kampala-based diplomats and Ugandan and Congolese
authorities and community leaders.
37. Three officials of the Government of Uganda, a Ugandan local leader and M23
cadres told the Group that, in July, the Ugandan armed forces had assembled troops
from the Western Division headquarters in Mbarara and from Kisoro and sent them
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo using deployments near the border. To
facilitate Ugandan troop support, M23 placed agents at the Bunagana and Kitagoma
border posts. During its visit to Kitagoma in August 2012, the Group observed M23
controls on the Congolese side and no officials present on the Ugandan side (see
annex 25 to the present report).
6
38. Local Congolese armed forces commanders and current and former M23
officers informed the Group that, in July 2012, the Ugandan armed forces had
deployed a unit of some 600 soldiers of the Ugandan armed forces were present in
Busanza, Democratic Republic of the Congo, to prepare the rebel attacks in
Rutshuru territory. These same sources stated that the Ugandan soldiers had
reinforced Rwandan troops already present and formed what they termed a "mixed
brigade", which outnumbered the M23 troops. During that period, a former M23
soldier overheard a conversation between Ugandan armed forces and M23
commanders, using a commercial radio, during which they discussed the need to
"decentralize the Kivus". The Group obtained a copy of radio intercepts in which
Ugandan officers communicated with Rwandan and M23 officers during joint
military operations, speaking with a Swahili accent described by several interpreters
as being commonly used within the Ugandan military in addition to using some
expressions in Kiganda (see annex 26 to the present report).
7
39. Former M23 soldiers, local authorities and villagers were able to easily
distinguish the Ugandan troops because they wore Ugandan armed forces uniforms
and had distinct boots and military equipment. While the Ugandan troops spoke in
English, Kiganda, Kinyankole or Swahili, Rwandan troops spoke in Kinyarwanda
and M23 troops in a mix of Kinyarwanda and Swahili.
40. M23 cadres said that Ugandan armed forces officers introduced themselves as
Ugandans. A local leader told the Group that a Ugandan armed forces officer had
addressed the population in Kifumbira, a language spoken in south-western
Uganda.
8 Medical personnel stated that another Ugandan armed forces officer
unable to speak the local languages requested medicines from Rutshuru hospital in
English.
41. The Group interviewed a Ugandan soldier arrested in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. He said that, after completing military training in Masaka, Uganda,
his commanders had sent him to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
alongside three groups of 75 experienced Ugandan soldiers and other trainees. Two
former M23 soldiers who fought together with the Ugandan armed forces stated that
some of those soldiers were experienced, while the others had recently completed
basic training. The Group twice interviewed another Ugandan national captured by
__________________
6
The Government of Uganda informed the Group in writing that M23 had a military position at
Kitagoma.
7
The Group has placed these tapes in the United Nations archives.
8
Kifumbira is a language that is very similar to Kinyarwanda and is spoken in Rwanda and the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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15
the Congolese armed forces in Rutshuru territory, who refused to reveal more than
his name and Ugandan armed forces membership.
9
42. Following the large-scale operations in July 2012, a border official, two
Congolese local leaders residing in Uganda and former M23 soldiers told the Group
that the Ugandan armed forces and M23 had evacuated casualties to Uganda and
transported them to the military hospital in Mbarara. The Group interviewed a
former M23 officer and a civilian who had been tasked with evacuating the dead and
injured across the border with a Ugandan armed forces escort.
(ii) Arms supplies
43. M23 has procured weapons and ammunition from Ugandan armed forces
commanders. Col. Makenga had already begun purchasing weapons from support
networks in Uganda before his desertion from the Congolese armed forces (see
annex 27 to the present report). The Group gathered many accounts of weapons
deliveries to M23 from within Uganda, in particular ahead of attacks in Rutshuru,
including the following:
(a) Former M23 soldiers stated that Ugandan armed forces officers based in
Kisoro had been supplying M23 with small quantities of weapons. One said that he
had accompanied Col. Makenga to Kisoro on three occasions at the beginning of
July 2012 and witnessed how Col. Makenga had procured weapons from Ugandan
armed forces officers. On each occasion they had returned with 12.7 mm machine
guns that they had received free of charge;
(b) A former M23 soldier stated that Ugandan armed forces commanders had
brought heavy weapons, including 12.7 mm machine guns, to the hill overlooking
Bunagana, on the Ugandan side of the border, in order to reinforce M23 during the
attack and subsequently left them with the rebels after they had taken the town.
10 A
former M23 officer told the Group that during the attack he had received several
boxes of AK-47 and submachine gun ammunition from Ugandan soldiers stationed
on the same hill;
(c) Two former Rwandan armed forces officers, two Congolese armed forces
officers, an M23 cadre and a former M23 soldier stated that two trucks had
transported weapons and ammunition to Bunagana before the attacks on Rutshuru
and Kiwanja. According to a Congolese armed forces officer, the two trucks mainly
contained RPG-7 grenade launchers and machine guns;
(d) Two M23 cadres and a Kampala-based businessman told the Group that
Ugandan armed forces officers had met M23 representatives near the site of the
arms production plant at the Nakasongola military base
11 to discuss weapons stored
there. Ugandan armed forces officers had subsequently delivered the weapons and
ammunition, including mortars, to M23 in Bunagana, around 19 September 2012.
An M23 cadre, a Ugandan border official and an ex-Rwandan armed forces officer
stated that a truck had offloaded weapons in Bunagana during that same week.
__________________
9
The Ugandan national has also refused to state anything to the Congolese officers overseeing his
detention for more than two months.
10
These heavy weapons remained on the Ugandan side of the border until the rebels had dislodged
MONUSCO and the Congolese armed forces from Bunaganga, at which point Ugandan soldiers
provided them to M23.
11
The plant is operated by Luwero Industries.
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Attacks on principal towns in Rutshuru territory
M23, Rwandan and Ugandan troops operated together during the
July 2012 takeover of Rutshuru. Former Rwandan armed forces officers,
border officials, Congolese armed forces officers and former M23
soldiers stated that, during the night of 5 and 6 July 2012, while M23 and
Rwandan troops were engaged in combat in Bunagana, Ugandan troops
had shelled the border town from their deployment on the hill
overlooking the town and sent a unit of between 100 and 150 soldiers to
fight alongside M23 and Rwandan troops. MONUSCO peacekeepers
confirmed that the Congolese armed forces had been fired upon from
Uganda.
The Group interviewed separately 15 eyewitnesses to the events,
including Congolese and Ugandan border agents, Congolese armed
forces officers based at the border, villagers, refugees, a former Ugandan
armed forces soldier and M23 soldiers, who all observed Ugandan troops
crossing into Bunagana in the middle of the attack by the Rwandan
armed forces and M23.
Additional Ugandan troops crossed into the Democratic Republic
of the Congo through three distinct locations during the two days prior to
the 24 and 25 July 2012 operations against Rutshuru and Kiwanja. Four
local leaders, two Ugandan officials, Congolese refugees in Uganda and
former M23 soldiers witnessed four trucks crossing into the Democratic
Republic of the Congo through Kitagoma to Busanza. Four other trucks
entered through Bunagana and transported Ugandan troops and weapons
to the front lines in Rutshuru town and Kalengera. Congolese armed
forces and M23 soldiers estimate that these trucks transported some 300
additional Ugandan troops.
First-hand witnesses from Busanza told the Group that the
Ugandan, Rwandan and M23 troops had forced some 30 young men to
transport ammunition to Rutshuru and Kiwanja and then to evacuate
the
dead and injured on the way back to Kabira. The Group interviewed two
civilians among the 30. Congolese armed forces officers, former M23
officers and local leaders saw the bodies of Ugandan soldiers after the
battle.
Subsequent to the attack, the Congolese armed forces recovered
several ammunition cartridges normally used by their Ugandan
counterparts (see annex 28 to the present report).
(b) Recruitment for M23 in Uganda
44. M23 cadres have been recruiting in Uganda with the support of the Ugandan
authorities. Ugandan officials, a Ugandan border agent, a Ugandan community
leader, current M23 members and collaborators, former M23 soldiers, former
Rwandan armed forces officers, former CNDP officers, armed group members based
in Kampala and a diplomatic source told the Group that those activities were
S/2012/843
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17
continuing in Mbarara, Kasese, Kampala and Kisoro, as well as in the refugee
camps of Kisoro and Nyakivale.
45. Four Ugandan officials, a Congolese armed forces officer based in Bunagana,
border agents and a former CNDP member told the Group that the Jomba locality
chief based in Bunagana, Vincent Mwambutsa, regularly travelled to Kisoro to
organize recruitment for and financial contributions to M23 with the Kisoro District
Chairperson, Milton Bazanye, his ally, Willbaforce Nkundizana, and local Ugandan
armed forces officers. On one occasion, a former M23 soldier confirmed that the
rebels had recruited 28 Ugandan civilians in Kisoro. A Ugandan official in Kisoro
personally witnessed the Ugandan armed forces taking recruits to the border.
46. M23 cadres and a rebel collaborator acknowledged that, in August 2012, M23
politicians Sendugu Hakizimana, alias "Museveni", and Déogratias Nzabirinda had
proceeded together with Ugandan officials to recruit at the Nyakivale refugee camp
in Uganda. Nine refugees interviewed by the Group in Nyakivale attested to
recruitment for M23 in the camp. Three active M23 cadres, in addition to the
Congolese authorities, informed the Group that, in July 2012, an M23 colonel,
Innocent Kaina, had travelled from Bunagana to Kasese, Uganda, to recruit with the
assistance of Ugandan armed forces officers.
47. Three former combatants who underwent training at the M23 camp in Runyoni
attested to the presence of Ugandan nationals among the trainees. They also stated
that, when recruits attempted to flee to Uganda, Ugandan armed forces returned
them to M23.
(c) M23 political activities in Kampala
48. M23 has developed its political branch out of Kampala. Politicians, M23
members and intelligence sources told the Group that the M23 delegation led by
Mr. Runiga travelled to Kampala on 29 July 2012, before the summit of the
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region held in Kampala on 7 and
8 August and before the Congolese authorities had authorized the Government of
Uganda to facilitate a review of the agreement of 23 March 2009 with CNDP.
According to the same sources, after consultations with Ugandan officials in
Kampala, M23 leaders finalized the movement's 21-point agenda initiated in Kigali,
ahead of anticipated negotiations (see annex 29 to the present report).
12
49. Since the beginning of the regional initiatives, many M23 members have
frequently travelled to Kampala and maintained a permanent presence in the capital.
As at September 2012, the rebel movement had also rented two houses in Kampala,
one of which the Group visited (see annex 30 to the present report).
50. While in Kampala, M23 cadres have been regularly meeting senior Ugandan
military and civil authorities. In particular, a Ugandan armed forces officer, a
Ugandan civil society member, several Ugandan politicians, intelligence agents,
diplomats and former Rwandan armed forces officers told the Group that M23 met
the military adviser to the President, Gen. Salim Saleh, and the Inspector General of
Police, Lt Gen. Kale Kayihura. Three M23 cadres and M23 collaborators
acknowledged that they had been engaging with those authorities on a weekly basis.
__________________
12
The Group obtained these 21 points from representatives of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, who had received them from Ugandan officials.
S/2012/843
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M23 leaders and Ugandan officials told the Group that the Ugandan armed forces
commanders provided the rebels with technical assistance and political advice,
carried out joint planning and coordinated military support. During the Group's
second official visit to Kampala, the Government denied that any M23 members had
ever been in Uganda, the public knowledge of their presence there notwithstanding.
(d) Coordination between M23 and the Ugandan armed forces
51. Two current M23 cadres, two former M23 officers, a Ugandan armed forces
officer, a Ugandan community leader, a former Rwandan armed forces officer,
several Kampala-based businessmen and a diplomat told the Group that
Gen. Ntaganda maintained strong connections with senior Ugandan armed forces
officers and directly coordinated the Ugandan military support provided to M23, in
addition to facilitating initial contact with the M23 political delegation. A former M23
officer based in the position held by Gen. Ntaganda attested to multiple telephone
conversations between Gen. Ntaganda and Ugandan armed forces officers.
52. A Ugandan armed forces officer, a Ugandan leader, an M23 cadre, politicians,
intelligence sources, a Kampala-based diplomat and several businessmen stated that
Gen. Saleh was principally responsible for the support provided from within the
Ugandan armed forces to M23.
53. At the local level, a Ugandan official, a local leader based in Uganda, a current
M23 cadre and three former M23 soldiers told the Group that, before M23
operations, Col. Makenga had travelled to Kisoro to meet Ugandan armed forces
officers. Four Ugandan officials and two Ugandan armed forces officers stated that
the commander of the 63rd battalion of the Ugandan armed forces, based in Kisoro,
Maj. Charles Mukasa, had been in charge of coordinating the provision of support to
M23 at the local level. A Ugandan civil society member, two M23 cadres and a
Ugandan counter-intelligence report also affirmed that the Western Division
commander of the Ugandan armed forces, Brig. Gen. Patrick Kankiriho, had
overseen the provision of military support to M23, which included providing orders
to Maj. Mukasa (see annex 31 to the present report).
54. Three Ugandan officials stated that, in May and July 2012, Gen. Kayihura had
held meetings with the rebels in Kisoro. According to a Ugandan official, a diplomat
in Kampala, a Western intelligence officer and an armed group member residing in
Uganda, Gen. Kayihura frequently sent his deputy, John Ngaruye Ndungutse, in
charge of counter-terrorism, to Kisoro to facilitate the provision of support to the
rebels.
(e) Support for sanctioned individuals
55. A Ugandan armed forces officer, intelligence agents and M23 cadres told the
Group that Gen. Ntaganda maintained long-standing ties with Ugandan armed forces
officers and intelligence agents. A Ugandan armed forces officer, a former Rwandan
armed forces officer, former and current M23 officers, three Kampala-based armed
group members and a Kampala-based diplomat told the Group that Gen. Ntaganda
had undertaken clandestine travel to Kampala in June 2012, in violation of the travel
ban. They also told the Group that he had purchased a house in Kampala for his
family, violating the assets freeze.
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19
B. Armed groups allied with M23
56. The respite in major combat operations on the Rutshuru front lines
notwithstanding, armed groups allied with M23 have conducted several attacks
against the Congolese armed forces and gained ground in Masisi, Walikale and
Uvira territories. Many of these attacks have included widespread violations of
international humanitarian law. M23 also attempted to create alliances sparking
instability in Ituri and the high plateau of South Kivu.
57. The leader of M23, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, acknowledged to the Group
that the movement was a broad coalition of armed groups, including Raïa
Mutomboki. Other M23 members stated that they had formed an ideological alliance
with Raïa Mutomboki. Gen. Kayonga told the Group during its visit to Kigali from
23 to 25 July 2012 that Raïa Mutomboki was a legitimate self-defence group
protecting itself from a weak central Government, in the same spirit as M23.
1. M23 attempts to expand to Masisi and Walikale through Raïa Mutomboki, the
Forces de défense congolaise and Nduma Defence of Congo
58. Raïa Mutomboki, the Forces de défense congolaise (FDC-Luanda) and Nduma
Defence of Congo (NDC)
13 have formed a common front in Masisi and Walikale
territories, operating under the orders of M23 commanders Gen. Ntaganda and
Col. Makenga, with the objective of facilitating further M23 expansion. The
instability caused by Raïa Mutomboki in Masisi prevented the Government forces
from reinforcing the front lines in Rutshuru against M23.
59. Early in 2012, before his defection from the Congolese armed forces,
Col. Makenga began supporting Raïa Mutomboki, originally established in
Shabunda territory in South Kivu. Soldiers close to Col. Makenga, an ex-CNDP
officer and intelligence sources told the Group that, before the beginning of the
April 2012 mutiny, Raïa Mutomboki members visited Col. Makenga in Bukavu,
where he supplied them with weapons and ammunition from his extensive private
stocks, in violation of the arms embargo. The same sources stated that six of the
soldiers led by Col. Makenga joined Raïa Mutomboki after M23 had been created.
60. Several community leaders have supported the expansion by Raïa Mutomboki
into Walikale and Masisi territories, as have Rwandan officials. According to
Congolese armed forces officers, local authorities and traditional leaders, Alexis
Kalinda and Raymond Muhombo have travelled frequently to Kigali, where they
have obtained funds to help to convince local chiefs to support the creation of Raïa
Mutomboki groups in their zones of influence. A local chief supporting Raïa
Mutomboki asked the Group for the contact information of Rwandan officials so
that he could negotiate his financial compensation directly. Two other armed group
members from South Kivu stated that, in July 2012, they met M23 representatives in
Gisenyi who described how they provided large amounts of weapons and
ammunition to Raïa Mutomboki.
61. Since May 2012, Raïa Mutomboki has established a presence in southern
Masisi, notably among the ethnic Tembo communities in the area of Remeka.
According to police and intelligence sources in Ngungu, the diversion of weapons and
__________________
13
NDC is led by sanctioned individual and Rwandan armed forces collaborator, Sheka Ntabo
Ntaberi. See S/2012/348/Add.1, paras. 36 and 52, and S/2012/348, paras. 60-63.
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ammunitions by Congolese armed forces commanders linked to Gen. Ntaganda has
been instrumental in the arming of Raïa Mutomboki. In Remeka, Lt Col. Musafiri
distributed weapons to Raïa Mutomboki in July 2012. First-hand witnesses told the
Group that, before joining M23, former CNDP Lt Col. Gakufe Japhet handed over
50 AK-47 rifles to the local chief of Ufamandu, to be given to Raïa Mutomboki.
62. Congolese armed forces officers and local leaders reported that, since his
desertion from the Congolese armed forces on 27 July 2012, former CNDP
Lt Col. Eric Badege had become the focal point of M23 in Masisi and commanded
joint operations with Raïa Mutomboki. Former CNDP Col. Makoma Semivumbi
Jacques, who had deserted from the Congolese armed forces in South Kivu in
August 2012, travelled to Masisi to also reinforce Raïa Mutomboki alongside
Lt Col. Badege.
63. A series of coordinated attacks carried out in August by Lt Col. Badege and Raïa
Mutomboki jointly with FDC and NDC enabled M23 to destabilize a considerable part
of Masisi territory. According to former combatants, Lt Col. Badege and Col. Makoma
acted under the orders of Col. Makenga when they orchestrated the attacks. Local
villagers who fled the offensives saw men under the command of Lt Col. Badege
jointly operating with Raïa Mutomboki units.
64. This cooperation with M23 has led to internal fissures within Raïa Mutomboki
in South Kivu, in the light of its original anti-Rwandophone ideology. Although he
had already sent them communications equipment and weapons, when leaders based
in South Kivu learned that Col. Albert Kahasha
14 was in fact a part of M23, they
halted their cooperation with him.
2. Force oecuménique pour la libération du Congo
65. The Force oecuménique pour la libération du Congo (FOLC) is an armed group
previously led by Mai Mai leader Bana Sultani Selly, alias "Kava wa Selly". In June
2012, FOLC forged an alliance with M23 in Beni territory with the backing of
parliamentarian Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi.
15 According to armed group members,
Congolese armed forces officers and local leaders, Maj. Hilaire Kombi deserted
from the Congolese armed forces in June 2012 and recovered dozens of weapons in
the residence of Mr. Nyamwisi in Beni before joining Mr. Selly in the Semliki
Valley. Weeks later, Lt Col. Jacques Tahanga Nyoro joined FOLC on instructions
from Mr. Nyamwisi in order to assume its political leadership. Mr. Nyamwisi has
also recruited ethnic Nande politicians for both FOLC and M23. On 3 August 2012,
a small FOLC unit attacked the border town of Kasindi in a failed attempt to recover
weapons.
66. Mr. Nyamwisi has travelled several times to Kigali to meet Rwandan officials
and has established a FOLC liaison officer in Gisenyi, Andy Patandjila. According
to several Congolese armed forces officers, Mr. Patandjila has been offering $1,000
to individuals to join the rebels. FOLC collaborators told the Group that both
__________________
14
Col. Kahasha was previously a part of Mudundu 40, an armed group based in South Kivu. After
entering the Congolese armed forces, he deserted in January 2012. See S/2012/348, paras. 106
and 126-128, and S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 43.
15
Mr. Nyamwisi was previously the head of the rebellion by the Rassemblement congolais pour la
démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération in northern North Kivu and subsequently held
several ministerial positions within the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
before joining the opposition prior to the elections of November 2011.
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21
Maj. Kombi and Lt Col. Nyoro also communicated regularly with Col. Makenga in
M23. The same sources and an M23 officer stated that Lt Col. Nyoro had travelled
twice to Rutshuru to coordinate operations with M23, most recently during the final
week of September 2012.
16
67. Mr. Nyamwisi, in addition to his own contributions, has received financial
support from several businessmen based in Beni and Butembo, including former
Congolese airline operator Mango Mat (see S/2008/43, para. 90). In return, he has
promised that the rebels will lower the taxes at the Kasindi border crossing to
Uganda.
68. Former CNDP leader and sanctioned individual Gen. Kakolele Bwambale
17
also supports FOLC operations with intelligence and advice from Beni. According to
M23 officers, intelligence officers and local leaders, Gen. Saleh of the Ugandan armed
forces unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile Mr. Nyamwisi and Gen. Bwambale in
order to establish a unified M23 command for Beni territory. Furthermore,
Lt Col. Nyoro and Maj. Kombi have repeatedly met Ugandan military and civilian
officials, including the Resident District Commissioner of Kasese, Lt Col. Muhindo
Mawa,
18 in pursuit of financial and military assistance.
3. M23 attempts to expand the rebellion to South Kivu
69. M23 and its backers have adopted a strategy to expand their rebellion to South
Kivu by supporting allied armed groups. According to several Banyamulenge
leaders, the Government of Rwanda has pressured their community to rebel against
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to open a new front
for M23. These same sources, Congolese armed forces officers and former
combatants stated that sanctioned individual Col. Jules Mutebutsi had actively
spearheaded those efforts in several confirmed meetings in the hopes of a military
return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
19 The same sources also stated that
the chief economist of the National Bank of Rwanda, Thomas Rusuhuzwa Kigabo,
20
and Agee Mugabe Shyaka
21 had carried out fundraising and recruitment efforts
among Banyamulenge living in Rwanda. Diplomats and ex-combatants confirmed
that the Government of Rwanda tasked Col. Mutebutsi, Mr. Kigabo and Mr. Agee
with instigating an armed rebellion in South Kivu. Most Banyamulenge leaders and
commanders in the Congolese armed forces, however, have refused and launched a
counter-campaign to halt those efforts.
4. Mouvement congolais pour le changement
70. In Uvira territory in South Kivu, M23 has established a strong alliance with
former Mai Mai commander and ex-CNDP officer "Col." Bede Rusagara, from the
Bafuliro community. "Col." Rusagara is the commander of the Mouvement
congolais pour le changement (MCC), an alliance composed of 250 fighters from
__________________
16
Lt Col. Nyoro and Maj. Kombi have recently sent troops to reinforce M23 in its attempts to
seize control of the strategic Ishasha axis in Rutshuru territory.
17
The Committee designated Gen. Kakolele in 2004 for arms trafficking.
18
Col. Mawa is a long-standing ally of Mbusa Nyamwisi. When FOLC attacked Kasindi, he was
present.
19
Col. Mutebutsi has been in Rwanda since 2004, following his brief takeover of Bukavu.
20
Mr. Kigabo was previously a senior administrator of the Free University of Kigali.
21
Mr. Agee recently denounced the Group's findings in an open letter.
S/2012/843
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several armed groups. While he denied to the Group that he worked with M23, he
declared that he shared the M23 objective of fighting the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
71. According to Congolese armed forces officers, after the arrest of
"Col." Rusagara on 4 February 2012, Col. Makenga and the tenth military region
Deputy Commander, Col. Baudoin Nakabaka,
22 intervened to help him escape on
5 April before the ex-CNDP mutinies that led to the creation of M23. In June, the
Group listened to a telephone conversation in which "Col." Rusagara stated that he
regularly spoke with Col. Makenga. A community leader stated that "Col." Rusagara
was also often in communication with Ephrem Bwishe, a worker in the M23
Department of Finance, Budget and Natural Resources. "Col." Rusagara stated that
two of his brigade commanders were "Lt Col." Janvier Muyoboke, a former member
of the Congolese armed forces who also regularly coordinated with Col. Makenga,
and his brother, "Col." Thomas Ndoli.
72. Several armed group members and collaborators told the Group that
Col. Nakabaka supported MCC. He facilitated the defection of "Col." Rusagara
from the Congolese armed forces in 2011, attempted to convince other officers to
join M23 and had coordinated, with Col. Makenga, operations to provide
ammunition to MCC and other potential M23 allies in South Kivu.
73. MCC has sought to recruit Banyamulenge since the beginning of the M23
rebellion. In July 2012, a Congolese armed forces deserter, Nkingi Muhima, himself
a member of the Banyamulenge community, joined MCC and became its
spokesperson. "Col." Rusagara told the Group that currently half of his commanders
were Banyamulenge. Although "Col." Rusagara denies recruiting outside the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Muhima told the Group that Banyamulenge
"from everywhere", including from refugee camps in Burundi and Uganda,
regularly came to join MCC.
74. Several MCC recruitment meetings were held in the Rwandan border town of
Kamembe at the end of August 2012. According to a participant at one such
meeting, MCC recruiter Maj. Eric Kimararungu, a former bodyguard of
Col. Mutebutsi, told the young people "to go to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to fight". Following those meetings, more than five new recruits, including at
least two Rwandan nationals, arrived from Rwanda on 1 September to join MCC.
Another Rwandan national guided the recruits into the Democratic Republic of the
Congo through Kamanyola along the border with Rwanda. Arrested on 2 September,
the same individual stated that M23 collaborators had financed the transport of those
recruits from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to text
messages on his telephone, he had received a transfer of some $100 from Kanyana
Immaculée, a close collaborator of Gen. Kabarebe according to Congolese armed
forces and ex-CNDP officers, on the day of his travel to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (see annex 32 to the present report). The same individual received calls
from Kanyana and "Col." Rusagara during the trip, after having received the latter's
telephone number from Kimararangu (see annex 33 to the present report). On
3 September, Kanyana also transferred $4,000 to a confirmed courier of
"Col." Rusagara in Uvira (see annex 34 to the present report).
__________________
22
Col. Nakabaka provided weapons and ammunition to Mai Mai Yakutumba in 2011 (see
S/2011/738, paras. 149, 154, 174 and 329). He supported the initial flight from Burundi of
Agathon Rwasa in 2010 (see S/2010/596).
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23
75. "Col." Rusagara stated to the Group that he was the leader of all armed groups
in the Uvira plateaux and the Ruzizi plain. Burundian armed groups have also allied
themselves with him. During a Congolese armed forces attack on the MCC
headquarters near Runingu on 6 September 2012, the Congolese armed forces
captured MCC officer Jeremy Rugombangabo after he was seriously injured. In a
video recorded before his death, Mr. Rugombangabo stated that, although
Mr. Muhima had recruited him, his commander was Col. Abdallah of the Burundian
group Front du peuple murundi/Alliance divine pour la nation (FPM/ADN) (see
paras. 114-115). He also said that MCC supplied food to FPM/ADN. A Mai Mai
collaborator and Congolese armed forces officers affirmed that Forces nationales de
libération (FNL) deserters had also joined MCC.
76. On 18 September 2012, MCC organized an attack on the Congolese armed
forces training camp in Luberizi to steal stored weapons and ammunition. According
to one of Mr. Bwishe's collaborators, Mr. Bwishe of M23 boasted about having
helped to plan the attack. The Congolese armed forces killed two of the
Banyamulenge troops led by "Col." Rusagara during the operation. Banyamulenge
leaders told the Group that one of them was until recently a student in Kigali.
5. Alliance pour la libération de l'est du Congo
77. In July 2012, a group of Banyamulenge from the diaspora established the
Alliance de libération de l'est du Congo (ALEC), an armed movement allied with
MCC and M23. Its statute proclaims that the movement's objective is to "create an
independent republic of the Kivu" (see annex 35 to the present report). Akim
Hakizimana Muhoza was the original president of ALEC until recently. Mr. Muhoza,
now based in Rwanda, had resided in Canada since 1996 before recently returning to
the Great Lakes region. The Group has obtained e-mail records demonstrating his
coordination of ALEC and financing of travel for military commanders (see annex 36
to the present report). Late in September 2012, the former Rassemblement congolais
pour la démocratie
23 vice-governor of South Kivu, Tommy Tambwe,24 who currently
lives in Rwanda, replaced Mr. Muhoza as president of ALEC. Mr. Muhoza has
become its vice-president.
78. According to arrested ALEC members, Mr. Muhoza has recruited young
Banyamulenge throughout the Great Lakes region, including from refugee camps in
Rwanda and Uganda. Statements made in this regard include the following:
(a) A former ALEC recruit stated that Jean-Marie Shaka, a key ALEC
recruiter in Uganda, gave him $100 and promised a further $500 upon his arrival in
South Kivu;
(b) An armed group representative in Kampala confirmed that M23
recruiters sent more than 40 young Banyamulenge and Bafuliro residing in Uganda
to join ALEC and MCC in South Kivu;
(c) Another arrested ALEC member said that a group of young
Banyamulenge from Uganda arrived in Uvira via Burundi at the end of August
2012. After an ALEC member had given them $350 for their transportation, the
recruits travelled to the village of Rubarati in Uvira territory;
__________________
23
A previous Government of Rwanda proxy group that became a Congolese political party.
24
Also previously the head of internal security for the Rassemblement congolais pour la
démocratie.
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(d) On 1 September 2012, Congolese troops conducted operations against an
ALEC unit in the village and killed a rebel. According to his identification card,
22-year-old Edouard Serugaba Bineza was a Rwandan national (see annex 37 to the
present report).
25
79. The Congolese armed forces have arrested several ALEC leaders, although
Mr. Muhoza and Mr. Tambwe have found protection in Rwanda. The Chief of Staff
of ALEC, Willy Kiyana Sebatware, detained on 23 August 2012, acknowledged to
the Group that Mr. Muhoza had paid for his flight to Burundi from the United States
of America and instructed him to join up with Mr. Muhima of MCC (see annex 38 to
the present report). Another ALEC member stated that he met an MCC officer,
Col. Bigaya, to discuss an operational partnership. Two ALEC members separately
told the Group that the leaders of the movement had held meetings with M23 liaison
officers on 2 September 2012 in Gisenyi, Rwanda.
80. ALEC has also sought to establish alliances with other armed groups in Fizi
territory. On 17 August 2012, Mr. Muhoza and the ALEC Secretary-General, Jules
Sebahizi, alias "Major", a Rwandan national who was formerly the Director of
Planning within the country's Ministry of Public Service and Labour (see annex 39
to the present report), held a meeting in the Mai Mai Mayele camp in Lusambo.
According to arrested ALEC members and pictures taken during the meeting,
Mayele and other representatives of armed groups, including those of Mai Mai
Yakutumba
26 and MCC, were present. ALEC members, including Mr. Muhoza and
Mr. Sebahizi, had previously discussed the purchase of weapons for Congolese
armed groups via e-mail (see annex 40 to the present report).
81. On 30 August 2012, Mr. Muhoza and Mr. Sebahizi invited Congolese armed
group representatives for a follow-up meeting in Kigali. According to text messages
obtained by the Group, Mr. Muhoza insisted on the location in Rwanda for security
purposes, following the arrest of Mr. Sebatware (see annex 42 to the present report).
6. M23 attempts to ally itself with militias in Ituri
82. In Ituri, M23 and the Government of Rwanda have persistently reached out to
armed groups to build a coalition, but have to date been unsuccessful. Popular
support for M23 is limited and the Congolese armed forces have thwarted the
expansion of newly created armed groups.
(a) Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri
83. The strongest rebel force in Ituri is the Forces de résistance patriotiques en
Ituri (FRPI) of "Brig. Gen." Justin Banaloki, alias "Cobra Matata". In its interim
report, the Group documented how FRPI had expanded its area of control owing to
the security void left by the Congolese armed forces regimentation process at the
end of February 2012 (see S/2012/348, paras. 51 and 52). Meanwhile, FRPI has
been reaching out to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
negotiate its demobilization and integration into the Congolese armed forces (see
__________________
25
The Group obtained e-mail exchanges illustrating that the family of Mr. Bineza in Kigali held
Mr. Muhoza and Mr. Sebahizi responsible for his recruitment and death.
26
While Yakutumba envoys visited Kigali several times and considered an alliance with M23,
pushback from the Babembe community has prevented them from forming such an alliance (see
S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 43).
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25
para. 117). According to militia members and Lendu community leaders, however,
"Brig. Gen." Banaloki has engaged simultaneously in negotiations with M23
regarding an alliance. The same sources informed the Group that:
(a) "Brig. Gen." Banaloki has been in regular telephone contact with
Gen. Ntaganda and Gen. Kabarebe of the Rwandan armed forces to discuss an
alliance with M23;
(b) A delegation of militia members, including an FRPI representative,
travelled to Kigali to meet Gen. Kabarebe. The delegation received a cash amount of
at least $15,000 (see S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 40). Local leaders and villagers
explained that angry militia members shot in the air when they did not receive a
share of the money;
(c) FRPI has been receiving several M23 envoys, including former CNDP
cadre and Ituri militiaman, John Tibasima,
27 to persuade the rebels to launch
military operations against the Congolese armed forces. Mr. Tibasima, who stayed
with FRPI as part of cooperation by the Coalition des groupes armés de l'Ituri
(COGAI) (see para. 85) until July 2012, brought with him dozens of former
militiamen,
28 who contributed arms and ammunition from caches. In August, M23
Lt Col. Papy Maky Rutsholi and Maj. John Bebwa engaged with FRPI regarding
collaboration with M23 after receiving a briefing in Kigali;
(d) In October 2012, "Brig. Gen." Banaloki granted safe passage to fighters
of the Mouvement de résistance populaire du Congo (MRPC) heading from Djugu
to Rutshuru to link up with M23 (see paras. 86-89).
84. FRPI controls the gold mining site of Bavi from where, according to an
ex-FRPI combatant and inhabitants of Bavi, the rebels generate profits through
illegal taxation and the direct sale of gold. According to traders in Bunia, gold from
Bavi is of superior quality in the region, which makes it easy to recognize. The main
buyers are traders from Bunia and Butembo. FRPI also sells gold directly to
Ugandan armed forces officers posted along the Congolese border. A regular client,
cited by Congolese armed forces, militia members and a Lendu community leader, is
a former Ugandan armed forces officer, Alex Mugisha. In exchange for gold, he has
delivered arms and munitions to FRPI at the Semliki border crossing.
29
(b) Coalition des groupes armés de l'Ituri
30
85. COGAI is an umbrella organization, created in May 2012, aiming to unite Ituri
militias. Although FRPI is officially a member of COGAI, and "Brig. Gen."
Banaloki is presented as its president, M23 members, local businessmen and former
militia members from the Hema community are the true driving forces behind
COGAI. Support has come from Nestor Bamaraki, John Tibasima and the president
of CNDP in Ituri, Mateso Savo. Mr. Bamaraki led the COGAI delegation travelling
__________________
27
John Tibasima is a lawyer who was a member of the Parti pour l'unité et la sauvegarde de
l'intégrité du Congo and the Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais militias. He remains close to
Chief Kawa of the Parti pour l'unité et la sauvegarde de l'intégrité du Congo.
28
Many of these former combatants had fought for Thomas Lubanga.
29
Mugisha left the Ugandan armed forces as a colonel in 2009.
30
During a press conference in New York on 25 June, Rwandan officials referred explicitly to the
Coalition des groupes armés de l'Ituri as a key potential threat to security in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
S/2012/843
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to Kigali to receive support (see S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 40). Mr. Savo is under
investigation after a September 2012 raid by the Congolese armed forces on his
family farm, where militia fighters had been harboured. COGAI has had a limited
impact owing to its inability to secure the complete loyalty of FRPI. It has also
failed to gain the support of the majority of the Hema community, which opposes
the idea of a new armed group allied with M23 and the Rwandan armed forces.
(c) Mouvement de résistance populaire au Congo
86. A second attempt to create a coalition of armed groups in Ituri was announced
in August 2012 with the creation of MRPC. Former ethnic Hema militia members
and both Tutsi and Hema Congolese armed forces deserters constitute most of
MRPC. Although MRPC did not replace or abolish COGAI, it clearly emerged as a
result of the failure of the latter to gain momentum. MRPC is divided, however. In
its terms of reference (see annex 43 to the present report), it explicitly opposes M23,
but members state that a wing maintains permanent contact with M23 and the
Rwandan armed forces. When its president, Eric Dhedongha, and chief of staff,
Jules Musafiri, were arrested, those in favour of an alliance with M23 split from the
others. The breakaway faction is led by Lt Col. Rutsholi. It includes other envoys of
the Government of Rwanda, such as John Tibasima and Maj. Bebwa, and
demobilized former members of the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC), such as
Charité Semire and a number of officers who have defected from the Congolese
armed forces, including Col. Eric Ndole Panya, Maj. Nonzi "Taekwondo"
Bondokana and Maj. Katanazi. MRPC affiliates explain that a small group of their
combatants left Irumu for Rutshuru early in October 2012, after meeting M23
Col. Kahasha in the vicinity of Boga. This group includes several Rwandan armed
forces liaison officers.
87. Ex-UPC combatants within and outside MRPC are under considerable pressure
from M23 to enter into an alliance. Several senior M23 commanders formerly held
command positions within UPC. Gen. Ntaganda, who was the chief of staff of UPC,
has recruited ex-combatants by telephone. He has also sent instructions to the group
led by Lt Col. Rutsholi group to recover a number of arms caches that he left in
Ituri, including at the farm of Thomas Savo. M23 members and a local organization
have explained to the Group that, in July 2012, M23 Col. Kaina, also a former UPC
commander, travelled to Berunda and Degho
31 in Djugu territory for mobilization
and recruitment activities.
88. Rwandan agents have contributed to these efforts. A Hema community leader,
a COGAI commander and local leaders told the Group that ex-UPC members
received calls from the secretary of Gen. Kabarebe, Capt. Senkoko, and from Rafiki
Saba Aimable, a former liaison officer between UPC and the Government of
Rwanda who both attempted to convince them to collaborate with M23.
89. The Congolese armed forces deserters within MRPC are remnants of two
previous attempted mutinies.
32 Congolese armed forces commanders identified
Lt Col. Germain Bahame, the second in command of the 911th regiment, based in
Marabo, as the main M23 collaborator in Ituri who lobbied several of his fellow
__________________
31
The headquarters of Gen. Ntaganda in UPC times.
32
Mr. Lumbala confirmed that he had signed the statement with the Burundian authorities, but
later claimed that the contents had been fabricated. Burundian intelligence sources stated that
the declaration by Mr. Lumbala was official.
S/2012/843
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27
officers to desert. Lt Col. Bahame admitted to the Group that he had been contacted
on several occasions by Gen. Ntaganda, Col. Makenga and Gen. Kabarebe, having
previously served under the last-mentioned. All three instructed several Congolese
armed forces officers with whom they had long-standing ties, to prepare an attack in
Ituri, promising material support. Congolese armed forces and intelligence sources
told the Group that Lt Col. Bahame provided weapons and ammunition to FRPI
when he was posted in Marabo.
7. M23 attempts to open a front in the western Democratic Republic of the Congo
90. M23 has also sought to open a front in the western Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Consequently, it has adopted a broader political platform, denouncing the
flaws in the 2011 electoral process and the lack of good governance by the
President, Joseph Kabila. This has enabled M23 leaders to reach out to the
Congolese opposition and to create new alliances. Three M23 members and
intelligence sources told the Group that M23 established contacts with the Union
pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS), whose representatives travelled to
Bunagana to meet the leader of M23, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero.
91. Intelligence officers, M23 members and politicians told the Group that
Rwandan officials had worked with Roger Lumbala, a Congolese parliamentarian
and opposition member allied with UDPS. M23 members and Congolese officials
told the Group that Mr. Lumbala travelled to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda several
times between June and August 2012 to meet the rebel leaders (see annex 44 to the
present report). After his arrest in Bujumbura on 1 September, he signed an official
statement to the Burundian police, in which he affirmed that Rwandan intelligence
agents had invited him to Kigali to convince him to join M23 (see annex 45 to the
present report and S/2012/348, box 3). During an interview with the Group, he later
claimed that he had never been in Uganda and went to Rwanda only to see a friend.
92. According to M23 leaders, the rebels had tasked Mr. Lumbala with supporting
Col. John Tshibangu, who had deserted from the Congolese armed forces with a
small group of soldiers on 13 August 2012 in Kasai Occidental Province.
Col. Tshibangu announced the creation of the armed group Mouvement pour la
revendication de la vérité des urnes and hoped to rally discontented supporters of
UDPS, who believed that opposition candidate Etienne Tshisekedi had in fact won
the presidential elections held in November 2011.
93. M23 officers acknowledged that they were allied to Col. Tshibangu. Soldiers
previously under the command of Col. Innocent Zimurinda of M23 had been
redeployed to Kananga at the outset of the mutiny.
33 Former CNDP officers told the
Group that several senior M23 commanders, including Gen. Ntaganda himself,
attempted to convince Rwandophone officers stationed in Kananga to join
Col. Tshibangu. Additional information on M23 and its support networks can be
found in annex 46 to the present report.
__________________
33
In January 2009, FDLR comprised more than 7,000 soldiers and officers. The Government of
Rwanda contends that there are more than 4,000 FDLR fighters.
S/2012/843
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III. Foreign armed groups
A. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
94. FDLR is currently seeking to readapt its military capacity following the drying
up of external support and in the aftermath of a succession of attacks on its positions
and civilian dependents. Since April 2012, in the light of significant troop shortages,
FDLR has consolidated its units into two sectors. Col. Pacifique Ntawunguka, alias
"Omega", remains the commander of North Kivu and Lieutenant Col. Hamada
Habimana has assumed the command of South Kivu. Each of the six FDLR
subsectors is constituted of between 250 and 400 soldiers. The Group estimates that
the rebels now number between 1,500 and 2,000 (see S/2011/738, paras. 93 and 94).
While limited recruitment efforts continue in Uganda, Rwandan refugee populations
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo no longer have sufficient young people to
reinforce rebel ranks, according to ex-combatants.
95. Following a wave of targeted attacks by Raïa Mutomboki, the immediate
concern of FDLR commanders has become the protection of their dependents. After
initially launching brutal retaliatory attacks, FDLR in South Kivu has returned to
Mwenga territory to distance itself from the threat of Raïa Mutomboki in Shabunda
and Kalehe. In North Kivu, according to ex-combatants, FDLR has been forced to
withdraw from its traditional headquarters near Kimua in Walikale and move deeper
into the forest. The same sources stated that even senior commanders had begun to
consider leaving the Kivus for the security of Maniema or Orientale Province.
96. Four FDLR subsectors have been strategically deployed in zones in which they
can participate and control local commercial markets linked to mineral production.
Ex-combatants have stated that, in the high plateau of Uvira territory, FDLR profits
from the trade in wolframite via Bujumbura. Furthermore, it continues to benefit
from the production and taxation of cannabis in North Kivu (see S/2012/348/Add.1,
para. 43). According to former combatants, it still obtains most of its AK-47
ammunition from corrupt Congolese armed forces officers in exchange for cannabis
or the profits from commercial activities in mining zones. Owing to the
Government's focus on M23 in Rutshuru territory, FDLR has expanded control over
commercial zones in southern Lubero. Currently, FDLR is deployed alongside
Union des patriots congolais pour la paix forces allied with M23 and led by
"Gen." Kakule Sekuli LaFontaine (see S/2012/348, paras. 100-102), in and around
the gold market of Bunyatenge.
1. Repatriation of former members of the Forces démocratiques de libération du
Rwanda to Rwanda
97. According to MONUSCO records, between 1 January and 30 September 2012,
867 combatants officially deserted from FDLR and returned to Rwanda.
MONUSCO also demobilized another 151 Congolese members of FDLR.
Repatriation rates have, however, diminished significantly since February, when 141
combatants returned home, compared with only 47 in September. The only senior
FDLR officer to return to Rwanda since the outbreak of the M23 rebellion has been
Lt Col. Etienne Mbarushimana, on 24 May.
98. According to several ex-combatants, FDLR officers are fearful that, if they
return to Rwanda, the Government will force them to join the reserve force of the
S/2012/843
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29
Rwandan armed forces and redeploy them to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
In addition to those sent to reinforce former FDLR commander Col. Mandevu
within M23 (see S/2011/738, para. 64), former combatants confirmed that the
Rwandan armed forces had redeployed small units of ex-FDLR combatants to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for intelligence-gathering missions and to
reinforce M23.
99. An increasing number of deserters from FDLR either seek to integrate into
local communities or to flee to Zambia. Instead of merging his battalion and moving
northwards in South Kivu, the former FDLR commander in Kilembwe (Fizi
territory), "Lt Col." Tharcisse "Sharaf" Uwimana, deserted from the movement in
June 2012 and travelled to Zambia. In addition, the lone remaining FDLR liaison
officer in Uvira fled for Zambia in April.
2. Alleged support by the Congolese armed forces to the Forces démocratiques de
libération du Rwanda
100. Between May and July 2012, the Government of Rwanda alleged that there
had been 15 cases of cooperation between the Congolese armed forces and FDLR
(see annex 47 to the present report). The Group has been unable, however, to
independently confirm these specific claims and the Government of Rwanda has
refused to meet the Group to provide any further details. In one case, the
Government alleges that, on 5 June, the Congolese armed forces provided safe
passage to two FDLR companies to infiltrate Rwanda. The Rwandan armed forces
have, however, recently reinforced their deployments along the border between
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in view of their support for
M23, thus making it highly improbable that two FDLR companies could enter
Rwandan territory unnoticed.
101. Furthermore, the Government of Rwanda also alleged that the Congolese
authorities facilitated a visit by two Belgian nationals, Faustin Murego and Joseph
Nzabonimpa, to negotiate an alliance with FDLR to fight against M23 in June 2012.
Congolese intelligence services arrested the two men but released them on 10 July.
The Government of Belgium told the Group that it possessed no information
regarding support by the men for FDLR.
102. According to senior Congolese armed forces officers, mid-level FDLR
commanders have sought to establish operational alliances with Congolese armed
forces units in Rutshuru territory. Instead of cooperating with the rebels, however,
the Congolese armed forces have mounted operations against FDLR on several
occasions, including near Tongo in August 2012 and near the Ishasha border
crossing with Uganda late in September 2012. During the latter attack, the
Congolese armed forces cooperated with "Col." Muhima Shetani and his Mai Mai
group to dislodge the last remaining FDLR liaison antenna unit. Nevertheless,
Congolese armed forces officers do acknowledge that operations against FDLR have
been significantly reduced since the outbreak of the M23 rebellion, as they seek to
avoid overstretching themselves.
103. Several oral and written requests notwithstanding, and past precedent to the
contrary, the Government of Rwanda did not authorize the Group to conduct
interviews with former FDLR combatants at the Mutobo demobilization centre in
Rwanda.
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B. Allied Democratic Forces
104. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are a Ugandan-led Islamist rebel group
based around the Rwenzori mountains of North Kivu. According to MONUSCO and
Ugandan estimates, during 2012, ADF has increased in strength to more than 1,300
combatants, of whom 800 are trained and well-equipped fighters. The ADF military
commander continues to be Hood Lukwago, while sanctioned individual Jamil
Mukulu remains the supreme leader. The Ugandan authorities and ex-combatants
confirmed the presence of Mr. Mukulu alongside ADF for several months early in
2012. The Kenyan authorities, however, told the Group that they believed that he
was currently based in the United Republic of Tanzania.
105. The Group has independently gathered several examples that support the
assertions of the Government of Uganda that ADF collaborates with Al-Shabaab in
Somalia. According to former combatants, ADF trained groups of young people in
its camps for several months before sending them to Somalia to fight. The first of
these groups departed the camps in November 2011. After the arrest in Nairobi of
the son of Mr. Mukulu, Bikumbi Hassan Mukulu, Al-Shabaab agents Mustapha
Kamau and Jacob Musyoka posted his bail in November 2011. Several Kenyan
intelligence agencies confirmed that those individuals were members of Al-Shabaab
and supported Mr. Mukulu and his family when in Nairobi.
106. While the Group was unable to speak with Mr. Hassan after he was eventually
recaptured and extradited to Kampala, Ugandan intelligence agents told the Group
that he had informed them that several businessmen linked to Al-Shabaab resided in
the Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi and worked with his father. Kenyan intelligence
agents told the Group that they possessed records of telephone conversations
between Mr. Mukulu and Al-Shabaab agents residing in Eastleigh.
107. According to ex-combatants and Ugandan intelligence agents, ADF has strong
support networks in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Following their arrest on 30 November 2011, Congolese officials repatriated ADF
political cadres Hoods Sempebwa and Habibi Kiwanuka to the United Kingdom (see
S/2012/348, para. 31). The two play an important role in coordinating diaspora
support networks. ADF also operates financial support cells at the port of Tanga in
the United Republic of Tanzania and in Bujumbura, Kigali and Nairobi. According
to ex-combatants, couriers transport financial resources generated by those cells to
ADF by crossing through the Kasindi border post from Uganda to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. ADF also generates local revenue through several business
arrangements in Beni territory. According to ex-combatants, local leaders and
Ugandan authorities, the rebels profit from taxation on illegal timber production
west of Erengeti and several gold mines near Bialose village along the Lesse River.
Nevertheless, ADF has increased its attacks on civilians accused of not respecting
business arrangements or providing intelligence to the Congolese authorities (see
S/2012/348, para. 20).
108. The extensive recruitment networks of ADF persist throughout Burundi,
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. The movement continues to use the
Ugandan border town of Bwera as a transit centre for its recruits. According to
ex-combatants and the Ugandan authorities, however, new recruits and political
officers visiting the rebels from abroad are increasingly passing through Kigali to
Goma and travelling northwards to Beni. ADF recruits include children, as
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31
exemplified by the case of a rebel recruiter who was captured by Ugandan
authorities in Kasese with six young boys on his way to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo in July 2012.
109. ADF is increasingly targeting recruits from East Africa. In April 2012, senior
ADF leaders gave their Congolese combatants a chance to freely depart the
movement. From 1 January to 30 September 2012, MONUSCO repatriated only
nine former ADF members.
110. In the face of potential MONUSCO air strikes (see S/2012/348, para. 19),
Congolese and Ugandan intelligence officers and community leaders informed the
Group that ADF had obtained anti-aircraft weapons. They described the arrival of
such weapons in July 2012, requiring six ADF collaborators to transport them from
near Oicha westwards towards ADF camps.
111. Ugandan officials acknowledged to the Group that a Ugandan armed forces
battalion based on Mount Rwenzori regularly entered Congolese territory to conduct
reconnaissance operations on ADF positions in Beni territory. Senior Congolese
armed forces officers have never authorized these sporadic Ugandan armed forces
deployments into the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
C. Forces nationales de libération
112. FNL remains divided and weakened in South Kivu, relying on reinforcements
from Congolese armed groups. Moreover, the Burundian army conducted joint
operations against the rebels with the Congolese armed forces in Uvira territory
early in October 2012. Agathon Rwasa has largely withdrawn from direct
involvement in FNL activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since his
departure from the former FNL base near the Burundian border in Kiliba,
"Gen." Antoine "Shuti" Baranyanka and his deputy "Maj." Evelyn live alongside
Mai Mai Mayele in Lusambo, Fizi territory. According to several armed group
members, the former deputies of Mr. Baranyanka, "Gen." Aloys Nzamapema and
"Col." Logatien Negamiye, have set up another camp in Mushule, in the Uvira
plateaux, with about 70 troops.
113. Former combatants told the Group that "Gen." Nzamapema was allied with the
Congolese groups of Mai Mai Baleke and Mai Mai Fujo, during addition to the
Burundian group FPM/ADN (see paras. 114-115), in particular during combat
operations against the Congolese armed forces. A Mai Mai Baleke combatant
described how FNL supplied Mai Mai with ammunition. Former combatants,
including FDLR soldiers, also described cooperation between FNL units led by
"Gen." Nzamapema and FDLR units, which visited Mushule camp several times in
July 2012. "Gen." Nzamapema delivered food and several boxes of ammunition to
FDLR in Itombwe in August 2012. FNL units attacked Burundian Government
forces in Bubanza Province late in July 2012 without major success. Lastly, FNL
continues to forcibly recruit in Burundi.
D. Front du peuple murundi
114. The Group previously identified 40 Burundian Tutsi combatants from the
Front national pour la révolution au Burundi (FRONABU), allied with FNL, in the
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middle plateau of Uvira, and widely known as "les gens de Sinduhije" (see
S/2012/348, para. 31). FRONABU has since been transformed into FPM, which is
the armed branch of ADN. Until recently, both groups, made up of 40 fighters in
total, shared the FNL camp in Mushule. The website of FPM/ADN
34 states that its
president is Guillaume George Majambere, a Burundian living in Belgium (see
annex 48 to the present report).
115. In July 2012, a Burundian FPM combatant and another from FNL separately
declared to the Group that Col. Abdallah and Col. Jean Claude Kasongo were the
leaders of FPM/ADN and that Burundian opposition leader Alexis Sinduhije had
financed them to begin their armed struggle in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Late in September 2012, armed group collaborators also told the Group that
"Alexis Sinduhije's men" had joined with the MCC troops in Runingu (see para. 75).
In June, the Congolese armed forces also arrested two FPM combatants who stated
that Mr. Sinduhije had backed their rebellion and that they had been collaborating
with ex-CNDP mutineers working for Col. Makenga.
IV. Integration challenges facing armed groups
116. The efforts of the Congolese armed forces to integrate Congolese armed
groups during the current crisis are driven by three objectives: to reinforce the ranks
of the army following desertions to M23; to undermine M23 efforts to establish
alliances; and to complement reform plans that include recruitment drives to replace
injured and elderly soldiers. As such, senior Congolese armed forces officers told
the Group that those armed groups would not constitute distinct auxiliary forces but
strengthen current units already overstretched in the face of M23.
117. In Ituri district, while FRPI leadership has remained in contact with M23
envoys in negotiating an alliance, the Congolese armed forces have encouraged
"Gen." Banaloki, using significant financial incentives, to consider integrating. By
the end of September 2012, more than 900 FRPI soldiers had regrouped in three
camps for official registration and received nominal monetary sums and food items.
The Congolese armed forces estimate that the number of FRPI core soldiers does
not surpass 350, however.
35
118. Since the outbreak of the M23 rebellion, the Alliance des patriotes pour un
Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) (see S/2012/348, paras. 55-57) has received
increased support from ethnic Hunde collaborators in the form of uniforms and
ammunition. After APCLS began cooperating with a faction of FDC that was loyal
to the Government and led by Lt Col. Bwira, a disgruntled Hunde commander, late
in July 2012, the senior leadership of the Congolese armed forces made efforts to
negotiate the integration of these armed groups.
119. On 21 August 2012, civilian and military representatives of the Government
visited the APCLS commander, "Gen." Janvier Buingo, in his headquarters in
Lukweti. Several subsequent meetings and scheduled regroupings of both the Hunde
rebel groups notwithstanding, no specific action has taken place to date. According
to community representatives, APCLS resented the decision of the Congolese
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34
http://adn-burundi.org/index.php/79-accueil/89-vision-accueil.
35
These estimates suggest that FRPI has inflated its numbers for the purposes of the integration
process with the Congolese armed forces while it undertakes parallel negotiations with M23.
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33
Supreme Court in September 2012 to recognize the results of the legislative
elections in Masisi, given that one of its key supporters, Bakungu Mitondeke, was
not re-elected.
120. In the context of a general struggle between M23 and the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for the support of the Hutu community,
36 the
Government has made efforts to integrate the local Hutu militias in southern Masisi
and northern Kalehe territories, known as "Nyatura". Most Nyatura commanders are
former Congolese armed forces officers who deserted in 2010 and 2011 owing to
their marginalization in the context of mounting ex-CNDP power and influence
within the army (see S/2012/738, paras. 242 and 347).
121. During the attacks carried out late in August and early in September 2012 by
Raïa Mutomboki, senior Congolese armed forces officers, including the land forces
commander, Gen. Gabriel Amisi (see S/2011/738, paras. 191, 205, 453, 469, 471
and 514), instructed the Congolese armed forces units in Masisi to work with the
Nyatura. Congolese police and local authorities informed the Group that, in July
2012, Gen. Amisi had sent a Congolese armed forces truck to deliver around 300
AK-47 rifles to Nyatura militia members. Several Congolese armed forces officers,
including Lt Col. Nkunduwera, distributed weapons and ammunition to Nyatura
militias on behalf of Gen. Amisi.
122. In Kasake, southern Masisi, villagers stated that, when Raïa Mutomboki first
attacked, the Congolese armed forces retreated and returned with Nyatura
reinforcements. In mid-September 2012, the Group met Nyatura commanders and
Congolese armed forces officers in Ngungu, who acknowledged that they had begun
working together to resist Raïa Mutomboki.
123. Gen. Amisi held several meetings with Nyatura representatives regarding their
integration in September 2012. The Nyatura commander, Haburigira, has requested
that the Congolese armed forces immediately redeploy to the areas controlled by the
militia members and ensure the protection of Hutu communities against Raïa
Mutomboki attacks.
124. Although the Congolese armed forces had already begun reassembling Nyatura
in Mushake early in October 2012, several challenges remain for the integration of
Nyatura. Nyatura commanders fear losing control of revenue generated from
taxation and control over small-scale mining. Moreover, Nyatura soldiers without
prior Congolese armed forces experience fear being excluded from the process.
Lastly, FDLR deserters living among Congolese Hutu communities may attempt to
infiltrate the process to remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
125. For its part, M23 has also sought to ally itself with Nyatura because some
original founders in Kalehe territory have to date refused to take part in the
Congolese armed forces integration process. In July 2012, the Congolese authorities
arrested individuals working with Xavier Chiribanya (see S/2012/348/Add.1,
para. 41), who acknowledged transferring $2,000 to Nyatura commanders in South
Kivu on his behalf.
126. North of M23 territory, the Congolese armed forces have sought also to
establish an operational alliance with the Front populaire pour la démocratie under
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36
Several important Hutu commanders, including the 3rd sector commander, Col. Sadaam Ringo,
deserted from M23 in September and October 2012.
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the command of Col. Shetani Muhima, along the route leading to the border post of
Ishasha. According to senior commanders, the Congolese armed forces worked with
Col. Muhima to dislodge FDLR in Ishasa
37 late in September 2012.38
V. Criminal networks within the Congolese armed forces
127. The Group has investigated criminal networks within the Congolese armed
forces that are cooperating with armed groups in Orientale Province.
A. Mai Mai Morgan
128. Paul Sadala, alias "Morgan", is a poacher operating in the territories of
Mambasa, Lubero and Bafwasende in Orientale Province. In 2012, he launched
violent raids on Congolese armed forces and Congolese Wildlife Authority
39
positions, while committing serious abuses against civilians. On 24 June, the rebels
attacked the okapi reserve
40 ranger station in Epulu, killing at least three people and
14 okapi. Consequently, the military prosecutor in Bunia issued an arrest warrant for
Mr. Sadala and opened an investigation for war crimes including murder and rape
(see annex 49 to the present report).
129. Mr. Sadala has cooperated with a criminal network led by 9th military region
Commander Gen. Jean Claude Kifwa in Kisangani, whereby the military supplies
arms, ammunition, uniforms and communication equipment to Mai Mai Morgan in
exchange for ivory. The Group confirmed this with two armed group collaborators, a
Congolese armed forces officer, a Congolese Wildlife Authority staff member,
community leaders and an intelligence officer. Kifwa has sent "Col." Jean Pierre
Mulindilwa
41 and Col. Kakule "Manga Manga" Kayenga to Mr. Sadala to oversee
his business interests and provide arms and ammunition.
130. Mai Mai Morgan combatants stated that, in June 2012, their group consisted of
85 fighters, all carrying AK-47s in addition to two MAGs, a rocket-propelled
grenade, a mortar, a satellite telephone and two backpack radios. Mr. Sadala and his
close assistants also use the traditional 12-calibre hunting rifle.
131. On several occasions, Gen. Kifwa has intervened in poaching-related cases and
arrests. In December 2011, he ordered significant amounts of confiscated ivory to be
shipped from Bunia to Kisangani. The price of ivory has increased dramatically in
the past few years. In 2007, 1 kg was sold for $30 in Kisangani, compared to $80 in
2009 and between $100 and $150 in 2012. In the okapi reserve alone, the Congolese
__________________
37
Several Congolese armed forces officers were embedded within Mai Mai Shetani for these
operations.
38
In South Kivu, the Congolese armed forces have also engaged in discussions with several armed
groups, including Mai Mai Yakutumba and Forces républicaines fédéralistes soldiers who
remained with Col. Richard Tawimbi.
39
Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Wildlife Conservation and Park Service.
40
A rare mammal found only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a source of national
pride.
41
"Col." Mulindilwa, nicknamed "Doctor J P", is a former member of Mai Mai Michigan. A
Congolese armed forces officer explained that he was officially still at the centre de brassage,
without official rank but with a Congolese armed forces uniform.
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35
Wildlife Authority has recorded poaching of at least 1 ton of ivory every year since
2008, resulting in a yearly profit of at least $250,000. Local traders, however,
claimed that as much as 3 tons of ivory were stocked in Elota in August 2012.
132. Mai Mai Morgan also collects gold twice a week at mining sites in Pangoi and
Elota and sells "access rights" to individual pits. Mr. Sadala keeps the gold and sells
it to traders from Butembo. Lastly, the rebels have established a monopoly on the
cigarette trade in the same area.
B. Mai Mai Luc
133. Mai Mai Luc, led by Maj. Luc Yabili, operates in the territory of Bafwasende
in Orientale Province and across the North Kivu border in Walikale. It controls
mining sites including Angumu and Elonga, where it sells its gold to businessmen
from Butembo and Beni.
134. The 10th integrated brigade of the Congolese armed forces, under the orders of
Gen. Kifwa, based in Opienge and Bafwasende, operates a criminal network that
collaborates with Mai Mai Luc with regard to poaching and mining. Although
Bafwasende remains an operational zone, the Congolese armed forces have
launched no combat operations for the past two years. Meanwhile, arms and
ammunition continue to be delivered to deployed units and are used for poaching.
The 10th brigade also has a monopoly on the cigarette supply and other trading
activities in the area, providing them with little incentive to suspend operations.
135. The criminal network makes considerable profits in Opienge, where a
Congolese armed forces commander, Maj. Sammy Biakya Baguma, controls the tin
mine of Ndonga and a number of gold mines, organizing some of the exploitation
himself and imposing a tax of 2 g of gold per week from the teams of miners. He
also trades in 12-calibre hunting ammunition. He makes additional profits by selling
"travel authorizations" and runs a prison known locally as "Guantanamo", where he
incarcerates civilians. Previously, to retain his control over the population,
Maj. Baguma had sent back more than 40 Congolese national police officers who
were to be deployed in Opienge.
136. Local community leaders and United Nations officials explained that
Mr. Yabili had attempted several times to demobilize, but received no response from
the Congolese armed forces or other Government officials. When traditional chiefs
from Bafwasende enquired about the matter on 1 October 2012, Maj. Baguma
explained that Gen. Kifwa had ignored the repeated requests.
42 On 31 July 2012,
Mr. Yabili captured Mr. Sadala and offered to hand him over to the Congolese armed
forces, although Gen. Kifwa again failed to react.
C. 12-calibre hunting ammunition
137. 12-calibre hunting ammunition is widely available in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo and is extensively used for poaching. The Group documented
the use of this ammunition by Congolese armed forces units and several armed
__________________
42
Several requests notwithstanding, the 9th military region has not been able to share with
MONUSCO any copy of the three letters sent by Mr. Yabili and seen by dozens of witnesses.
S/2012/843
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groups, notably Raïa Mutomboki and Mai Mai Morgan (see annex 50 to the present
report).
138. Manufacture d'armes et des cartouches du Congo, whose factory is in Pointe
Noire, the Congo, produces most of this ammunition. When asked for a list of its
clients, the company responded that it sold none of its products in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (see annex 51 to the present report). Nevertheless, the Group
has found that large quantities of the ammunition are widely available in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 52 to the present report). The network
organizing shipments of the ammunition from Kinshasa to Goma and Kisangani
uses both boat and plane transportation. Individuals involved in the trade explained
that, in mid-2012, the ammunition had been flown into Goma via Air Pegasus. Other
freight companies explain that Air Pegasus runs commercial flights through military
airports without paying taxes. The trade is controlled by individuals with close ties
to Gen. Amisi of the Congolese armed forces. In Goma, the ammunition is
distributed by Damien Amisi, the younger brother of Gen. Amisi. In Kisangani,
"Type Tambwe", an ethnic Muzimba from Gen. Amisi's home region, sells the
rounds and oversees the local interests of Gen. Amisi. In Kasese, the former
bodyguard of Gen. Amisi, Capt. Salung of the Congolese armed forces, stocks and
sells the ammunition.
VI. Arms
A. Stockpile management and diversion
139. The management of arms continues to pose a challenge for the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although a signatory to the Nairobi Protocol
for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
has yet to embark on a programme of marking State-owned arms. Congolese armed
forces stockpiles continue to be a significant source of ammunition for armed
groups. An escalation in armed group activities in the Kivus and Ituri has led to an
increase in the diversion of arms and ammunition.
140. Commanders of Congolese armed forces logistics bases in the Kivus and Ituri
confirmed that one of the biggest challenges was the defection of their rank and file
with their arms and ammunition. Corrupt individual soldiers and criminal networks
within the Congolese armed forces also sell ammunition to armed groups. Four
ex-FDLR combatants from Rutshuru territory told the Group that they regularly
purchased ammunition from the Congolese armed forces. In August 2012, the North
Kivu military prosecutor indicted two Congolese armed forces soldiers for selling
rifles for $200 each to M23 rebels near Rumangabo. Former combatants from
Nyatura and Raïa Mutomboki told the Group that they purchased ammunition,
AK-47 rifles and military uniforms from Congolese soldiers. On 25 August 2012,
security officials intercepted APCLS rebels in Minova with 34 boxes of ammunition,
each containing 750 rounds, and an AK-47 rifle that they had recently purchased from
Congolese armed forces soldiers. Mai Mai groups in the middle plateau of Uvira also
regularly purchase ammunition from the Congolese armed forces in local markets,
with each box of 750 rounds costing $10.
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B. Challenges to disarmament
141. The emergence of M23 and its allies has exacerbated the demand for arms and
ammunition. According to local authorities, civil society representatives and
villagers interviewed in Nyiragongo and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu, the
price of an AK-47 rifle has increased from between $20 and $50 to between $200
and $250 since early in May 2012.
142. Programme oecuménique pour la paix, la transformation des conflits et la
reconciliation, an organization working towards the voluntary disarmament of
civilians, informed the Group that, on five occasions in July and August 2012,
individuals identified as emissaries of armed groups had offered to purchase arms
handed over by civilians at $200 each.
143. The organization showed the Group a list of 125 civilians who had surrendered
their rifles and/or ammunition between February and September 2012. Owing to a
shortage of funds, however, the organization has been unable to pay them (see
annex 53 to the present report). The organization further informed the Group that
some of the individuals who remained unpaid had demanded the return of their arms
or ammunition, claiming to have buyers elsewhere. Two such individuals told the
Group that they had received an offer of $250 per rifle from M23. At about the same
time, unidentified emissaries of M23 approached the organization offering to
purchase its entire stock of arms (see annex 54 to the present report).
144. The organization expressed concern that the number of civilians turning in
weapons and ammunition had dramatically decreased since the outbreak of the M23
rebellion. According to the organization, that could be a sign of civilians resorting to
either selling weapons to armed groups at prices higher than the $50 paid or
retaining the arms for self-defence owing to the insecurity, or a combination of both.
145. Lastly, combat between the Congolese armed forces and M23, including
through the use of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance, continues to kill
and maim non-combatants. In August 2012, six children were killed when they
stepped on a landmine in Gikoro village, Jomba groupement, Rutshuru territory. A
follow-up analysis by humanitarian organizations identified several unexploded
munitions scattered throughout the territory. The most affected areas are the M23
front lines (see annex 55 to the present report).
43
VII. Violations of international humanitarian and human
rights law
146. Since the mutiny by former members of CNDP, which led to the creation of
M23, local communities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have
suffered widespread human rights violations. Violence in North Kivu against
civilians by all armed actors, including the Congolese armed forces, has increased,
displacing more than 500,000 people since April 2012. Displacement creates
conditions favourable to further abuses. Owing to the increasing insecurity,
humanitarian agencies have also faced difficulties in gaining access to populations
and in providing relief.
__________________
43
These areas include Kitobogo farms near Kiwanja.
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147. Sexual violence remains prevalent in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In the context of the continuing combat, women and children are further at
risk in conflict areas or when displaced. For the first six months of 2012, the United
Nations Population Fund recorded 742 cases of sexual violence perpetrated by
armed men in North Kivu, with Rutshuru the most affected territory, and 955 similar
cases in South Kivu, almost half of which were in Fizi territory. The Group
identified cases of mass rapes committed by M23, Raïa Mutomboki, Mai Mai
Morgan and FDLR in 2012. Commanders of the last-mentioned group are
responsible for more than 100 rapes, including of minors. By the end of September,
the United Nations and international human rights non-governmental organizations
had documented 46 rapes committed by M23. On the night of 5 and 6 August, Raïa
Mutomboki attacked the village of Nyalipe in Masisi territory and raped nine
women, including four girls.
148. There have been several major incidents of indiscriminate killings of civilians,
including women and children, by armed groups. Since May 2012, Raïa
Mutomboki, under the command of M23, has killed hundreds of civilians in North
Kivu and burned at least 800 homes. Under the orders of M23 Col. Makenga, a
series of coordinated attacks in August carried out by Lt Col. Badege and Raïa
Mutomboki jointly with FDC and NDC enabled M23 proxies to destabilize a
considerable part of southern and western Masisi territory. From 26 to 29 August,
Raïa Mutomboki, operating jointly with Lt Col. Badege and with the assistance of
FDC-Luanda soldiers, carried out systematic attacks against civilian populations in
and around the villages of Ngungu and Luke in southern Masisi.
149. Raïa Mutomboki also killed tens of civilians in similar ethnically motivated
attacks on communities accused of supporting FDLR and Nyatura in South Kivu,
including 32 people in villages near Ekingi, early in March.
150. The United Nations has confirmed at least 282 killings committed by FDLR
since December 2011. The most egregious cases took place near Bunyakiri, in
Kalehe territory, in May. In Lumenje, on 5 May, FDLR killed at least 11 civilians,
including 3 women and 5 children. In Kamananga, on 14 May, FDLR killed
35 civilians, including 20 women and 12 children, injured 38 people and burned
55 houses. According to Congolese armed forces officers, Capt. Castro Rafiki led
the attack in Bunyakiri. The FDLR commander for the South Kivu sector was
Lt Col. Hamada Karera.
151. Moreover, some M23 commanders, in particular Col. Ngaruye and sanctioned
individual Col. Zimurinda, have ordered the extrajudicial executions of at least
15 recruits. Gen. Ntaganda and Col. Makenga gave orders for the execution of at
least 20 prisoners of war. Rwandan troops also executed M23 escapees. According
to local leaders and medical personnel, these numbers could be substantially higher.
152. Further information on violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights profiles of senior M23 commanders can be found in annex 56 to the present
report.
Recruitment of children
153. Since the beginning of the M23 rebellion, child recruitment by armed groups
has dramatically increased throughout the Kivus. Several M23 commanders with
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39
long histories of child recruitment, including Col. Makenga and Col. Kaina,
continue these activities. The Group estimates that, since its inception in May 2012,
M23 has recruited more than 250 children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Rwanda. Between April and September 2012, MONUSCO received 38 children
who had escaped from M23, 22 of whom were Congolese and 14 Rwandan.
154. M23 uses boys on the front lines as cover for advancing units, often after a
week of training. Others act as porters, intelligence operatives and bodyguards. The
rebels also use young girls as cooks and as commanders' wives.
155. Deployed in Bukima, Col. Kaina oversaw the recruitment and training of more
than 150 children between May and August 2012, according to several
ex-combatants. Half of those children were from Rwanda. Two ex-M23 combatants
confirmed that Col. Kaina conducted recruitment in villages near Bukima in May
2012, when he ordered his soldiers to kidnap three boys aged between 12 and
15 years. A 14-year-old boy, who had been recruited by Col. Kaina, also declared
that Col. Kaina had forcibly recruited two boys of the same age. On several
occasions, former M23 soldiers under Col. Kaina personally witnessed him order
the shooting of boys who had attempted to escape. Another ex-M23 combatant from
Bukima told the Group that 14 women were also trained there, including 6 young
girls.
156. Six former M23 child soldiers between the ages of 12 and 16 years told the
Group that M23 officers had recruited them by force during patrols in Rumangabo,
Kiwanja, Jomba and Bunagana. All said that they were warned that they would be
killed, on orders of Col. Makenga, if they sought to escape. According to several
ex-M23 combatants, Col. Makenga and Col. Ngaruye summarily executed dozens of
children who attempted to escape. In two accounts, child soldiers witnessed other
children being shot or buried alive after failed escape attempts.
157. The Group interviewed four former FDLR combatants who had been
demobilized in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and rerecruited from the
Mutobo demobilization and reintegration centre in Rwanda in September 2012.
Upon their arrival at the centre, its permanent director, Frank Musonera, separates
young boys targeted for recruitment, including children aged below 16 years. In one
case, on 15 August 2012, he sent five former FDLR child soldiers between the ages
of 13 and 16 years to Kinigi, where Rwandan troops forced them to carry boxes of
ammunition and join M23. Two ex-FDLR combatants recruited from the centre also
confirmed that they had encountered more than 15 former FDLR minors in an M23
position commanded by Col. Ngaruye. Three ex-M23 recruits who trained in
Runyoni informed the Group that Col. Makenga had a special protection unit of
20 ex-FDLR child soldiers below the age of 15 years who were under strict
instructions not to leave Runyoni. Former M23 child soldiers told the Group that
those who were captured seeking to escape were executed in plain view of the
others.
158. The Group also interviewed dozens of children recruited by other Congolese
and foreign armed groups. These cases are described in detail in annex 57 to the
present report.
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VIII. Natural resources
A. Tin, tantalum and tungsten trade
1. Trade and production trends
159. In its interim report, the Group highlighted a gradual resumption of official
exports of tin, tantalum and tungsten from the Kivus and Maniema Province. By
August 2012, however, official exports had nearly disappeared, for three reasons.
First, the Minister of Mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo suspended the
export houses Huaying and TTT Mining/Congo Minerals and Metals (TTT/CMM) in
both North and South Kivu (see S/2012/348, paras. 141 and 142). Second, in an
attempt to halt smuggling into Rwanda, the Minister of Mines prohibited the
transport by air of tin, tantalum and tungsten from Maniema to the border towns of
Goma and Bukavu, insisting on their transport through Katanga Province. That
measure put exporters in Goma sourcing from Maniema out of business. Lastly,
Chinese importers previously buying untagged minerals are increasingly requiring
mineral tagging under the International Tin Research Institute (ITRI)
44 Tin Supply
Chain Initiative.
160. Following mine site validation, mineral tagging is to be implemented in parts
of Maniema and at the mining site of Nyabibwe in South Kivu by the end of 2012.
For the moment, however, there is no legal market for untagged mineral production
in the Kivus and Maniema Province. Consequently, cross-border smuggling is again
on the rise. As smugglers typically do not distinguish between trade from areas
controlled or not controlled by armed groups, this illegal trade undermines the
exercise of due diligence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Moreover, it
affects the credibility of due-diligence-based certification systems that have been or
will be rolled out in neighbouring countries.
161. Smugglers also prefer tantalum ore and tungsten ore because they are lighter
than tin ore and therefore easier to conceal. In addition, profit margins are higher,
which compensates for corruption payments required to facilitate border crossings
and transportation by private vehicles or boats.
162. The diminishing formal market for tin ore and increasing relative importance
of tantalum ore and tungsten ore is also reflected in production levels. Tin ore
production levels have fallen in the Kivus, but the decline is most stark in remote
mine locations such as Bisie in Walikale territory, from where minerals have to be
transported by air. In contrast, tantalum ore production in accessible locations such
as Masisi and Idjwi territories remains strong. While the Group estimates that
between 50 and 60 tons per month are produced, official statistics show that only
about 5 tons were exported in the second trimester of 2012.
__________________
44
A tin industry association whose membership, it claims, accounts for 80 per cent of world tin
purchases. It launched the Tin Supply Chain Initiative with the Tantalum-Niobium International
Study Center in 2009.
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2. Smuggling chains
Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda
163. In 2012, mineral smuggling between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Rwanda has continued, involving new but also many of the same networks that
the Group identified in previous reports. From Bukavu, Frédéric Mastaki Lubamba,
alias "Sénégalais", controls much of the cross-border smuggling (see S/2011/738,
para. 491). Details of mineral seizures that the Group obtained from Congolese
mining authorities demonstrate that he is increasingly active in the smuggling of
tungsten ore from Idjwi and Walungu territories. Another key trader overseeing
smuggling operations from Bukavu in 2012 is Kaferege, who used to represent
Rwanda Metals in Bukavu.
45
164. In January 2012, the Government of Rwanda arrested four senior Rwandan
armed forces officials because of their alleged involvement in illegal mineral trade
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Two, Col. Dan Munyuza and
Col. Richard Rutatina, were the heads of external and military intelligence,
respectively.
46 According to ex-CNDP members, ex-Rwandan armed forces soldiers
and provincial leaders, both men were involved in the smuggling networks through
Goma overseen by Gen. Ntaganda (see S/2011/738, paras. 484-487). The Group is
unaware of any trial or sentencing in these cases.
165. In Goma, the Group was able to identify three key traders involved in
smuggling operations. One is Charlotte Nyirakanyana, who was arrested on 10 July
2012 after the authorities seized 3 tons of her minerals hidden in a truck at the main
border crossing in Goma. She told the Group that the minerals included tantalum ore
from Masisi territory and tin ore from Kalehe territory. In March 2012, 1.5 tons of
her minerals had already been seized in Rwanda.
166. A second trader is Clémence Rwiyereka Mikamo, who manages CLEPAD, an
export house in Goma.
47 According to individuals involved in her smuggling
operations, in June 2012, she transferred minerals from her export house premises in
Goma to Hotel Planète near the main border post and owned by her husband Joseph
Sebagisha, from where CLEPAD agents hid them in vehicles that crossed into
Rwanda during the night.
167. According to the above-mentioned sources, Ms. Clémence operates in
collaboration with Eddy Habimana of Global Mining Company, who also smuggles
minerals from Goma to Gisenye. Global Mining Company and CLEPAD
representatives stated to the Group that in December 2011 they rented their facilities
to the export house Metachem, claiming that all activities taking place at their
__________________
45
Rwanda Metals traded Congolese minerals on behalf of the Rwandan Patriotic Army in 2002.
46
Col. Munyuza coordinated commercial activities for the Rwandan Patriotic Army in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002 (see S/2002/1146, para. 70).
47
This is Ms. Clémence's full name, as taken from a list of comptoirs compiled by the International
Peace Information Service in August 2009 (see www.ipisresearch.be/fck/file/20090805_Comtoirs_
Kivu.pdf). She is also known in combination with the names of Feza and Sebagisha, after that of her
husband. The name "CLEPAD" stands for "Clemence, Patrick Dealings".
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premises were those of Metachem.
48 Provincial leaders, M23 officers and
Congolese authorities told the Group that part of the profits made by Ms. Clémence
and associated traders through cross-border smuggling was channelled to M23.
Telephone records demonstrate that Ms. Clémence has communicated with Rwandan
armed forces officers, including Gen. Kabarebe (see annex 59 to the present report).
168. A third trader is Gen. Kamwanya Bora (see S/2011/738, paras. 444 and 504),
formerly of the Congolese armed forces, who, in 2012, moved his supply chain to the
island of Idjwi. Gen. Bora organizes the smuggling of minerals from Kamole, among
other locations, into Rwanda by boat across Lake Kivu. According to Congolese
intelligence sources and local mine operators, he sent Congolese armed forces
Lt Col. Pacifique Sekanabo, who is without position, to oversee his business on
Idjwi.
49
169. Individuals participating in this smuggling explained that minerals from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo were inserted into the Rwandan certification
system through the illegal purchase of tags issued by mining cooperatives with
concessions in western Rwanda. The cooperative would then sell the mineral tags
for 50 kg bags at up to $50 each for tantalum ore.
170. The Group obtained photographic evidence of the tagging, at a depot in
Gisenyi, of Congolese minerals that had been smuggled across a secondary border
crossing in Goma (see annex 60 to the present report). The numbers of six Rwandan
mine tags that the Group was able to view were, according to the ITRI Tin Supply
Chain Initiative database, issued to the company Alpha Minerals for its concession
at Gatare II. The database further showed that four tagged mineral bags had been
sold to the mineral exporter Minerals Supply Africa in Kigali.
171. The Group informed Minerals Supply Africa about tagging fraud by Alpha
Minerals. The company's management provided the Group with full purchasing
records for verification and explained that it had visited mine sites operated by
Alpha Minerals, which had showed continuing mineral production. On the basis of
the information provided by the Group, the company's management decided to
suspend purchases from Alpha Minerals, in line with the Group's due diligence
recommendations.
50
172. The Group also obtained tags in the possession of a smuggler operating
between Goma and Gisenyi (see annex 61 to the present report). According to the
__________________
48
CLEPAD and Global Mining Company are members of ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative and can
therefore not officially purchase and export untagged minerals. Metachem, which is not a
member, can and does officially purchase and export untagged minerals. A representative of
Global Mining Company stated to the Group that, since it decided to stop operations in March
2011, intermediary traders sold minerals stocked in its warehouse to Metachem. Metachem also
took over Global Mining Company staff. According to Global Mining Company, official records
in 2012 wrongly state Global Mining Company as a seller and purchaser of minerals during the
period from January to May (see annex 58 to the present report). Provincial mines authorities
stated to the Group that throughout that entire period they believed that Global Mining Company
had been operating as an export house. In a communication to the Group, CLEPAD
representatives made no reference to selling or transferring minerals to Metachem upon renting
its facilities to the latter. Mineral transporters operating between Goma and Maniema told the
Group in May 2011 that Ms. Clémence sold her minerals to Huaying. Ms. Clémence's smuggling
activities in June 2012 immediately followed the suspension of Huaying on 15 May 2012.
49
Lt Col. Sekanabo also recruits young people for M23.
50
www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroupguidelines.shtml.
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ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative database, one of the tags had been issued to the
TUHAGERE cooperative for its concession in Kamarembo. Another tag was issued
to KUAKA cooperative for its concession in Giseke. The Group visited a concession
of TUHAGERE in Musasa in June 2012 and found it to be inactive at that time.
173. On the same trip, the Group also visited the concession of Coko, near Gikenge,
operated by EPROCOMI, where it found no trace of actual mining taking place (see
annex 62 to the present report). EPROCOMI mainly supplies the export house
MUNSAD. Representatives of Rwandan mining companies and mining authorities
confirmed that many concessions in western Rwanda were inactive but had received
tags nevertheless.
174. The Group further obtained photographic evidence of a smuggling operation of
Congolese tantalum ore from Masisi to an exporting house in Kigali. Smugglers
paid bribes to Congolese border officials to transport their minerals at the main
border crossing in Goma. At its depot, the cooperative COMIKABA subsequently
tagged the minerals, without any Rwandan mines agent being present, and delivered
them to the premises of mineral exporter RUDNIKI in Kigali.
51
175. Individuals involved in smuggling operations told the Group that Dany
Nzaramba purchased and tagged minerals from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. He is the owner of the COPIMAR cooperative, in addition to Trading
Services Logistics, a Kigali-based export house. According to ITRI Tin Supply
Chain Initiative data, Trading Services Logistics also purchases from Alpha
Minerals, which sells tags. The same sources also singled out Jean Népomuscène
Ndagijimana as a key smuggler. In 2007, he was a licensed exporter in Burundi.
176. The scale of laundering of Congolese minerals in the Rwandan tagging system
is impossible to estimate on the basis of the incidents highlighted above. There is,
however, a clear correlation between the shifting predominance of tantalum ore and
tungsten ore mining close to the border and the increasing exports by Rwanda of
those minerals. Conversely, Rwandan exports of tin ore have declined as smuggling
of this ore from the interior of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has decreased.
These trends suggest that the volumes of laundered minerals may be significant.
177. Furthermore, fluctuations in Rwandan exports of tin, tantalum and tungsten do
not appear to be price-related (see annex 63 to the present report). Tin ore exports
continue to decline, the stabilization of prices notwithstanding. Tantalum and tungsten
ore exports are increasing, despite declining and stable price levels, respectively.
Democratic Republic of the Congo-Uganda
178. Smugglers in Goma and Kisangani told the Group of alternate routes to
remove minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Bunagana,
Kasindi and Mahagi into Uganda.
52 Uganda produces and exports tungsten ore, but
no tantalum ore, and only a very small quantity of tin ore, suggesting that smuggled
tin, tantalum and tungsten transit through the country, rather than being exported.
179. The supply chain from tin and tantalum ore mining sites of Kivuye in Masisi
territory partially runs through Bunagana and Kasindi, while another part moves to
__________________
51
The Group has placed this footage in the United Nations archives to protect the individuals with
whom it cooperated.
52
Some minerals from Maniema have been officially exported through Kasindi in 2012.
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Goma. According to the local authorities, the main mine operators in Kivuye work
under the protection of armed groups, including Nyatura and APCLS. Furthermore,
in Busumba, on the way to Kasindi and Bunagana, minerals are stocked in a depot
belonging to M23 member Erasto Ntibaturana, who is currently living in Gisenye
(see S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 38).
Democratic Republic of the Congo-Burundi
180. Smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Bujumbura crosses the Ruzizi plains, in addition to the official
border crossing of Kavimvira. Congolese police seized 13 tons of tantalum ore in
Kavimvira in September 2012. According to smugglers, these minerals belonged to
Mr. Lubamba (see para. 163).
181. Burundian exports of tin, tantalum and tungsten, and in particular tantalum
ore, have dramatically increased in 2012. Burundi Minerals Supply exported 87 tons
of tantalum ore from January to August 2012, compared to 58 tons during the same
period in 2011. The company's manager is Dany Nzaramba, who is also involved in
mineral smuggling in Rwanda (see para. 175). Wolfram Mining and Processing
more than tripled its tantalum exports, from 24 tons in 2011 to 87 tons in 2012.
B. Gold trade
1. Near absence of official trade
182. The Ministry of Mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has attempted
to promote official gold trade by reducing the export tax to 1 per cent and requiring
at least 30 kg of exports per trimester for export houses to retain their licence (see
S/2012/348, para. 155). No export house in the Kivus has attained this minimum
requirement to date.
183. Upon receiving export certificates, Congolese export houses must declare the
identity of the consignee of the gold that they are exporting abroad. This
information provided by export houses is often misleading. The declared trading
partners of Établissement Namukaya — Pinnacle (see S/2011/738, para. 545), in
Nairobi, and LLG, in Dubai — do not exist. According to several individuals
involved in gold trafficking, the real trading partners of Établissement Namukaya
continue to be Rajendra "Raju" Kumar (see S/2012/738, para. 512), of the
sanctioned entity Machanga Limited in Kampala, and Bujumbura-based Mutoka
Ruganyira.
184. Some consignees declared by exporters do exist. According to North Kivu
official statistics in 2012, AR Gold has in 2012 exported to its own branch in Dubai
and to Swiss Golden Metals Financial, a company registered in Geneva. Glory
Minerals in Butembo does not declare to whom it sells. A manager of the export
house COPED in Bunia told the Group that the company sold to Maha Jewellery in
Dubai.
2. Gold trade linked to armed groups and criminal networks in the Congolese
armed forces
185. The origin of gold purchased by export houses is usually poorly specified,
referring to a territory, town or locality. Établissement Namukaya purchases gold
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indiscriminately from areas throughout South Kivu, notably Misisi, Lugushwa and
Kamituga, without querying the exact origin, chain of custody or potential
involvement of armed groups or Congolese armed forces criminal networks. The
Group visited Misisi in July 2012. Operators and local authorities told the Group that
for each of the 250-odd crushing machines a $50 tax was levied per week by the
Congolese armed forces under the command of Col. Rugo Heshima (see S/2011/738,
paras. 522-527). Traders and authorities in Tubimbi told the Group that Établissement
Namukaya was the main buyer from the mine of Mufa, which was frequently pillaged
by FDLR.
186. AR Gold declares that it purchases gold from Butembo, which is not a mining
site but a trading centre. The management of SOCAGRIMINES in Mubi showed the
Group invoices to demonstrate that AR Gold had purchased gold produced by the
company, however. SOCAGRIMINES operates in Omate, where, from May 2011 to
January 2012, NDC militia members repeatedly came to demand rations and
contributions in the form of gold.
187. In addition to the few licensed exporting companies, there are intermediary
traders exporting gold without a licence. In Ituri, at the FRPI-controlled mine of
Bavi (see para. 84), local traders Banga Djelo and Justin Peke buy gold and sell it to
Ugandan traders Rajendra Kumar (see para. 183) and Silver Minerals. In Bukavu,
non-licensed traders Buganda Bagalwa and Mange Namuhanda continue to purchase
from mining sites where FDLR derives profits and sell to Mutoka Ruyangira and
Rajendra Kumar, respectively. In Uvira, the non-licensed traders Mwite and Honoré
continue to trade gold from Misisi. They supply Établissement Namukaya in Bukavu
(see annex 64 to the present report), but also sell directly to Mr. Ruyangira and
Mr. Kumar.
Congolese gold traded through Burundi
188. Mutoka Ruyangira (see paras. 183 and 187) is the main trader of Congolese
gold in Bujumbura. He changed the name of his export house in 2011 from
Berkenrode to Ntahangwa Mining. By August 2012, the company had officially
exported 958 kg of gold that year to Dubai — with a market value of at least
$41 million — representing 65 per cent of total gold exports from Burundi (see
annex 65 to the present report).
189. Up to mid-2012, Indian nationals Amit Patel, alias "Rinko", and Vipul
Mendapara assisted Mr. Mutoka in the sale of his gold. Mr. Mendapara has an
electronics shop called Sanya in Bujumbura. In May 2012, the two fled to Niamey
with up to 50 kg of gold belonging to Mr. Mutoka with a value of some $3.2 million
(see annex 66 to the present report). At the request of Mr. Mutoka, Burundi has
sought the extradition of the two men (see annex 67 to the present report).
Congolese gold traded through Uganda
190. According to Ugandan Customs statistics, Silver Minerals, of Indian national
Madadali Sulnanali Pirani, is the main gold exporter in 2012, accounting for 70 per
cent of the total exports of 274 kg from January to July 2012. While the Group
found evidence that Silver Minerals sources from Ituri, Democratic Republic of the
Congo (see para. 187), the company declares South Sudan as the country of origin
of all its gold.
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191. The second-largest gold export house in Uganda is Mineral Impex Uganda.
The company officially exported 70 kg in 2012, all in January, and declared South
Sudan as the origin. According to several industry officials in Kampala, Mineral
Impex Uganda is a front company for Rajendra Kumar.
192. Mr. Kumar uses the company DATCO, owned by the Dattani family, to receive
and transfer money to associates in Bukavu in order to pre-finance gold purchases.
The company's representation in the United Arab Emirates is MCD General Trading
LLC. DATCO has not responded to the Group's requests for information.
193. A third gold exporter in Kampala is Midas All Minerals Ltd. of British national
Sameer Bhimji. Although the company exported only 2.5 kg in 2011, police
authorities in Entebbe told the Group that, in November 2011, 15 kg belonging to
Midas Minerals had been stolen by employees of the airfreight handling service
ENHAS at Entebbe airport. Mr. Bhimji buys from Ituri traders previously identified
(see para. 187).
Congolese gold sold in Dubai
194. In the first half of 2012, Mr. Mutoka sold a portion of his gold in the United
Arab Emirates where middlemen Mr. Patel and Mr. Mendapara brought it to the
Al Fath goldsmith in Sharjah (see annex 68 to the present report). According to
smugglers and members of the gold market, or souk, the shop is owned by two
individuals by the names of "Jigger" and "Muna". Gold buyers stated that Al Fath
purchased gold from African destinations. Apart from purchasing from Mr. Mutoka,
former gold smugglers in Kampala told the Group that "Jigger" was related to
Mr. Kumar and also purchased from Mr. Kumar.
195. Since Mr. Patel and Mr. Mendapara stole gold belonging to Mr. Mutoka (see
para. 189), the latter's gold is carried to Dubai by individuals named "Kaswis" and
"Djamal". According to collaborators of Mr. Mutoka, his gold arrives in the United
Arab Emirates twice a week in hand-carried loads of around 30 kg. These totals
correspond to figures for exports from Burundi supplied by the company owned by
Mr. Mutoka.
196. The official trading partner of Silver Minerals in the United Arab Emirates is
Yogesh Jewellers. Gold smugglers in Kampala explained to the Group that Yogesh
Jewellers was used only for testing the purity of gold, however, and that the real
destination of the gold belonging to Silver Minerals was Kanz Jewellery in Dubai.
197. After repeated requests by the Group and several promises by the United Arab
Emirates authorities, the Group received no Customs data concerning total imports
from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, nor did it receive
information on the specific imports of the above-mentioned jewellers.
C. Due diligence: tin, tantalum and tungsten
1. Enforcing the Government's
note circulaire on due diligence
198. The Congolese authorities suspended export houses Huaying and TTT/CMM
for having purchased minerals of dubious origin, thereby violating the
Government's
note circulaire of 6 September 2011 concerning the application of
United Nations and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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(OECD) due diligence guidelines. Mining authorities in North Kivu stated that their
purchases might have financed armed groups operating in mining sites in Walikale.
199. In July 2012, the Minister of Mines authorized all export houses, including
Huaying and TTT/CMM, to export minerals that they purchased from Maniema and
held in their depots in Goma, provided that they made a financial contribution of
$75 per ton to development projects in mining areas. The provincial Minister of
Mines in North Kivu extended the provision to also include validated mines in
Masisi in a subsequent letter.
200. Consequently, by the end of August 2012, Huaying had exported at the same
rate as at the beginning of 2012, for a total of 248 tons of tin ore, up to and
including 24 September 2012. Huaying declared that it sold to China National
Nonferrous Metals. TTT/CMM officially exported 86 tons of tin ore to Tolead
Group in Hong Kong, China (see annex 69 to the present report). According to
mining authorities, in North Kivu, Huaying and TTT/CMM have inserted minerals
purchased from Walikale into the exported volumes that were supposed to originate
only from Maniema.
53 Red-iron-rich tin ore from Walikale is very distinct from
black tin ore in Maniema and can therefore be easily detected (see annex 70 to the
present report).
2. Expanding trading counter validation and certification
201. To date, the Congolese authorities have validated as "green" several mine sites
around the trading counters of Mugogo and Rubaya in the Kivus and 21 mine sites
in Maniema Province. Trading counters are not yet operational in the Kivus and
have still to be constructed in Maniema, however (see S/2012/348, box 6).
202. Although authorized to do so, no tin, tantalum and tungsten traders have yet
exported from mine sites qualified as "green" around Mugogo (see S/2011/738,
para. 468). In contrast, in North Kivu, the export house AMR Mugote has lawfully
exported minerals purchased from "green" mine sites in Masisi, to Guilin Jinli New
Chemical Materials in China. The export house does not, however, ascertain on the
ground whether minerals from other mines enter its supply chain.
203. In annex 71 to the present report, the Group outlines identified risks of
minerals from mines controlled by armed groups entering the supply chains of
trading counters in Mugogo and Rubaya.
204. In July 2012, a joint validation mission qualified five mines surrounding
Nyabibwe, in South Kivu, as "green". The Group has received no information that
would call such qualification into question. On 18 September, industry partners
convened by the Government of the Netherlands announced their intention to
establish a "conflict-free tin" initiative in South Kivu. A pilot phase will be
launched in October in Nyabibwe, where Pact, a non-governmental organization,
will operate the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative traceability, tagging and due
diligence mechanism.
205. In Maniema, authorities conducted a joint validation mission in August 2012
around the trading counter of Kalima and gave the "green" qualification to the mine
__________________
53
In South Kivu, however, the mining authorities have not allowed Huaying and TTT/CMM to
export at all (see S/2012/348, box 6).
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sites of Kailo and Pinga. The Group's findings in 2011 also confirmed conflict-free
trading of minerals in those territories (see S/2011/738, para. 416).
206. On 24 September 2012, intermediary traders under the Société minière du
Maniema and Metmar Trading proposed to international partners to export 968 tons
of stockpiled material from Kailo, Pangi and Kindu before the tagging of newly
produced material begins. The proposal stipulates that profits will be allocated to
finance ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative tagging and assures both that current
stockpiles are correctly accounted for and that the company will conduct its own
tagging. The proposal is in line with the Group's recommendation on stocks in its
final report of 2011.
54 The Group urges the Société minière du Maniema to verify
and demonstrate the origin of stocks through transport authorizations issued by local
mining authorities.
207. Provincial efforts to improve the mineral paper trail notwithstanding, the high
level of illegal transport of minerals from Maniema to export centres, and
subsequent cross-border smuggling, pose a critical challenge to the introduction of
traceability schemes. A comparison of the official export documentation of the first
half of 2012 and provincial taxation data shows that around half of Maniema
mineral production leaves the province without the required documentation, after
which it is likely to be smuggled.
208. In North Kivu, validated mine sites around the trading counter of Rubaya
include eight sites on the concession of the company Mwangachuchu Hizi
International. With semi-industrial operations only at the Bibatama site, the
company uses artisanal miners affiliated with the cooperative Cooperama on its
other concessions. After the Congolese authorities validated Bibatama, held by
Mwangachuchu Hizi International, the Certified Trading Chain initiative of the
German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources conducted a
baseline audit for certification and concluded in April 2012 that there was no
indication of armed group involvement and that traceability had been developed to
the highest level achievable. Mwangachuchu Hizi International claims, however,
that its trading partner in China, Sino Investment, continues to demand ITRI Tin
Supply Chain Initiative tagging, thus impeding any exports.
209. While validation exercises are expanding in the Kivus and Maniema, Orientale
Province has yet to be considered. The security challenges near tin ore reserves
around the town of Opienge, in Bafwasende territory, could, however, be resolved
by demobilizing Mai Mai Luc and suspending the Congolese armed forces
operational zone (see paras. 133-136). The concessionaire of the Opienge mining
area has begun repairing the 185 km of road between Opienge and Bafwasende.
3. Shortening supply chains through Congolese smelter initiatives
210. The construction of smelting facilities on Congolese territory could greatly
enhance traceability and facilitate due diligence by importers. Such facilities would
render current initiatives to sanitize trading chains considerably easier, given that a
shortened trading chain would naturally reduce the opportunities to insert conflict
minerals. In addition, it would increase the added value of the minerals produced
and, consequently, potential tax revenue for the Congolese authorities.
__________________
54
www.itri.co.uk/index.php?option=com_mtree&task=att_download&link_id=53055&cf_id=24.
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211. In Lubumbashi, Mining Mineral Resources has installed a first electric furnace
and a second will be operational in November 2012. The plant will produce 98 per
cent tin ingots to be exported to Malaysia Smelting Corporation Berhad for final
refining up to the 99.9 per cent London Metal Exchange
55 standard. Minérales
Industries Métallurgiques is building a second plant in Kisangani. Although it had
received machinery from China in July, the Rwandan Customs service blocked
necessary parts in Gisenyi until October 2012. The company is currently sourcing
tin ore and tantalum ore from its concession in Manono and claims that it will smelt
at least 10 tons of tin ore per day at 99.9 per cent, as from January 2013. Lastly,
African Smelting Group has launched a third attempt to establish an in-country
smelter either in the vicinity of Sake, west of Goma, or in Kindu, Maniema
Province, and has committed itself to following the OECD due diligence guidelines.
4. Traceability and due diligence in Rwanda
212. In 2011, Rwanda implemented a nationwide tagging system in collaboration
with the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative. In addition to supply chain transparency
and controls, the Initiative includes United Nations due diligence components of
risk assessment, risk mitigation and independent third party audits. In August 2012,
Channel Research published a first report to identify and evaluate risks and the
overall governance performance of the stakeholders of the supply chain for the
Initiative. An audit of the Initiative has yet to be conducted.
213. Channel Research found no serious abuses associated with the extraction,
transport and trade of minerals or any direct or indirect provision of support to
armed groups. On the basis of observations of continuing smuggling of Congolese
minerals into Rwanda, Channel Research does highlight the risk of State and
non-State armed actors in the Kivus benefiting from minerals either tagged or
exported through a parallel supply chain of untagged minerals in Rwanda, outside
the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative. The research team, however, gathered no
specific evidence in this regard, meaning that incidents of irregularities in tagging
procedures and operators' possession of untagged minerals have not been found to
be connected to cases of cross-border mineral smuggling.
214. Owing to limitations by the Government of Rwanda, the assessment team has
been unable to complete investigations into a number of issues, such as cross-border
smuggling, the suspension of senior military officers (see para. 164) and the
involvement of security services in the supply chain. Follow-up research is therefore
deemed necessary, with the Government of Rwanda agreeing to permit Channel
Research to work independently, carry out unannounced spot checks and maintain
the anonymity of its sources.
215. In addition to the risk assessment by Channel Research, the ITRI Tin Supply
Chain Initiative and its implementing partner, Pact, published a status report for the
first half of 2012,
56 in which they highlight the main incidents reported to Initiative
staff concerning violations of the tagging procedure and the ways in which those
were addressed. They also consider baseline studies carried out to assess the
production capacity of new mine sites, on the basis of which tags are issued. The
execution of baseline studies is, according to the report, marred by problems,
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Several individual companies in Rwanda have undergone audits of their mine sites and supply
chains.
56
www.itri.co.uk/index.php?option=com_mtree&task=att_download&link_id=53060&cf_id=24.
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including overreporting of production and discouragement of mine site inspection.
Furthermore, they state that, at the beginning of 2012, mining authorities issued tags
to some companies before baseline studies had been carried out and before
production had even begun.
216. The incidents of laundering of Congolese minerals into the Rwandan tagging
system that the Group has identified demonstrate that the risk assessment — step 3
of the due diligence guidelines and an integral part of the Initiative tagging and due
diligence scheme — is not sufficiently comprehensive. To date, Initiative staff have
not reported any incident of tagging Congolese minerals. The Group has provided
and will continue to provide such information to Initiative staff and to mine
operators and export houses, in order to facilitate more complete risk mitigation.
5. Traceability and due diligence in Burundi
217. Burundi is currently awaiting the promulgation of a law that incorporates due
diligence requirements and traceability mechanisms into the national mining
legislation. From 26 February to 6 March 2012, Pact visited Burundi to begin a
feasibility study and participated in a meeting with mining operators to discuss
financing the implementation of the scheme. Mining operators have agreed to
finance the purchase of the first batch of packaging and tags, but the Government
continues to seek financing to train personnel to execute tagging.
6. Due diligence initiatives beyond the Great Lakes
218. Further updates on due diligence initiatives beyond the Great Lakes region are
included in annex 72 to the present report.
D. Due diligence: gold
219. Updates on the limited due diligence initiatives in the gold sector are included
in annex 73 to the present report.
E. Socioeconomic assessment
220. By paragraph 5 of resolution 2021 (2011), the Security Council requested that
the Group of Experts should include, in its evaluation of the impact of due
diligence, a comprehensive assessment on the economic and social development of
the relevant mining areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
methodology used by the Group is described in annex 74 to the present report.
1. Main conclusions
221. For those mining areas in which no tagging or traceability system has been
installed, the following phenomena occur:
(a) Tin, tantalum and tungsten ore production continues in most areas. Most
minerals are either smuggled out or stockpiled. Consequently, there is a large
discrepancy between official exports and production. Smuggling is particularly
prevalent in mining areas that are easily accessible and/or close to the border;
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(b) The prices paid for minerals have fallen significantly because of the
limited demand for untagged materials. Other factors, such as fluctuating world
market prices, also contributed to the current low cost of minerals, however;
57
(c) Whenever alternative minerals, primarily gold or diamonds, are available
in the vicinity of the tin, tantalum and tungsten mine, miners adapt and begin
digging for other minerals. In addition, there is a move from tin ore to both tungsten
ore and tantalum ore mining;
(d) In areas where no alternatives to tin, tantalum and tungsten mining are
readily available, the virtual cessation of trade and the sharp fall in prices at the
mining site have led to reduced family income, which has an immediate impact on
family expenditure;
(e) Isolated mining communities that previously relied on inbound mineral
flights to supply them with basic commodities suffer from the secondary effect of a
shortage of such products and consequent price increases;
(f) The impacts described above were visible from the 2010 mining ban.
They were less pronounced at the end of 2011 when traders Huaying and TTT/CMM
identified alternative markets for untagged minerals in China, but resurfaced after
those traders were suspended in May 2012;
(g) The security situation at tin, tantalum and tungsten mining sites has
improved and the trade in tin, tantalum and tungsten has become a much less
important source of financing for armed groups. Both these changes will reflect
positively on the potential for sustainable socioeconomic development in mining
areas.
222. In Katanga, where a tagging system is in place at most mining sites, the
general trends are very different. Business flourishes and gives a modest impetus to
local development through investments. Trade options remain limited, however,
because one buyer holds a virtual monopoly position, leading to persistent miner
protests about the prices offered.
2. Detailed findings on mining indicators
223. In 2011, the combined regulatory pressure on the tin, tantalum and tungsten
sector to exercise due diligence generated a dual market in the region. On one side,
this pressure spurred the creation of islands of traceability in Rwanda and northern
Katanga. In both areas, mineral production has increased as a result of privileged
market access. Where tagging was not introduced, in the Kivus and Maniema,
international buyers have ceased purchasing.
224. In 2012, the impact of due diligence on tin, tantalum and tungsten mining
continued when the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo decided
to suspend two export houses — Huaying and TTT/CMM — on the basis of
non-compliance with the United Nations and OECD due diligence guidance. The
drastic decline in trade is reflected in official export figures, in particular for tin ore.
Whereas annual official exports between 2007 and 2009 from North Kivu rose to
more than 10,000 tons, they fell to 2,300 tons in 2011. Between June and August
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57
The London Metal Exchange tin price dropped by almost 33 per cent between January 2011 and
September 2012.
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2012, no official exports from Goma were recorded. The selected examples below
show some of the most pronounced current and past effects of national and
international measures on mining and the mineral trade.
225. Mining areas and trading towns in the territory of Walikale have suffered the
most radical economic decline. Local tin prices in Mubi fell from $5.5 per kg in
2010 to $3.5 or $4 in much of 2011 to $2 after May 2012. At the mining sites
themselves, traders will pay as little as $1. The low prices negatively affect working
conditions, given that there is no money to invest in basic equipment such as boots,
torches and gas. Consequently, the main mine of Bisie is virtually empty, with only
a few hundred miners remaining. COKABI, one of the main miner cooperatives,
explained to the Group that by July 2012 it had only 200 workers left at the site,
compared to 600 in 2011 and 1,200 before the 2010 suspension. Statistics from the
local mining service show how monthly production early in 2011 was half that of
the level of 2010 (500 tons). Current production is considered marginal. Flooding
has also contributed to poor output affecting 40 per cent of mining pits in Bisie.
226. In other mining areas, such as Lubutu and Lemera, similar effects exist and
miners face a similar fall in tin ore prices. Artisanal miners in Ntufia, however, told
the Group that they continued to produce because they had no alternatives to sustain
their families. Since the suspension of Huaying and TTT/CMM, hardly any buyers
arrive in Lubutu, forcing local miners and small-scale traders to stockpile
production in preparation for better times.
227. In Lemera in South Kivu, a comparable decline in prices was observed: from
$8 in 2010 to $5.5 at the beginning of 2012 to $2.5 since May 2012. In addition, the
number of diggers fell from 500 at the beginning of 2012 to 100 at the time of
preparation of the present report.
228. Tungsten and tantalum ore mining are generally less affected, as can be seen
from the examples of Idjwi and Masisi. On the island of Idjwi, in the middle of Lake
Kivu, tungsten ore mining has been in decline, but still about half of the
pre-suspension miners remain at the main mining site of Kamole. The island's
isolated position, bordering Rwandan territorial waters, enables smuggling and
therefore access to other markets. Moreover, local prices have fallen "only" by some
20 per cent, from $11 per kg before 2010 to $9 in July 2012.
229. In Masisi, tantalum ore miners at the Lufufu site in Bishasha explained that,
while price levels had steadily risen since the 2010 suspension, demand had dropped
after May 2012 and half of the 90 workers had left the mine, leading to decreased
but still significant production. Given that there have been hardly any formal
tantalum ore exports from Goma since May 2012, the larger share of production is
either stockpiled or smuggled out of the country.
230. In Katanga, where at many sites a tagging system is in place, official trade
generally continues at pre-suspension levels or higher. The Group learned, however,
that miners protested against mineral prices on several occasions in 2011 and 2012.
Provincial export statistics show that almost all the tin ore and tantalum ore
production in Katanga is purchased by a single trader, Mining Mineral Resources,
which can therefore set prices. In September 2012, it paid a fixed price of $34 per kg
for tantalum ore in Kisengo, regardless of the quality. The prices offered by Mining
Mineral Resources are indeed lower than what miners can earn in Masisi, where
they receive $36 for the standard 20 per cent quality tantalum ore and an additional
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$1.8 for every additional percentage point. The company explains that the price
difference stems from the additional costs that it incurs, such as the technical and
material support that it provides to miners, its development projects and the cost of
the tagging procedure itself.
3. Detailed findings on other socioeconomic indicators
231. The decline in mineral production and the drop in prices have generated a
series of secondary social effects in all the tin, tantalum and tungsten mines that the
Group visited. Several such impacts have been particularly visible in Nyabibwe,
where the local population explained that food and basic goods were harder to come
by because most shops had closed since October 2010.
232. They also pointed out that school enrolment in mining communities had been
much affected. A headmaster explained that dropout rates had increased from a few
percentage points in 2010 to 30 per cent in 2012. In Lemera, the Group witnessed a
similar phenomenon, learning how school attendance by children from mining
communities had fallen by 50 per cent since 2010.
233. Secondary effects are particularly present in remote mining locations serviced
by air. Before 2010, about 20 flights would arrive in Mubi per day, bringing in
consumer goods and taking out tin ore. After March 2011, that frequency slowly
increased from one flight every two days to four flights per day. After May 2012,
however, the air traffic virtually stopped.
234. Food and medicine now reach Mubi via road from Kisangani, but there is less
choice and prices are higher. A sack of flour, for example, now costs between $40
and $45, compared to $35 when it was flown in from Goma. Because no minerals
are taken on return flights from Mubi, the cost of transporting goods by air has
doubled, making it too expensive. Other mining areas, such as Shabunda and
Kasese, experience similar difficulties.
235. The above notwithstanding, commercial activity continues in most mining
towns, including Mubi, which is also a trading centre for gold from Omate.
Likewise, in Lubutu, gold and diamond mining is flourishing, explaining why there
is no shortage of supplies in shops. Moreover, miners continue to shift to new
locations while adapting to price and demand fluctuations and, when they move,
related economic activities move with them.
236. Particularly notable is the move from tin, tantalum and tungsten mines to gold
mines. In Misisi, South Kivu, miners explained that the mining population had
almost tripled over the past two years with many newcomers from tin, tantalum and
tungsten mining areas in the Kivus and Katanga. In addition, there has been a move
from tin ore mines to tungsten ore and tantalum ore mines. For example, miners
have moved from Nyabibwe to Idjwi, from Bisie to Rubaya and from Zola Zola to
Luntukulu. Their mobility much depends on the extent to which they are tied to the
locality in which they mine, mostly through property, family relations and long-time
residence. This phenomenon is not absolute. In Nyabibwe, for example, several
"migrant" miners identified alternative income and used their mining revenue to
purchase houses, land and cattle.
237. Although there are some prospects, the Group came across no public works
paid for by money generated from the mineral trade in the Kivus and Maniema
during the past five years. There is no direct contribution by the mining sector to
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development. The lack of investment in mining communities was recently raised
once more by a Goma-based non-governmental organization, Association pour le
développement des initiatives paysannes, which concluded in a report that the few
existing public works were financed mostly by humanitarian organizations. In a
study carried out in seven mining communities in October 2011, Catholic Relief
Services, the Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development and the
Commission on Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Bishops' Conference explain that income generated by mining is often used for the
personal needs and pleasure of individual miners, especially because many are not
originally from the area.
238. In Katanga, on the other hand, Mining Mineral Resources has invested in
social and infrastructure projects. In Kisengo, it has built a school and a hospital and
throughout the mining districts it has repaired roads and bridges. The secondary
social impact of the implementation of due diligence experienced at mining sites
such as Kisengo and Mayi Baridi is largely positive and gives a modest impetus to
local development. An important exception is the mine of Kahendwa, where
virtually no social projects are launched because of the disputed concession
ownership.
239. Following the example of Mining Mineral Resources in North Katanga, more
investment is to be expected in those mining areas where traceability will next be
introduced. In Maniema, for example, several economic operators are already
competing for access to mines. Mining Mineral Resources, teaming up with the
Malaysia Smelting Corporation, has sought to gain exclusive access to former
concessions held by Sakima. In exchange, Mining Mineral Resources has pledged to
rehabilitate the Kindu-Kalemie railway. The Société minière du Maniema has
obtained concessions beyond the Sakima perimeter and Minserve has already signed
a contract with a local mining cooperative. In total, these companies are expecting
to purchase at least 850 tons of minerals each month.
4. Security situation
240. The Group described several security problems at tin, tantalum and tungsten
mining sites above: the abandonment of Lufufu because of the arrival of Raïa
Mutomboki, taxation by FDLR in Karembo, pillaging by Nyatura in Lwizi and
extortion by the Congolese armed forces in Kasese. Most stakeholders interviewed
by the Group in tin, tantalum and tungsten mining areas, however, indicated that
they could work in relative security.
241. Security issues pertain particularly in those mining sites that are remote and
near front lines. More accessible and larger mining sites that are closely watched by
international companies, mining authorities and Congolese civil society are
currently benefiting from improved security. These include Nyabibwe, Bisie and
Bibatama in the Kivus and Kisengo in Katanga. The temporary suspensions of
tagging in Mitwaba because of incidents involving Mai Mai Gédéon (see annex 75
to the present report) and Congolese armed forces, however, show that the security
situation remains volatile. Continuous monitoring is therefore required.
242. In addition, there is a genuine risk that military actors will move their rackets
to mining activities that are not closely supervised. In Katanga, for example, the
commander of the 61st brigade, Col. Igwe Lungeni, has deployed his troops in most
major mining sites, including Lunga, Luba, Malemba and Mayi Baridi. They
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interfere with gold mining activities but steer away from the tin, tantalum and
tungsten trade. Insecurity at gold mining sites throughout the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo remains widespread.
IX. Recommendations
243. The Group of Experts recommends that the Committee revise the sanctions
criteria to include owners of sanctioned entities and any front companies, in addition
to individuals and entities supporting criminal networks within the Congolese armed
forces through the trade in natural resources. The Group recommends that the
Committee call upon:
(a) The Governments of Rwanda and Uganda to cease all violations of the
arms embargo and to submit regular reports to the Committee on measures taken to
halt all activities of M23 and its allies in their territories;
(b) Member States to review and reconsider future military assistance to
Rwanda and Uganda;
(c) The Joint Verification Mechanism of the International Conference on the
Great Lakes Region to install motion sensors and night-vision cameras on the few
footpaths used by the Rwandan armed forces and M23 between Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 76 to the present report);
(d) International donors to provide the Joint Verification Mechanism and
Fusion Intelligence Cell with unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor border crossings
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda and regularly report to
the Committee;
(e) All armed groups, including FDLR and M23, to immediately release all
child soldiers and cease any future recruitment of minors;
(f) The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda to complete
marking of all arms under State control in accordance with the Nairobi Protocol for
the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa;
(g) Donors to financially support innovative civilian disarmament strategies
to avoid the diversion of weapons to armed groups;
(h) The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to suspend
unnecessary military operational zones and redirect funds to accelerate
representative and inclusive integration processes for armed groups, taking into
account lessons learned from past experience;
(i) The Democratic Republic of the Congo to leverage commercial interest
in tin, tantalum and tungsten minerals for enhanced socioeconomic development in
artisanal mining zones;
(j) Exporters, processing industries and consumers of tin, tantalum and
tungsten mineral products from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and
other "red flag" locations to invest in traceability and due diligence in the Kivus,
Katanga, Maniema and Orientale Provinces in order to halt cross-border smuggling
and preserve the credibility of the Rwandan tagging scheme;
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(k) The Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda and Uganda to deter smuggling and tagging fraud and allow those carrying
out supply chain risk assessment and audits unhindered access to relevant sources
and data;
(l) The Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Uganda and the United Arab Emirates to report to the Committee periodically on
specific measures taken to halt the smuggling of gold from the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo;
(m) Donors to the Rwandan demobilization programme to more closely
monitor the reintegration of former FDLR combatants from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Annex 1
Complete overview of the Security Council mandate of the
Group of Experts.
The Group of Experts on Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a non-permanent team of
independent individuals appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General, in consultation with the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004). The mandate of the
Group, which supports the Committee and works under its direct guidance and advice, was originally
established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1533 (2004) to monitor violations of the sanctions
regime and arms embargo introduced by Security Council resolution 1493 (2003). The Group's
current mandate is derived from five subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 2021
(2011) adopted on 29 November 2011.
1
In its monitoring of the arms embargo, the Group's primary role is to investigate and document
evidence regarding the procurement of military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, by
armed groups active in the DRC, as well as their related financial networks and involvement in the
exploitation and trade of natural resources. Following the adoption of resolution 1807 (2008), the
arms embargo was lifted on the Government of the DRC and subsequently only applies to all
non-governmental entities.
However, as established in its previous two final reports (S/2010/596 and S/2011/738), the Group
evaluates the challenges related to the integration of former armed groups into the national security
forces, notably the
Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) as well as the
involvement of criminal networks within security forces in the exploitation and trade in natural
resources, thus undermining mining industry and security sector reform efforts. The Group has taken
note of the particular interest of the Security Council in such issues through its informal consultations
with Council members as well as by paragraph 12 of resolution 2021 (2011), by which the Council:
"Encourages the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue to address
the underlying issue of the cohesion of the national Army, including by further ensuring
proper integration and vetting of former armed groups, in particular the
Congrès National
pour la Défense du Peuple
(CNDP), into the FARDC…".
Moreover, by paragraphs 6 to 13 of resolution 1952 (2010), reaffirmed by paragraph 5 of resolution
2021 (2011), the Council has tasked the Group with evaluating the impact of its due diligence
guidelines for importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products, as
conveyed to the Committee in its 2010 final report on 18 October 2010.
2 The guidelines aim to help
companies avoid reputational damage and possible targeted sanctions. With regards to the latter, by
paragraph 9 of resolution 1952 (2010), the Security Council decided that the Committee:
"in determining whether to designate an individual or entity supporting the illegal armed
groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through illicit trade of
natural resources … should consider, amongst other things, whether the individual or entity
has exercised due diligence. . .".
By paragraph 5 of resolution 2021 (2011), the Security Council requested that the Group include in its
evaluation of the impact of due diligence "a comprehensive assessment on the economic and social
development of the relevant mining areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo".
Furthermore, by paragraph 6 of resolution 1952 (2010), the Council requested that the Group
investigates "perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights
abuses, including within the national armed forces…", which was reaffirmed by paragraph 5 of
resolution 2021 (2011). As such, the Group seeks to identify command responsibility for the
recruitment of child soldiers,the targeting of women and children, and acts of sexual violence.
On the basis of the conclusions of its investigations, the Group makes recommendations in its interim
and final reports regarding the implementation of measures to enforce the arms embargo and sanctions
regime as well as to address issues related to armed groups, criminal networks within the security
services, and the trade in natural resources. By paragraph 18 (f) of resolution 1807 (2008), the Group
is mandated to identify individuals and entities found to have violated the provisions of the arms
embargo or the sanctions regime, and to recommend them for targeted sanctions through a
confidential annex to its final report.Resolutions 1807 (2008) and 1857 (2008) established the
designation criteria.
The Group considers that financial support to or business dealings with a sanctioned individual or
entity constitute violations of the assets freeze and therefore are sanctionable acts. The current list of
individuals and entities designated for targeted sanctions by the Committee (as of 28 November 2011)
can be found on the 1533 website.
3
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1
Security Council resolutions 1807 (2008), 1857 (2008), 1896 (2009) 1952 (2010) & 2021 (2011).
2
S/2010/596 Section IX. A consolidated version of the recommended 5-step due diligence process is available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/due_diligence_guidelines.pdf
Annex 2
An overview of the Group of Experts methodology.
The Group of Experts adheres to a rigorous investigative methodology to ensure the greatest degree of
accuracy of its assertions and conclusions. Its evidentiary standards uphold those recommended by the
2006 report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions.
4
The Group conducts exhaustive and in-depth field research in zones controlled by armed groups,
seeking at all times to rely on authentic documents and, wherever possible, first-hand, on-site
observations by the experts themselves, including photographs. Where such evidence is not possible
to obtain, investigative conclusions must be corroborated by, at a minimum, three sources assessed by
the Group to be independent of one another, credible and reliable. The Group prioritizes testimonies
from current and former members of armed groups, local witnesses of specific events, and security
services principally from the DRC. Nevertheless, the Group systematically assesses the credibility of
each of its sources and remains wary of deliberate efforts to influence its findings.
In the light of the serious nature of the Group's findings regarding external support from the
Government of Rwanda and individuals within the Ugandan security services, the Group has adopted
elevated methodological standards for these investigations. Since early in April 2012, the Group
interviewed over 120 deserters of FARDC mutinies and Congolese armed groups, including from
M23. Among the latter, the Group interviewed 57 Rwandan nationals and two Ugandan nationals.
During its field visits, the Group privileged its own observations and research on in conflict zones and
along border posts. Furthermore, the Group also photographed weapons and military equipment found
in arms caches and on the battlefield, and has obtained official internal documents and thoroughly
analyzed both satellite imagery and intercepts of radio communications, assessed to be credible.
The Group has also consulted dozens of senior Congolese military commanders and intelligence
officials as well as political and community leaders with intricate knowledge of developments
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and both Rwanda and Uganda. Moreover, the Group
has communicated regularly with many active participants of the M23 rebellion and other armed
groups, as well as current and former security officials and civil authorities within Uganda and
Rwanda. The Group interviewed extensively eyewitnesses of specific events described in the report,
including combat operations in the DRC supported by Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Finally, while
the Group's standard methodology requires a minimum of three sources, assessed to be credible and
independent of one another, it has raised this to five sources when naming specific individuals
involved in these cases of arms embargo and sanctions regime violations. The Group has not cited in
its final report dozens of government officials in both Rwanda and Uganda for whom it has
undertaken specific investigations, but could not complete them due to the time limitations of its
mandate
While the Group wishes to be as transparent as possible in the descriptions of its sources, particularly
for official sources, in situations where specific details would expose individuals or lead to potential
safety and security risks, the Group withholds identifying information and places the relevant
evidence in United Nations archives, along with other relevant documents. For further information on
the Group's confidentiality policy, see paragraphs 26-28 of annex 3 below.
In its interim and final reports, the Group does not include any claims unsubstantiated by the abovementioned
standards, other than to present official positions, statements, and/or responses from
concerned individuals. Where applicable and possible, however, the Group seeks to address
unfounded allegations regarding provision of military, financial, or political support to armed groups.
The Group is equally committed to impartiality and fairness, and will endeavour to make available to
all relevant parties, if appropriate and possible, any information about actions for which those parties
may be cited, for their review and response within a specified deadline. To further uphold the right of
reply, the Group is committed to annexing to its reports brief rebuttals, with a summary and
assessment of their credibility, and to make any appropriate amendments regarding assertions already
published in earlier reports, in consultation with previous Groups of Experts, where possible.
Nevertheless, the Group is not a judicial mechanism or an intelligence service, and does not dispose
of the financial resources, technical assets, or legal power to subpoena information which in a number
of Member States is protected by privacy laws. The Group relies upon the cooperation from Member
States to support its investigations by providing the Group with, as per paragraph 16 of resolution
2021 (2011) "unhindered and immediate access to persons, documents, and sites the Group of Experts
deems relevant to the execution of its mandate." Though the Group generally does not benefit from a
favorable response rate to its written inquiries for concrete evidence from Member States, it remains
grateful to those Member States which have conducted thorough inquiries into individuals and issues
raised by the Group, including such cooperation recently extended by Norway. The Group encourages
Member States to provide information on regional and international networks with potential links to
armed groups in the DRC, unprompted by the Group's inquiries, and to consider taking action
bilaterally or regionally on the recommendations contained in the Group's reports.
Engagement with the Government of Rwanda
The Group conducted seven investigative missions to Rwanda, incuding two official visits with the
Government of Rwanda. The Group traveled to zones in western Rwanda where recruitment for M23
has been taking place, in particular to the towns of Ruhengeri and Kinigi. For further information
regarding the Group's engagement with the Government of Rwanda prior to the publication of the
Addendum to the interim report, see paragraphs 6-17 of Annex 3 regarding the Government of
Rwanda's claims that the Group did not provide it with a right of reply.
Following the Group's second official visit to Kigali on 25-27 July 2012, the Government of Rwanda
has subsequently refused on five separate occasions to meet and cooperate with the Group of Experts
including during the Minister of Foreign Affairs' visit to New York in August 2012. Moreover, the
Group was willing to delay the submission of its final report, scheduled for 12 October 2012 (though
Securty Resolution 2021 required submission "by 19 Ocobter 2012") in order to provide the
Government of Rwanda with one last opportunity to discuss with the Group on 13 October 2012 in
Rwanda. However, the Government of Rwanda once again refused to participate in any meeting with
the Group's Coordinator.
Engagement with the Government of Uganda
The Group conducted a total of ten investigative missions to Uganda, including an unprecedented
three official visits to discuss the situation in the eastern DRC with government representatives
designated by the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations. During the Group's first visit
from 23-25 May 2012, the Ugandan Foreign Ministry arranged only one roundtable discussion with
some senior security officials. During that meeting, the Group posed several questions about the M23
rebellion's deployments near the Ugandan border but did not receive any response. Though the Group
requested a follow-up meeting with the heads of external and military intelligence to discuss M23, the
Ugandan officials told the Group that any discussion on this subject would need to pass through
official channels.
In early June 2012, the Group orally expressed its disappointment to representatives of the Ugandan
Permanent Mission to the United Nations, who instructed the Group to conduct a follow-up visit to
Kampala and explicitly request in writing to meet with the heads of external and military intelligence
to discuss M23. The Group communicated accordingly in a letter dated 9 August 2012.
However, during the subsequent second official visit to Uganda from 17-18 September 2012
(extended to 22 September 2012), the Ugandan representatives only organized a one-hour meeting for
the Group with junior security officials. A lieutenant from military intelligence told the Group that
that: a) no M23 member had ever been present in Ugandan territory, despite this being public
knowledge at the time; b) M23 was simply "winning hearts and minds of the Congolese people" and;
c) no Ugandans were supporting M23 from Ugandan territory or in the DRC. The Group took note of
these official statements, but insisted on a serious discussion regarding M23 with senior external and
military intelligence officials, as per its letter. However, Ugandan officials declined to arrange any
further meetings for the Group, despite the dozens of phone calls and even a personal follow-up visit
to the Foreign Ministry by the Group's Coordinator. The Group remained an additional five days in
Uganda waiting for this meeting and only departed the country on 23 September 2012.
As such, in an email dated 24 September 2012, the Group expressed its disappointment once again to
the Ugandan Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York who then arranged for a third
official visit to Uganda to meet with a senior officer within the Ugandan police. On 14 October 2012,
the Group traveled to the Ugandan border town of Kisoro and presented the designated representative
of the Government of Uganda with its findings, explicitly stating that individuals within the Ugandan
security services had provided technical, political, and material support to M23. The senior Ugandan
police officer acknowledged that this support to M23 was indeed taking place, but maintained that this
was not an official government policy and promised to take immediate action to investigate and arrest
any individuals involved in such support to M23.
In a letter dated 15 September 2012, the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations invited
the Group to return to Kampala for a fourth official visit. Unfortunately, the Group had already
completed its field research and was in the process of returning to its home bases at the time. The
Group replied that it would be happy to follow up on expressed plans by the Government of Uganda
to take action against M23 supporters in Uganda through a meeting in Goma. However, no Ugandan
official traveled to the DRC to meet with members of the Group.
Annex 3
The text of the Group's written response to the Committee, dated
2 October 2012, concerning the Government of Rwanda's rebuttal to
the Addendum (S/2012/348/Add.1).
I. Introduction
1. Though the Group of Experts' findings of Government of Rwanda (GoR) violations of the arms
embargo have received broad support from the members of the Committee, the GoR's rebuttal is
characterized by a tone of general disdain for the Group's work and its methodology. The GoR states
that the Group's findings "have no value whatsoever, and should be considered with the contempt
they deserve."
5 Publically, Rwandan President Paul Kagame has called the Addendum, "rubbish."6
During the Group's visit to Kigali, the head of GoR delegation said the Group's work was "trash."
2. The GoR rebuttal's seeks to distort the conclusions of the Group's investigations so as to portray
them as if they "hinge on" specific minor details.
7 However, the Group purposefully stated that it had
gathered "overwhelming evidence" demonstrating that the GoR had directly violated the United
Nations arms embargo and sanctions regime. During an intense period of its investigations, dating
from 4 May 2012 when the GoR created M23 to 13 June 2012, when the Group orally presented its
findings before the Sanctions Committee, the Group reached conclusions about GoR violations of the
arms embargo and organized them within seven categories:
• Direct assistance in the creation of M23 through the transport of weapons and soldiers
through Rwandan territory
• Recruitment of Rwandan youth and demobilized ex-combatants as well as Congolese
refugees for M23
• Provision of weapons and ammunition to M23
• Mobilization and lobbying of Congolese political and financial leaders for the benefit of M23
• Direct Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) interventions into Congolese territory to reinforce
M23
• Support to several other armed groups as well as Forces armées de la république
démocratique du Congo (FARDC) mutinies in the eastern Congo
• Violation of the assets freeze and travel ban through supporting sanctioned individuals.
8
3. As per its previous commitments, the Group has made clear its willingness to correct and/or clarify
any information within the categories which may be required following additional research. However,
the Group explicitly adopted an approach of categorization of arms embargo violations, not only to
present its findings in the most coherent fashion possible, but also to avoid the possibility that one
detail would undermine the entire category. Even if the Group were to retract one or two elements per
category, more than sufficient evidence would remain to substantiate each of the seven categories of
violations of the arms embargo.
4. Nevertheless, the Group does not share the view that any of the arguments in the GoR's rebuttal
would convince it to alter any particular elements or overall categories of the Addendum.
5. The Committee has consistently requested that the Group seek to compliment first-hand witness
testimony with as much physical documentation it is able to gather. The Group included the images
and documents in the Addendum for this reason. However, this physical documentation does not
constitute the foundation upon which the Group's findings are based, but rather they reinforce the
unprecedented number of credible first-hand witness accounts attesting to GoR support to armed
groups in the eastern DRC.
6. Prior to the submission of the Addendum, the Group interviewed over 80 former combatants who
all confirmed Rwandan support to armed groups, including M23. Many of these combatants were
interviewed several times by different members of the Group and in multiple languages to evaluate
potential inaccuracies in their testimony. The Group also cross-checked and confirmed these accounts
with dozens of other sources including local leaders, villagers, politicians, former members of CNDP,
current and former members of the RDF, other Rwandan authorities, border officials, and in many
cases, current M23 members themselves. Without these detailed first-hand accounts, none of the
complimentary images and/or documents standing alone would have led the Group to reach the
conclusions that it did.
II. GoR Arguments on Fairness and Process
a) Absence of a right of reply
7. Throughout its rebuttal to the Group's Addendum, the GoR repeatedly makes the claim that the
Group "did not feel compelled to consult the Rwandan authorities."
9 The rebuttal defends that "at no
stage was the GoR provided an opportunity to offer substantive input"
10 and "none of the sources
interviewed were Rwandan officials."
11 Furthermore, the GoR argues "any formal consultation with
the GoR would have invalidated the need for the addendum."
12
8. As stated in the Addendum,
13 these claims are untrue. From 14-17 May 2012, the Group, in
connection with its letter sent to the Permanent Mission of Rwanda on 19 April 2012, conducted an
official visit to Kigali during which the GoR declined to participate in any substantive meetings with
the Group other than a thirty-minute conversation on 17 May. During the latter, however, the Group
quickly raised several concerns regarding the potential for external support from Rwandan territory to
M23 in light of its recently established position along the DRC-Rwanda border. The GoR
representatives declined to respond and stated that they took note of these questions.
9. The GoR has also stated that the GoE did not explicitly mention M23 in its letter of 19 April 2012
concerning this visit to Kigali.
14 However, M23 was created on 4 May 2012, more than two weeks
after the transmittal of the Group's letter regarding this official visit. Therefore, the Group could not
have made any reference to M23 in such a communication, as the rebel movement did not exist at the
time. The GoR also claims that "the purpose of that visit was unrelated to violations of the UN Arms
Embargo and certainly not to Rwanda's alleged support to the M23 mutiny."
15 However, the Group's
core mandate is the arms embargo, and all of its activities, research, and official visits are
fundamentally based on monitoring its application and investigating violations of the embargo. In the
second paragraph of its 19 April 2012 letter, the Group states, "As you are aware, the Group of
Experts is mandated by the Security Council to monitor implementation and investigate violations of
the arms embargo, with a view to recommending individuals and entities for financial and travel
sanctions."
16 Furthermore, during its previous mandates, the Group has always discussed external
support to armed groups in violation of the arms embargo while conducting its official visits to
Rwanda. This has included diaspora backing of the FDLR and previous GoR support to the CNDP.
Furthermore, the Group attached to its 19 April 2012 letter to the GoR a copy of Security Council
resolution 2021 (2011), which constitutes the current mandate of the Group of Experts and renews the
arms embargo on all armed groups operating in the DRC.
10. Prior to this official visit, the Group made two other attempts to meet with the GoR in Kigali. At
the outset of its mandate, on 29 February 2012, representatives of the GoR's Permanent Mission to the
United Nations invited the Group to Kigali for a series of meetings during the third week of March
2012. However, when the Group sought to arrange the final details, the GoR canceled the visit.
Subsequently on 7 April 2012, two members of the Group arranged a meeting in Kigali with Rwandan
Minister of Defence, General James Kabarebe. However, after traveling three hours from Goma to
Kigali and waiting another five hours, the meeting was also canceled.
11. The Group raised its frustration with the lack of communication with the GoR's Permanent
Mission to the United Nations on 6 June 2012. As a result, two senior government officials did meet
with a member of the Group in Kigali on 9 June 2012, during which time they explicitly discussed the
crisis in eastern DRC and the activities of M23.
12. Furthermore, at the specific request of members of the Committee, the Group agreed to delay its
submission of the Addendum in order to provide the GoR with an opportunity to share any
explanations or clarifications regarding the Group's findings. On 25 June, the Coordinator of the
Group met in New York with the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, H.E. Louise
Mushikiwabo, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations, H.E. Eugène Richard
Gasana, and the Presidential Security Advisor, Major Patrick Karuretwa. With regards to this
meeting, the GoR rebuttal states that "The GoE coordinator also offered to include in the report any
comment from his Rwandan interlocutors, notwithstanding the fact that, even at that stage, he did not
present anything beyond the "general categories of allegations" against Rwanda."
17 This claim is
untrue.
13. During this meeting, the Coordinator, accompanied by a member of the United Nations
Secretariat, clarified for the GoR delegation the Group's methodology, the process of the submission
of the interim report (S/2012/348) and the circumstances of the Addendum. However, contrary to
what the GoR rebuttal purports, when the Coordinator began his briefing on the contents of the
Addendum, the GoR delegation asked the Coordinator to wait until a follow-up visit to Kigali in July
2012.
14. After explaining that members of the Committee had explicitly requested that the Group provide
the GoR with the contents of the Addendum and the opportunity for a right of reply, the Coordinator
proceeded with his briefing. Though the GoR representatives listened to the Group's findings, they
declined to pose any questions or respond with any explanations or clarifications. Nevertheless,
immediately following the meeting with the Coordinator on 25 June 2012, the Minister conducted a
press conference at the United Nations on the crisis in eastern DRC, during which she stated,
"Rwanda is not privy to the leak of this report. We don't really know what is being claimed here but. .
. our position is that whatever is in the report, Rwanda and the Rwandan Army doesn't know and
hasn't had the opportunity to look at the allegations and comment."
18 On that same evening, the
Coordinator held a follow-up meeting with Major Karuretwa to discuss further the contents the
Group's Addendum. However, Karuretwa once again declined to provide any explanation or
clarification of the Group's findings.
15. Despite these facts, the GoR claims that "it is therefore preposterous to suggest that a 30-minutes
meeting, two hours before the submission of the addendum to the UN Sanctions Committee, could be
considered as Rwanda's opportunity to respond to detailed allegations against its senior officials." Not
only did the meeting with the Minister take place from 9 am to 11 am, but the Addendum was
submitted to the Sanctions Committee the following day on 26 June 2012. The Group communicated
in writing to the Chairman of the Committee regarding the GoR's reticence to take advantage of this
opportunity for a right of reply on 25 June 2012.
16. In the absence of any explanation or response the Group sought out information which could
constitute an official GoR position, for the purposes of the Addendum, including a statement made by
the Rwandan representative to the African Union
19 as well as the confidential Rwandan report within
the Joint Verification Mechanism.
20
b) Pressure from the Sanctions Committee
17. The GoR's rebuttal claims that "Mr. Hege admitted that the GoE did not initially intend to present
the allegations at that stage but bowed to demands by members of the DRC Sanctions Committee."
21
However, the Group originally submitted an interim report to the Committee on 18 May 2012, which
it began drafting prior to the creation of M23. By the time the Group arrived to present its findings to
the Committee on 13 June 2012, it had already gathered considerable evidence on GoR violations of
the arms embargo. The Group provided the Committee with multiple options for the presentation of
such new and critical information and suggested the publication of an Addendum to the interim report,
which was endorsed by the Committee. Though independent in nature, the Group operates on the
basis of the guidance and advice of the members of the Sanctions Committee.
c) Pressure from the media & NGOs
18. The GoR rebuttal refers to a series of social media commentary by the Director of Human Rights
Watch in seeking to explain the origins of the Addendum.
22 It also argues that "news organizations
transformed unverified allegations from an interim document into the central element of the GoE's
findings namely that Rwanda was secretly supporting militia groups in the eastern DRC."
23 As
previously described (see paragraphs 13 & 17 above), the process of the submission of an Addendum
to the interim report was based on the Group's independent technical investigations on arms embargo
violations and its consultations with the Committee. The submission was, therefore, in no way related
to social media commentary or news organisations.
d) Follow-up visit to Kigali following publication of the Addendum
19. As per its commitment expressed in the Addendum,
24 the Group conducted a second official visit
to Kigali from 23-25 July 2012 in order to formally receive the GoR response to the Group's findings.
In paragraph 10 of its rebuttal, the GoR states that during the visit, it provided the Group with
"technical evidence regarding each allegation."
25 This is not the case. While the GoR did orally brief
the Group on its response and referred to many documents, including confidential internal
MONUSCO reports, the GoR did not provide the Group any document to view or read during its visit.
However, the GoR did pose numerous questions to the Group about its alleged failings in
methodology.
20. The GoR states that "as acknowledged by members of the GoE, it is strongly expected that the
information shared will be clearly reflected in the final GoE report."
26 The Group never
acknowledged that it would adopt the GoR's version of events in the final report, but rather
consistently stated throughout the three days, that it would "take into consideration" the GoR's
information during its ongoing investigations.
III.GoR Arguments on Methodology
a) Manipulation of the Group by the Government of the DRC
21. During the 23-25 July 2012 visit to Kigali, the GoR argued that the Group was the victim of an
elaborate set-up orchestrated by the Congolese military leadership and intelligence services to frame
Rwanda. The Group has found no evidence to support this hypothesis. The Congolese military and
intelligence authorities could hardly be in a position to fabricate interviews with over 80 excombatants,
throughout Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces, in order to "support and
disseminate their own allegations."
27 Furthermore, it is very unlikely that in addition to excombatants,
the Government of the DRC would have been able to set up testimonies from local
villagers, politicians, border officials, civil society groups, former rebel commanders, former and
current RDF officers, and even active M23members and collaborators which the Group consistently
consulted during its field investigations.
22. Secondly, the GoR's argument ignores the fact that up until 7 June 2012, the official DRC
government policy was to avoid any public accusations against Rwanda in the hopes of quietly
resolving the issue of the GoR's support to M23. As such, the DRC's senior officials instructed the
military and civilian intelligence communities not to mention GoR involvement in their interactions
with the Group and sought to hide information from the Group as well as block access to key firsthand
witnesses.
23. The claim that the Government of the DRC misled the Group by feeding it false information also
overlooks the fact that in its recent reports, the Group has found numerous DRC authorities to be in
violation of the arms embargo. The Group has also consistently highlighted the risks related to the
handing over of military power in eastern DRC to abusive and criminal commanders of the ex-CNDP,
an arrangement which the Government of DRC previously defended as necessary in the interest of
peace.
24. Prior to the submission of the interim report (S/2012/348), the Group had only met once the
Administrator General of the
Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR), KalevMutundo during the
month of March 2012. Only on 7 June 2012 did the Administrator General phone the Coordinator to
ask for a copy of the Group's interim report. Contrary to the assertions of the GoR, the Group
conducted its investigations on GoR violations of the arms embargo without any formal assistance
from the ANR and the FARDC's military intelligence chiefs.
25. Finally, though not explicitly stated in its rebuttal, in several media interviews, the senior
leadership of the GoR has claimed that the Group is constituted of young and inexperienced experts
who would be easily manipulated by DRC authorities. In an interview, General Kabarebe asks, "How
could the United Nations designate these people as expert, so young, and little experienced, who get
lost in acronyms . . .They don't even have a minimum level of comprehension necessary in this
region."
28 However, the Secretary-General appointed each member of the Group based on his/her
extensive research experience on the DRC and the Great Lakes region. With five of the six members
of the Group having returned from the 2011 mandate, the current Group, in fact, benefits from
considerable experience in arms embargo violations monitoring.
b) Confidentiality of the Group's sources
26. Throughout its rebuttal, the GoR frequently criticizes the principal of confidentiality of the
Group's sources. The GoR claims that the Addendum is based on "hearsay and anonymous witness
testimony."
29 The GoR argues that "the onus to prove the identity of the alleged surrendered RDF
soldier is on the GoE and/or its sources."
30 The GoR also states that "Rwanda has not been given a
chance to interview the subjects or examine their testimonies and the GoE has not provided the details
of the individuals. Therefore, their testimonies cannot be used in the report",
31 and the Group does not
provide names of ex-FDLR sent to reinforce M23.
32
27. Nevertheless, in accordance with endorsed expert panel methodologies, the Group strictly adheres
to the confidentiality of its sources.
33 In light of the highly sensitive nature of the GoR's violations of
the arms embargo, this principle is even more paramount. In all of its reports, the Group endeavours to
provide the Committee with a general idea of the category of sources which substantiate specific
assertions, without revealing information which may compromise the physical security of those
individuals.
28. During the Group's visit to Kigali, however, the GoR insisted on questioning members of the
Group regarding specific individuals the GoR suspected of cooperating with the Group's
investigations. The GoR intentionally named individuals in order to assess the reaction from the
Group.
c) Fabrication of testimony by witnesses
29. The GoR suggested that the Group's sources fabricated evidence and testimony against Rwanda.
34
The GoR has argued that particularly ex-combatants have obvious motivations to lie and distort their
stories so as to please the authorities in whose custody they remain. The rebuttal states that
"fabricating evidence and dictated narratives, often represent the only life-ticket for 'former enemies'
in the hands of the notoriously abusive Governmental services and armed forces."
35 General Charles
Kayonga refers to ex-combatants as "coerced witnesses"
36 and Captain Celestin Senkoko argued that
those who provided information about his involvement "have done so out of duress and fear to save
their lives."
37
30. The Group found no evidence to substantiate the GoR's claims. As previously mentioned (see
paragraph 22 above), from the earliest stages of the mutiny, the Government of DRC was adamant
about hiding any information and/or witnesses which might implicate Rwanda. Thus, it would be
impossible for these same authorities to "coerce" testimonies for the Group. Furthermore, nearly all
the ex-combatants that the Group interviewed were initially reticent to provide sensitive information.
Contrary to any possible coercion from Congolese authorities who were not present during the
interviews, it was only when ex-combatants built greater trust with members of the Group that they,
on guarantees of strict confidentiality, revealed information concerning GoR support to armed groups.
Furthermore, the Group consistently assessed all accounts for credibility through extensive interviews
with local villagers, politicians, former RDF officials, as well as, in many cases, with current M23
members themselves.
31. Moreover, in its past cooperation with the Group, the GoR has facilitated numerous interviews
with former combatants within Rwanda. The Group has consistently accepted these opportunities and
conveyed to Rwandan military intelligence that, as it did during its investigations of the Addendum,
the Group must interview ex-combatants without the presence of security officials and independently
corroborate any accounts provided to it.
d) Lack of a motive
32. Another argument which the GoR has advanced is that the Group did not provide an explanation
for Rwandan violations of the arms embargo. During its visit to Kigali, GoR representatives told the
Group that they had been the guarantors of the integration of the CNDP since the joint RDF-FARDC
"Umoja Wetu" operations (Jan-Feb 2009), and therefore it would be illogical that they undermine
such a process. The GoR rebuttal states that the "GoE fails to ask why would Rwanda support M23
and what would it be seeking?"
38
33. In line with its mandate, the Group of Experts is first and foremost a team of field investigators
who establish facts concerning violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime. However, the
Group's previous reports, notably the 2011 final report (S/2011/738) and the 2012 interim report
(S/2012/348), provide sufficient findings, including on the regional trade in natural resources, for
independent political analysts to determine the motivations behind the GoR's support to armed groups
in the eastern DRC.
e) Disregarding material evidence
34. The GoR also argues that the Group routinely "disregarded available material evidence"
39 in
favour of testimonies. Unfortunately, as the GoR avoided any substantive engagement with the Group,
as mentioned above (see paragraphs 8-15 above), it was not possible to obtain any material evidence
in Rwanda. Furthermore, as this response to the GoR's rebuttal demonstrates, GoR documents have
not been sufficient to overrule or discredit the overwhelming evidence that the Group has
independently gathered.
f) Failure to investigate in Rwanda
35. Finally, the GoR rebuttal states that "no or very limited effort is made by the GoE to collect
corresponding amounts of testimonies from the Rwandan side where most of the alleged events
occurred."
40 However, the Group did indeed conduct investigations in Rwanda in areas where RDF
recruitment for M23 had been taking place. These visits confirmed and complimented the accounts
provided by numerous former combatants, politicians, former RDF officers, and border officials.
36. Nevertheless, the Group has found it extremely challenging to conduct research in Rwanda where
the authorities have routinely followed the Group, questioned several of the Group's interlocutors and
interpreters, and forced them to make official statements for intelligence purposes. The brief
conversation that a member of the Group held with Lieutenant Colonel Jomba (see paragraph 83
below) led to an exhaustive report regarding Jomba's communications with the Group.
41 This example
confirms the Group fears for the potentially negative consequences of even short interactions with
individuals within Rwanda.
IV.GoR Arguments on Factual Grounds
a) RDF direct reinforcements of M23 operations in the DRC
42
37. Collected over a period of five weeks, the Addendum outlines twelve credible and detailed
accounts of RDF direct reinforcement to M23 during its operations and combat against the FARDC.
However, the GoR argues that "provision of evidence regarding unit's designations, names of their
commanders, areas of operations, and other identifiers and operational details may be the only way
this allegation can be credible."
43
38. In its confidential letter to the Committee dated 7 August 2012,
44 the Group stated very clearly the
names of commanders and unit numbers involved in the attacks on Bunagana and Rutshuru during the
month of July 2012. While the GoR appears to have obtained a copy of this confidential letter and
publicly criticized elements of its contents, the GoR did not refute the Group's documentation of
operational details including RDF units and commanders that the Group cited as taking part in the
M23 attacks in Rutshuru.
39. Furthermore, during the course of the Group's visit to Kigali on 23-25 July 2012, GoR
representatives wrote a detailed message to the Group cautioning it that members of the Congolese
intelligence services were meeting together to fabricate false evidence regarding Rwandan
involvement in upcoming M23 attacks. As predicted by the GoR, the M23 attacks did take place
between 25-26 July, taking the major towns of Rutshuru, Kiwanja, and Rumangabo. Subsequently, the
Group found no independent confirmation or additional evidence of the meeting the GoR alleged to
have taken place, but did confirm the presence of RDF reinforcements in those particular M23
operations in Rutshuru. Not only did ex-combatants, politicians, FARDC, and M23 members
themselves confirmed the RDF participation, but also over ten villagers in Rutshuru stated that the
RDF troops were very visible because of their distinct discipline and the manner in which they carried
themselves. Confirming the credibility of such accounts, during its 23-25 July 2012 visit to Kigali,
General James Kabarebe argued that RDF soldiers could not be in the DRC, because they would be
too easily identifiable for exactly these same reasons.
40. Furthermore, the GoR argues that General Ntaganda does not need RDF support because he was
one of the most senior officers in the FARDC. However, the Group described in its interim report
(S/2012/348) how ex-CNDP officers began resisting Ntaganda's orders as of March 2012, thus
undermining his role and credibility. In fact, Ntaganda was so weakened that, after escaping from
Goma following immense pressure for his arrest, the FARDC successfully defeated his mutineers in
Masisi. Ntaganda subsequently was forced to flee once again towards the Rwandan border after his
troops had been driven out of Masisi. Ex-RDF and ex-CNDP former officers told the Group that an
advance party of soldiers loyal to Ntaganda, as well as RDF special units, had been sent to Runyoni to
prepare General Ntaganda's military position ahead of his arrival.
q) Phone calls to FARDC officers by RDF Generals Kayonga and Kabarebe
45
41. Concerning the Group's findings that Generals James Kabarebe and Charles Kayonga made
numerous calls to recruit and intimidate individuals on behalf of M23, the GoR claims that the Group
"deliberately" took these communications out of context. The rebuttal states that "most of the phone
calls and/or meetings were either solicited by the DRC Government or pursuant to mechanisms
established in the spirit of the UMOJA-WETU framework."
46 In his letter contained in the rebuttal,
Kabarebe cites five meetings and during discussions with the Group, he referred to "numerous" phone
calls and meetings with FARDC senior officers involved in the original mutiny and eventually M23.
47
42. DRC authorities have confirmed that the Minister of Defence of another country is only
authorized to speak with his counterpart and that no "UMOJA-WETU"
48 framework exists which
allows him to contact subordinates of the opposite Minister of Defence. Moreover, ex-RDF officers,
ex-CNDP officers, current M23 members, FARDC officers and politicians with close ties to the GoR
have repeatedly informed the Group that Generals Kabarebe and Kayonga have made these phone
calls actually to give direct orders to ex-CNDP and M23 officers in the Kivus, including General
Ntaganda.
b) The use of Kanombe military barracks in support of M23
49
43. As cited above, in support of its conclusion that the GoR had deployed RDF forces in the DRC to
sporadically reinforce M23, the Group gathered twelve detailed accounts of this particular category of
arms embargo violation. One of the accounts mentioned "training" at the Kanombe military barracks.
The GoR claims in its rebuttal that training in Kanombe is impossible because "it is common (and
verifiable) knowledge that Kanombe is a garrison-type barracks that comprises living quarters; a
referral military hospital also open to civilian patients; a cemetery; and five service support units'
headquarters and related facilities."
50
44. However, the Group did visit Kanombe barracks on 25 July 2012, alongside RDF officers, and
found that there were indeed several parade fields for marching and military drills as well as wooded
areas where training could be conducted. Furthermore, for covert operations in DRC territory,
"training" for experienced RDF soldiers usually consists of briefings and preparations of small
groups, to be carried out in any military facility. The Kanombe military barracks provides more than
sufficient facilities for such activities. The Group communicated these observations to the GoR while
at Kanombe, but nevertheless the GoR rebuttal inaccurately states that "a tour of Kanombe barracks
carried out by members of the GoE on the 25
th of June 2012 made it clear that no military instruction
could be held in such a busy neighborhood."
45. Since the publication of the Addendum, the Group has independently confirmed with several
ex-RDF officers, an ex-CNDP officer, an M23 collaborator and other Rwandan nationals that the
Kanombe military hospital treats RDF casualties resulting from operations in the DRC in support of
M23. According to the same sources, RDF troops recently killed in operations in the DRC have also
been buried behind the hospital in the military cemetery at the Kanombe barracks. The RDF did not
allow the Group to enter the hospital during its visit to Kanombe.
c) RDF recruitment of Rwandans for M23
51
46. With regards to recruitment of Rwandan citizens for M23, the GoR states that, "It is possible that
M23 cadres or Kinyarwanda-speaking FARDC officers living in proximity of the DRC-Rwanda
border could have clandestinely mobilized and recruited some youth to join their own movements. It
cannot be ruled out either that Rwandan citizens with family backgrounds linking them to FARDC
army officers or M23 fighters could have organized covert recruitment operations."
52 If this were
indeed taking place, the GoR should have conducted a thorough investigation and sought to arrest
individuals involved in such networks. To date however, the Group is not aware of any efforts made
by the GoR to investigate or detain those individuals involved in recruitment activities within
Rwandan territory. Furthermore, the RDF's dense deployment all along the border would make it
impossible for M23 recruits to clandestinely enter into the DRC without a minimum level of tacit
support.
47. Moreover, the GoR claims that during its own investigation, "the 30 Rwandans did not claim
involvement by the RDF or any other official of the GoR."
53 Nevertheless, the GoR did not ever
interview 30 Rwandan citizens in the DRC. Through the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM), GoR
representatives did however, interview 11 Rwandan nationals who, out of fear for potential threats to
their lives upon return to Rwanda, refused to provide details about members of the same security force
which they originally stated to the Group was involved in their recruitment from Rwanda.
48. Despite the fact that the GoR's representatives on the JVM recognized the ex-combatants as
Rwandan citizens, when MONUSCO sought to repatriate them on 14 July 2012, the GoR refused to
let them cross the border, questioning their nationality, and forced them back into UN camps.
Unfortunately, in early September 2012, this indefinite delay led most of these combatants to return
clandestinely to Rwanda.
49. Furthermore, the GoR argued that recruitment could not take place in refugee camps in Rwanda,
because "UNHCR is in charge of refugee camps and not the Government of Rwanda."
54 In the
Group's view, whether or not UNHCR oversees the management of refugee camps has no bearing on
the capacity of RDF officers or M23 collaborators to enter and recruit. Moreover, refugees and M23
collaborators confirmed that recruitment has taken place in Nkarmira camp outside Gisenyi,
regardless of UNHCR's presence.
50. Following the publication of the Addendum on 29 June 2012, the Group did visit Kinigi and
specifically General Bosco Ntaganda's hotel used for M23 recruitment, by the name of Bushokoro.
55
The Group confirmed that the premises of Bushokoro correspond to the description provided by
Rwandan ex-combatants of M23. An RDF protection force also surrounded the hotel and several
individuals inside took photos of members of the Group.
d) 75 mm canon rounds used by M23
56
51. The GoR argues that in its interim report, the Group stated that it would inquire about the origins
of the hundreds of 75 mm canon rounds which the FARDC discovered in the remaining weapons
caches held by Colonel Sultani Makenga
57 and that there was not sufficient time to do so between the
submission of the interim report and the Addendum. However, the Group submitted its interim report
on 18 May 2012 and the Addendum on 26 June 2012, thus providing it over five weeks to follow-up
on weapons and ammunition with several FARDC senior commanders, logistics officers, and military
development partners.
52. During this period, the Group incontrovertibly established through dozens of interviews with
ex-M23 combatants that the RDF had been providing M23 with arms and ammunition. To
compliment this conclusion, the Group describes in the Addendum that the M23 had been using
weapons and ammunition which were not available in FARDC stockpiles.
58 The Group specifically
cites anti-tank rounds found on the battlefield as well as 75 mm canon rounds left behind by Colonel
Makenga in one of his two arms caches. The GoR has consistently argued that M23 elements obtain
their weapons and ammunition by removing them from FARDC stocks when they defect. However,
FARDC stockpiles do not officially include 75 mm mortar rounds. As such, the Group sought to
highlight the contradiction in those assertions.
53. During its visit to Kigali, the GoR informed the Group that since its arrival to power, the RPF had
never purchased any 75 mm canon rounds. It acknowledged, however, that the previous government
of President Juvénal Habyarimana did indeed maintain significant numbers of 75 mm canon rounds
which the RPF seized upon taking control of the country in 1994. The GoR told the Group that it had
systematically destroyed these rounds in 2008. The GoR did not provide the Group with any details of
where and how these ammunition rounds were stored during those 14 years.
54. The GoR stated that "relevant documented evidence can be availed for in-situ review as verified
by members of the GoE during their recent visit to the Ordinance Regiment on 25 July 2012."
59 This
assertion is untrue. When RDF officers invited the Group to view the destroyed ammunition, the
Group only observed massive piles of dismantled AK-47 rifles. The RDF officers told the Group that
the 75 mm canon rounds were not visible because they were at the bottom of the piles of small arms.
The Group is of the view, however, that the only safe means of destroying 75 mm canon rounds would
be that of large-scale detonation. This would have to take place in open fields far from population
centres, not at a military barracks situated less than a kilometre from Kigali International Airport.
55. Furthermore, following the recommendation from the GoR, the Group requested the Nairobibased
Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA)
60 to provide it with information concerning the
destruction of weapons in Rwanda over the last decade. However, the response obtained from RECSA
only included small arms and light weapons, indicating that no 75 mm canon rounds have been
destroyed in Rwanda.
56. Finally, the GoR claims to have "credible information,"
61 which it did not avail to the Group, that
the FARDC possesses 75 mm canon rounds. Subsequent to the Group's 23-25 July 2012 visit to
Kigali, the GoR has argued that the 2008 final report of the Groups of Experts (S/2008/773) found
that the CNDP had looted one 75 mm canon from the FARDC, and the 2009 final report of the Group
of Experts (S/2009/603) stated that upon integrating into the FARDC, the CNDP turned in six 75 mm
recoilless canons to the government.
62 Nevertheless, though these very small amounts of 75 mm
recoilless canons may exist in private caches of FARDC officers, the Group maintains that their
corresponding ammunition, i.e. 75 mm canon rounds, of which Makenga had privately accumulated
over 500, do not exist in official FARDC records and therefore could not have been obtained through
diversion of government stockpiles.
e) RDF Support to other armed groups
63
57. The Group's Addendum included extensive findings that the GoR was not only supporting M23,
but also several other armed groups in eastern DRC. However, in paragraph 47 of its rebuttal, the GoR
claims that it "has no interest in aligning with small rebel groups to achieve its security objectives."
Nevertheless, even prior to the creation of M23, the Group had confirmed GoR alliances with several
armed groups which supported its covert operations against the FDLR.
58. Meanwhile throughout the Group's discussions during its 23-25 July 2012 visit to Kigali, the GoR
consistently advocated in defence of all armed groups in eastern DRC which, in its view, should be
regarded as credible and legitimate forces seeking protection against the FDLR and Government of
the DRC. General Kayonga stated that all Congolese armed groups acted out of self-defence and that
particularly Raia Mutomboki, responsible for wide-spread atrocities, pursued the same aims as M23.
Though there are no FDLR present in Ituri, Kayonga also argued that even Cobra Matata of the FRPI
was in fact created to fight against the Rwandan Hutu rebels. For his part, General Kabarebe told the
Group that his country had a common history with all armed groups in eastern DRC, including Mai
Mai Yakutumba, which were good friends with Rwanda because they fought together to overthrow
former President Mobutu Sese Seko.
59. With regards to the former Rwandan-imposed Governor of South Kivu, Xavier Chiribanya,
64 the
GoR stated to the Group in Kigali that it could not be held responsible for his activities within
Rwanda aimed at fomenting instability elsewhere. However, pursuant to Security Council Resolution
2021 (2011), all Member States are obliged to take measures to halt any violations of the arms
embargo.
65 To the Group's knowledge, Rwanda has undertaken no investigation into Chiribanya's
activities.
60. During Minister Mushikiwabo's press conference held at the United Nations on 25 June 2012, the
Presidential Security Advisor Karuretwa argued that M23 was not the only armed group in eastern
DRC, but other groups, such as the previously obscure "
Coalition des groups armés de l'Iuri
(COGAI)", were in fact the real threats to security in eastern DRC. In the Addendum, the Group
concluded that members of COGAI visited the Rwandan Minister of Defence in Kigali, receiving
financial and political support, only two weeks before Karuretwa's remarks in New York.
66
f) Lake crossing into Rwanda of Colonel Makenga's weapons and troops
67
61. With regards to the boat crossings into Rwanda of Colonel Makenga's weapons and troops, the
GoR argues that "it is not possible for RDF zodiac boats to carry 60 personnel."
68 However, in the
Addendum, the Group does not state that the motorized boats used in this case were RDF zodiac
boats. According to three ex-M23 soldiers who participated in the journey, Colonel Makenga rented
civilian boats specifically for this operation and the motors were turned off so as not to attract any
attention. These same sources stated that Rwandan civilians had been paid to manually row the boats.
62. The GoR also claimed during the Group's 23-25 July 2012 visit to Kigali that FARDC Naval units
deployed on the lake should have sighted and stopped the boats if they had crossed into Rwanda.
During previous mandates, the Group has documented undisturbed docking of boats at Makenga's
residence, as well as the Congolese Naval units' inaction in curbing mineral trafficking across the
lake.
69 The presence of FARDC Naval units on the lake is therefore not a deterrent to lake navigation
between the DRC and Rwanda by night.
63. During its meetings in Kigali, despite insisting that the Group consider alternative scenarios for
these events, the GoR failed to provide the Group with any reasonable explanation for how Colonel
Makenga's weapons and troops could have travelled from his home in Bukavu to Runyoni without
transiting through Rwanda. Furthermore, the FARDC has vigilantly monitored all road movements
from South Kivu to North Kivu, thus rendering it impossible for them to have travelled through
Congolese territory.
64. With regards to the arrival of Makenga's weapons and troops back to the DRC border, the GoR
also argues that "it is inconceivable how offloading of troops in RDF uniforms, on RDF trucks and on
the Rwandan side of the border at a time of tension would be viewed by so-called eye-witnesses as
extra-ordinary and linked to Col. Makenga." The first-hand witness testimonies near the border with
the DRC constitute additional confirmation of the original accounts described to the Group by excombatants
who took part in the troop movement themselves. These latter accounts are rendered more
credible when corroborated by independent local witnesses who attest to the arrival of RDF trucks on
that same day, and subsequently observed the movement of these off-loaded troops and weapons
across the border into the DRC.
65. Finally, the movement of Makenga's troops via Rwanda is consistent with a pattern of ex-FARDC
defections. According to current and former M23 officers and DRC officials, most ex-CNDP officers
who have joined M23 have done so using Rwandan territory.
n) Troop crossing north of Goma and visible "boot tracks"
70
66. The GoR questions the validity of a reference made by FARDC intelligence officers to "clear boot
tracks" of another group of Makenga's troops crossing the border into Rwanda north of Goma.
71
However, the accounts provided by the intelligence officers, border officials, and local leaders cited in
the Addendum more than meets the Group's standards of evidence. The Group only included the
reference to the "boot tracks" because separating the DRC and Rwanda at that specific location are
several bean fields. The movement of these soldiers through these crops was thus very visible after the
soldiers had crossed.
s) FARDC intercepts of RDF-M23 radio communications
72
67. The GoR claims that the radio intercepts referred to in the Addendum were impossible because the
RDF uses digital radio frequencies and not commercial ones.
73 However, in the Addendum, the Group
did not state that the radio communications intercepted by the FARDC were transmitted through RDF
radio equipment. Rather the Group concluded that the communications were between an RDF officer
and an M23 officer. The Group based its findings on the analysis of radio intercepts carried out by
several former armed group officers and one ex-RDF who confirmed the authenticity of the
communications, based on specific confidential code names and language in Kinyarwanda used by the
two parties.
68. According to ex-RDF and ex-CNDP officers, it is inconceivable that the RDF would provide
troops, weapons, and supplies to M23, and conduct joint operations with the rebels, without
establishing lines of radio communication. Former RDF and CNDP officers, with good knowledge of
RDF operations, told the Group that RDF did not widely distribute its own communication equipment
to rebels in the DRC out of fear they would be lost or seized as evidence. As a result, these same
sources acknowledged that RDF officers have used M23 communication assets which are commercial
radios also used by the FARDC, and thus easy to intercept, as in the case of the frequencies cited in
the Group's Addendum. FARDC officers engaged in operations against M23 in North Kivu and South
Kivu continue to regularly intercept M23-RDF communications. Ex-combatants and former RDF
officers state that only the most senior M23 commanders use digital radios to communicate at the
highest levels of the RDF.
69. Finally, the Group personally witnessed how an M23 officer, with a commercial radio, contacted
the RDF Special Forces units deployed in Rutshuru for security reinforcements. The member of the
Group encountered the RDF Special Forces who openly identified themselves as such, and confirmed
that the M23 had called them for this task. Following the publication of the Addendum, the Group
obtained further recordings of radio intercepts between commercial radios in which distinct RDF call
signs are audible. Former RDF officers have confirmed the veracity of the communications.
g) Former FDLR from RDF Reserve Force re-deployed to the DRC
74
70. Concerning the recycling of ex-FDLR combatants back to the DRC in support of M23, the GoR
claims that this is impossible because "the RDF Reserve is not an independent force, and would not
be in a position to provide unilateral support to armed groups."
75 In light of the Group's conclusion
that the Minister of Defence, the Ministry's Permanent Secretary, and the Chief of Defence Staff are
directly overseeing operations in the DRC and support to M23, whether or not the RDF Reserve force
could conduct unilateral operations is irrelevant. The RDF Reserve Force is under the ultimate
command of Generals Charles Kayonga and James Kabarebe.
h) RDF uniforms used by M23
76
71. In response to the photograph of a Rwandan uniform in the Addendum, the GoR claims that all
country's military uniforms are available throughout the Great Lakes region and particularly between
Rwanda and the DRC as a result of extensive RDF-FARDC joint operations.
77However, according to
several senior DRC government officials, the FARDC provided the RDF Special Forces with
Congolese uniforms and not the other way around.
72. The GoR also argues that "camouflage pants and any other military uniforms cannot be attributed
to the RDF unless proper verifications establish that they bear RDF insignia or serial numbers."
78
M23 ex-combatants stated to the Group that the RDF soldiers who recruited them had provided them
with military equipment, including uniforms; however many were forced to remove all potential
references to the RDF. Following the combat which took place at Rumangabo on 25 July 2012, the
FARDC recovered more RDF uniforms from surrendered and deceased soldiers, including one with a
tag from the Rwandan textile company, UTEXRWA.
73. In the Addendum, the Group included a photo displaying RDF gumboots and pants from an excombatant
in order to complement the account given by a former M23 soldier who attested to the
provision of uniforms and weapons by the RDF. Once again, the photo does not stand alone as
evidence, but reinforces and illustrates the accounts by former combatants of RDF provision of
uniforms and boots.
74. Finally, during frequent visits to territory controlled by M23, the Group continues to observe
combatants in RDF uniforms. To the Group's knowledge, M23 is the only armed group in the Kivus
which uses RDF uniforms.
i) Unique AK-47 rifle barrel used by M23
79
75. The GoR rebuttal states that "a single rifle cannot constitute credible evidence of weapon supply
to M23."
80 The Group agrees with the GoR in this case; as stated above, no piece of evidence taken
out of context could lead the Group to a definitive conclusion. However, when the bearer of the
weapons tells the Group that the RDF provided it to him, and this corresponds to dozens of other firsthand
accounts of similar provision of weapons, the single rifle becomes a complimentary piece of
evidence as a small illustration of a larger phenomenon.
j) Captain Celestin Senkoko's support to M23
81
76. In the GoR's rebuttal, Captain Celestin Senkoko acknowledges that "he has either initiated or they
have initiated the calls to FARDC officers and to politicians."
82 Senkoko claims, however, that he did
so out of efforts for peace and security. Furthermore, the GoR states that "Senkoko denies executing
any specific duties relating to foreign policy, but merely serves in assignments commensurate with his
rank of Captain."
83 Nevertheless, as the personal secretary of the Rwandan Minister of Defence,
Senkoko is responsible for executing direct tasks that the Minister gives to him which have been, as
the Group has concluded, directly related to support to M23. According to numerous local leaders and
military officials, Senkoko has been responsible for clandestine operations in the DRC in
collaboration with Ntaganda for many years throughout his military career, regardless of his rank.
k) Bishop John Rucyhana's support to M23
84
77. The GoR argues that Bishop John Rucyahana convened meetings for the purpose of peace and
unity.
85 This claim clearly contradicts several accounts of individuals who were present in the
meetings organized by Rucyahana and, on the contrary, attest to the Bishop's efforts to mobilize
recruits and resources for M23 from within Rwanda. Furthermore, the participants in Rucyhana's
meeting were mostly former CNDP politicians and M23 members who had fled from Goma (DRC) to
Gisenyi (Rwanda), from where they have been openly working to support M23. The Group is not
aware of any participant who has subsequently deserted M23 following meetings with Bishop
Rucyahana.
l) General Ruvusha's role in the creation of M23
86
78. The GoR claims that General Ruvusha could not possibly have supported the movement of
Colonel Makenga to form M23 because, at the time, he was on a two-week leave starting 30 April
2012.
87 Nevertheless, three first-hand witnesses interviewed by the Group placed General Ruvusha at
the Kabuhanga RDF base on 5 May 2012. The same sources sighted Ruvusha together with Colonel
Makenga, after the latter had fled through Rwandan territory and just before he returned to the DRC
to create the M23 rebellion. In addition, M23 collaborators, as well as North Kivu political leaders,
told the Group that Ruvusha met Makenga upon his arrival from Goma to Gisenyi on 4 May 2012.
79. As the RDF Division Commander in Gisenyi, it is highly unlikely that Ruvusha would have
departed his post during a period of tremendous unrest along the border with DRC, as well as during
RDF direct operations in the DRC.
o) Representatives of Goma business community meeting in Kigali
88
80. In its rebuttal, the GoR claims that there are no immigration records which show that the two
Congolese businessmen cited in the Addendum, Desiré Rwabaenda and Dieudonné Komayombi, had
ever crossed into Rwanda.
89 However, the Group has previously established the ease with which
Rwandan and Congolese citizens can cross into Rwanda without having to provide any
documentation. In its 2011 final report (S/2011/738), the Group documented border crossings in
Goma where tons of minerals had been smuggled into Rwanda.
90 Furthermore, the GoR
acknowledged to the Group that General Bosco Ntaganda traveled to Rwanda in 2011, constituting a
clear violation of the Committee's travel ban on Ntaganda, though the Group was unable to obtain any
documentation of his entry into Rwanda or exit from the DRC. Finally, as mentioned above, most
ex-FARDC defectors to M23 transit first via Rwanda, but are not registered in official immigration
records (see paragraph 65 above).
p) Support to M23 by RDF General Jack Nziza
91
81. In its rebuttal, the GoR maintains that the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence,
General Jack Nziza, could not have been involved in supporting M23 activities from western Rwanda
because he was fully dedicated to his "desk job" as chief administrator of the RDF in Kigali.
92 The
rebuttal shows records of meetings that he conducted in his office and within Kigali throughout that
time. However, the Group used the term "deployed" to signify that Nziza increased his presence in
western Rwanda to directly oversee support and mobilization in favour of M23. The town of
Ruhengeri, where most of the RDF support for the M23 has originated, is situated less than two hours
by road and twenty minutes by helicopter from Kigali.
82. Furthermore, according to former members of the RDF and the GoR, regardless of his everchanging
official position, Nziza has played varying roles in special operations in eastern DRC for
many years.
r) Lieutenant Colonel Jomba's support to M23
93
83. With regards to the involvement of Lieutenant Colonel Jomba Gakumba in support of M23, the
GoR claims that "The GoE would deliberately [disregard] specific information in their possession,
and falsely accused Jomba."
94Indeed, a member of the Group met with Jomba at Gako military
academy for a short conversation on 20 April 2012. However, the Group recognizes that it is entirely
possible that Jomba could have maintained some responsibilities at the Gako military academy while
simultaneously contributing to the RDF's support to the establishment and operations of M23 from
Ruhengeri, which is less than a three-hour drive from Gako. Despite his teaching responsibilities at
Gako, the GoR has recently named Jomba as its representative on the military evaluation team
deployed to North Kivu for the ICGLR
95-backed "neutral force." Moreover, the Group continues to
gather information regarding Jomba's involvement in support of M23.
t) General Ntaganda's properties in Rwanda
96
84. Concerning the GoR's violation of the sanction regime through failing to apply the assets freeze
on General Bosco Ntaganda, the GoR claims that the documents for the house identified by the Group
as belonging to Ntaganda in the Rwandan town of Gisenyi are not in Ntaganda's name.
97 However,
the Group did not seek to obtain the land records from the GoR regarding General Ntaganda's
properties because the Group had previously established that Ntaganda has never held in his own
name any of his extensive assets, including hotels, commercial businesses, vehicles, residences or
bank accounts.
85. Furthermore, in an interview with Time Magazine published on 14 September 2012,
98 Rwandan
President Paul Kagame responded to a question about Ntaganda's properties in Rwanda by saying,
"So what? . . . I would not be bothered. We do not differentiate when it comes to money unless it is
money that you killed people for or money that is questionable. But if you invest here, what's the
problem?"
u) Travel in Rwanda of sanctioned individuals
99
86. With regards to the travel of sanctioned individuals into Rwanda, in contravention of the travel
ban, the GoR acknowledged that General Ntaganda and Colonel Innocent Zimurinda have entered into
Rwandan territory, but defended that they had only done so with the authorization of the DRC
authorities.
100 Nevertheless, as the Group pointed out to the GoR while in Kigali, all Member States
must enforce the travel ban unless provided an explicit exemption by the Sanctions Committee. With
regards to sanctioned individual Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, the GoR's rebuttal fails to respond.
m) RDF tracer ammunition supplied to M23
101
87. During its 23-25 July 2012 visit to Kigali, the GoR did not contest the Group's findings regarding
RDF 7.62 tracer ammunition found in M23-controlled territory. Not only did the Group obtain
examples of this ammunition, but local villagers told the Group that M23 forced them to transport
military equipment from Rwanda to the rebels. According to FARDC officers, ex-M23 combatants as
well as RDF sources, this particular AK-47 ammunition has been used by the RDF.
v) General Laurent Nkunda's role in support of M23
102
88. In its rebuttal, the GoR also fails to address the issue of pro-M23 activities by
sanctioned
individual and former CNDP Chairman, General Laurent Nkunda, who is supposedly under house
arrest by the Rwandan authorities since January 2009. In subsequent discussions, one senior RDF
official confirmed that Nkunda is indeed involved in the support to M23 as the Group has described.
V. Attack Campaign Against the Group of Experts
89. Since the publication of the Addendum on 29 June 2012, the Group of Experts has explicitly
avoided any confrontation and back-and-forth public debate with the GoR. Only when the latter
requested to brief the Committee in New York on 27 August 2012, did the Group formally address the
GoR's rebuttal and the attacks against it.
90. Nevertheless, following the publication of the Addendum, the GoR has orchestrated an extensive
attack campaign against the members of the Group through multiple traditional and social media
channels. One website managed by a French-Israeli "cyber-defense" expert, published photos of all
the members of the Group.
103 The same individual authored an article in the Rwandan newspaper the
New Times, claiming members of the Group were concocting a plan to seize the mineral wealth of
eastern DRC.
104
91. The GoR has also sought to personally attack the Coordinator of the Group of Experts, making
false claims of genocide denial and alleging the Coordinator's sympathy for the FDLR. The GoR has
referred to an unpublished discussion paper found on a document-sharing website for which the
Coordinator was listed as the "contact" person. The paper outlines challenges to the demobilization of
the FDLR and mentions the same massacres committed against Rwandan Hutu refugees which the
UN's "Mapping Report"
105 thoroughly documented.
92. However, throughout its current and previous mandates, the Group has conducted objective and
detailed investigations on support networks to all armed groups operating in the DRC, including the
FDLR and its alleged links to Rwandan political dissidents. Rwandan military intelligence has
extensively cooperated with the members of the Group, including the current Coordinator, in the
conduct of such investigations. Following the publication of the 2011 final report (S/2011/738), the
GoR did not refute any of the Group's conclusions regarding the FDLR. Furthermore, the GoR is
aware that the Group of Experts has cooperated with the German Public Prosecutor's office in the
trials of senior FDLR leadership, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni. The Coordinator
conducted an official visit to Berlin within this framework at the end of May 2012.
93. Nevertheless, the GoR has gone so far as to even fabricate false testimony against the Coordinator
from former FDLR officers. On 12 September 2012, at the MONUSCO DDRRR camp in Goma, the
Coordinator interviewed, in the presence of other UN officials, an ex-FDLR officer who provided
detailed accounts of numerous meetings with Steve Hege dating back to 2007 and most recently in
November 2011. The ex-combatant claimed that Steve Hege had given the FDLR weapons and
instructed it to blow up bridges in Rwanda. When confronted with the identity of the Coordinator, the
individual eventually revealed that since early July 2012, several representatives of the Rwandan
Presidency had called him nearly every other day for a period of two months preparing the story about
the Coordinator which he was to recount during a press conference after returning to Rwanda. Upon
his repatriation, MONUSCO informed the GoR regarding the manipulation of this former FDLR
officer.
94. Despite these attacks, several other organizations, investigative journalists, as well as Member
States, including those of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have conducted
their own independent inquiries and confirmed the Group's main findings that the GoR has violated
the arms embargo through its support to M23 and other armed groups in the DRC. Even intelligence
officers from several neighbouring countries to Rwanda have expressed informally to the Group their
full support for the accuracy and rigour of the conclusions contained in the Addendum. As such, the
Group intends to continue conducting investigations from its usual objective approach, applying the
same laborious methodological standards already endorsed and supported by the Committee.
Annex 4
GoR response to the Addendum to the interim report of the Group of
Experts (S/2012/348.Add.1).
The complete GoR rebuttal can be accessed at:
http://www.minaffet.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/minaffet/doc/Rwanda%27s%20Response.pdf
__________________
42
Paragraph
5
Paragraph 41 "Rwanda's Response to the Allegations Contained in the Addendum to the UN Group of Experts Interim Report" 27 July
2012, (hereinafter "GoR rebuttal").
6
William Wallis, "Congo casts a pall over progress," The Financial Times, 24 September 2012, available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a2ffad5a-034b-11e2-a284-00144feabdc0.html
7
Paragraph 3, GoR rebuttal.
8
Paragraph 2, S/2012/348/Add.1
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